From Awareness to Presence: A Comprehensive Philippine Maritime Strategy
By Karl Garcia
Executive Summary
The Philippine Navy’s modernization is outpacing its shore infrastructure, creating an operational gap that threatens readiness, sovereignty, and fiscal discipline. Simultaneously, the nation faces a strategic challenge: converting legal rights and maritime domain awareness into sustained, credible presence. The solution requires integrating three elements: (1) a tiered basing and access strategy combining sovereign bases, modular infrastructure, and controlled commercial access; (2) innovative platforms that enable persistent presence without overt militarization; and (3) institutional frameworks that align security, economic, and environmental objectives. Implemented correctly, this approach enables immediate operational support while preserving long-term strategic independence under fiscal constraints.
The Strategic Context: Beyond Awareness
In his recent State of the Nation Address, President Ferdinand “PBBM” Marcos Jr. emphasized the critical importance of Maritime Domain Awareness (MDA)—a timely affirmation of the Philippines’ identity as an archipelagic and maritime nation. Yet awareness alone is insufficient.
The South China Sea remains one of the world’s most complex maritime theaters. The Nine-Dash Line intrudes deep into Philippine Exclusive Economic Zones, directly contradicting UNCLOS principles. Power asymmetry forces smaller claimant states to navigate complex dynamics, balancing international law, diplomacy, and selective partnerships to offset China’s material and coercive advantages.
The central dilemma: How can the Philippines convert legal rights and maritime awareness into sustained, credible presence and long-term strategic advantage?
The answer lies not in choosing between military presence or diplomatic engagement, but in building a comprehensive strategy that integrates infrastructure, innovative platforms, and governance reform.
Part I: The Basing Infrastructure Challenge
The False Binary That’s Holding Us Back
Philippine naval policy discussions often get trapped in an unproductive debate: Should we rent commercial port space or build our own bases? This framing misses the point entirely.
Renting isn’t cheaper—it’s just deferred cost. Recurring port fees eventually cannibalize modernization funds. Meanwhile, ownership without proper sequencing is unrealistic given budget constraints and the urgency of operational needs.
The real question isn’t rent versus own. It’s: How do we build operational sovereignty incrementally while maintaining readiness today?
Strategic Coherence: Connecting Geography to Security
An effective basing strategy must connect three critical elements:
- Basing geography → operational response times – Where you position assets determines how quickly you can respond to threats
- Infrastructure lag → fiscal and sovereignty risk – Delays in building proper facilities force expensive temporary solutions and create dependencies
- Port access policy → national security doctrine – Who controls your ports shapes your strategic autonomy
Most Philippine Navy discussions stay tactical—debating pier lengths and berthing capacity. What’s needed is strategic thinking that remains concrete without becoming abstract.
The Subic Question: Geography, Not Nostalgia
Subic Bay deserves special attention, not because of its historical legacy, but because of its strategic geometry:
| Factor | Subic Bay | Cavite (Sangley/Fort San Felipe) |
|---|---|---|
| Water depth | Deep, future-proof | Constrained |
| Expansion space | High | Severely limited |
| Civilian conflict | Low | Very high |
| Wartime survivability | Better | Poor |
| Strategic role | Fleet & sustainment | Training, admin, legacy |
Cavite cannot remain the fleet center, regardless of sentimental attachment. The geography simply doesn’t support modern naval operations at scale.
Subic isn’t a magical solution—but it is a Tier 1 anchor around which a distributed strategy can be built.
Forward Operating Bases: Persistence, Not Permanence
The archipelagic nature of Philippine territory demands forward presence. But these Forward Operating Bases shouldn’t try to replicate Subic-scale facilities.
Their core function is persistence, not permanence: refueling, rearming, ISR support, maritime domain awareness, and Marine littoral operations. Designed around modular infrastructure, each FOB can scale incrementally as threat conditions and funding allow.
Think of them as operational nodes, not static fortresses. This approach operationalizes archipelagic defense by enabling distributed maritime operations without waiting for fixed-base completion.
Part II: The Sierra Madre Dilemma and Alternative Solutions
The Limits of Symbolic Presence
The BRP Sierra Madre, intentionally grounded on Second Thomas Shoal in 1999, remains a powerful symbol of Philippine resolve. As a commissioned naval vessel, it continues to underpin Manila’s legal and sovereign claim under UNCLOS. However, its deteriorating condition raises serious operational, humanitarian, and strategic concerns:
- Escalating Chinese Coast Guard harassment during Philippine resupply missions
- The physical degradation of the ship and risks to personnel
- Arguments for enhanced presence to support deterrence and sustain logistics
Proposals to replace the Sierra Madre with a permanent Forward Operating Base highlight the need for sustained presence, yet a fixed military base also carries escalation risks, legal complications, and high lifecycle costs—prompting the need for alternative approaches.
Marine-Multifunctional-Modular-Mobile (M4) Platforms: A Strategic Alternative
An emerging and underexplored option lies in Marine-Multifunctional-Modular-Mobile (M4) platforms—flexible, civilian-oriented systems that blur the line between security, sustainability, and development. These platforms can integrate:
1. Renewable Energy Generation
Wind, solar, wave, and tidal systems combined with onboard storage
2. Aquaculture and Blue Economy Applications
Co-locating fisheries, food production, and research with offshore platforms
3. Coastal and Maritime Protection
Serving as breakwaters or buffer structures while supporting surveillance and logistics
4. Desalination and Water Treatment
Providing freshwater support for maritime operations and nearby communities
5. Tourism, Research, and Civil Presence
Reinforcing sovereign presence through continuous civilian and scientific activity
Crucially, M4 platforms offer persistent presence without overt militarization, aligning well with UNCLOS norms and reducing escalation risks. They operationalize the distinction between maritime boundaries (legal lines) and maritime frontiers (zones of actual presence and administration)—a concept emphasized by LCDR Arnold Enriquez, PN (Ret.).
Strategic Advantages of M4 Integration
M4 platforms complement traditional naval infrastructure by:
- Demonstrating effective administration – The ICJ’s Pedra Branca case established that sovereignty derives from demonstrable acts of administration, not historical assertions alone
- Sustaining civilian presence – Continuous occupation strengthens legal claims under UNCLOS Article 60 and customary international law
- Creating economic justification – Blue economy activities provide fiscal sustainability for platforms that also serve security functions
- Reducing escalation risk – Civilian-primary platforms are harder to characterize as military provocations
- Enabling strategic flexibility – Mobile platforms can be repositioned as circumstances change
Part III: A Comprehensive Three-Tier Framework
The path forward integrates traditional basing, modular infrastructure, and innovative platforms:
Tier 1: Sovereign Fleet Base (Subic)
- Deep-water fleet sustainment
- Shipyard and maintenance
- Long-term strategic anchor
- Power projection capability
Tier 2: Forward Operating Bases (Dispersed)
- Maritime domain awareness
- Rapid response capability
- Modular, scalable infrastructure
- Integration with Coast Guard operations
Tier 3: M4 Platform Network (Offshore)
- Persistent civilian-military presence
- Blue economy integration (aquaculture, energy, research)
- Mobile and reconfigurable
- UNCLOS-compliant sovereignty reinforcement
- Environmental monitoring and protection
Tier 4: Controlled Commercial Access
- Routine logistics support
- Training and administrative functions
- Clear security protocols and agreements
- Temporary measure, not strategic dependency
Part IV: Implementation Challenges and Institutional Reform
The Hidden Risk: Inter-Agency Friction
Infrastructure delays aren’t just about money or technical capacity. They’re often rooted in inter-agency friction:
- Local government units versus Department of National Defense (zoning, reclamation, airports)
- Philippine Ports Authority versus Philippine Navy (port control)
- Civil Aviation Authority versus Navy (Sangley conflicts)
- Public-Private Partnership laws not designed for military modularity
Framing these delays as structural rather than incompetence matters politically. It points toward governance reforms, not just budget increases.
Critical Implementation Requirements
Regulatory Alignment
Harmonizing maritime, environmental, energy, and security regulations while incentivizing private participation in M4 platforms
Technological Readiness
Leveraging advanced materials, autonomous systems, and digital monitoring for both fixed bases and mobile platforms
Economic Viability
Developing innovative PPP models and conducting full lifecycle cost analyses that account for dual-use benefits
Environmental Safeguards
Measuring impacts, protecting marine ecosystems, and quantifying ecosystem services—particularly for M4 deployments
Stakeholder Engagement
Ensuring buy-in from local communities, fishing industries, energy sectors, and regional partners
What Must Be Avoided
Clarity about what not to do is just as important:
❌ Turning temporary leases into permanent dependence – Short-term port solutions become long-term strategic traps
❌ Allowing recurring fees to cannibalize modernization – Operational costs shouldn’t consume capital budgets
❌ Hosting sensitive systems in ports with unclear ownership – Security requires unambiguous control
❌ Designing FOBs as static targets – Survivability demands flexibility and mobility
❌ Deploying M4 platforms without civilian integration – Security-only platforms lose UNCLOS protection and economic sustainability
Part V: Learning From Regional Approaches
Expert Perspectives on South China Sea Management
Prof. Pankaj Jha (2020) advocates for robust ASEAN-led Code of Conduct, trilateral engagements, Standard Operating Procedures, and a South China Sea-specific Treaty of Amity and Cooperation.
Mark J. Valencia questions sustained ASEAN unity against China, advocating pragmatic arrangements that acknowledge Chinese interests while preserving regional stability.
Bill Hayton argues for ICJ dispute resolution, drawing on the Malaysia–Singapore Pedra Branca case where sovereignty was determined by demonstrable acts of administration.
LCDR Arnold Enriquez, PN (Ret.) emphasizes the distinction between maritime boundaries (legal lines) and maritime frontiers (zones of effective presence), noting that the Philippines–Indonesia maritime boundary agreement illustrates how disciplined diplomacy produces durable outcomes.
The Philippine Advantage
The Philippines can synthesize these approaches through a unique strategy that:
- Maintains legal primacy (2016 Arbitral Award)
- Builds effective administration (M4 platforms, FOBs)
- Pursues selective partnerships (U.S., Japan, Australia)
- Develops economic integration (blue economy, energy)
- Strengthens regional diplomacy (ASEAN, bilateral agreements)
Conclusion: From Awareness to Strategic Advantage
The Philippines’ maritime challenge is no longer one of awareness alone, but of sustained, credible, and lawful presence. This requires moving beyond false binaries—rent versus own, military versus civilian, awareness versus presence—to embrace integrated solutions.
The strategic framework:
- Sovereign basing that provides fleet sustainment and power projection (Subic)
- Distributed FOBs that enable rapid response and domain awareness
- M4 platforms that sustain presence through civilian-military integration
- Institutional reform that removes friction between security and development agencies
- International partnerships that amplify capability without compromising sovereignty
Sovereignty is operational control, not land titles alone. It’s demonstrated through continuous presence, effective administration, and the integration of security with economic and environmental objectives.
The modernization of the Philippine Navy is already happening. The question is whether strategic infrastructure—both traditional and innovative—will keep pace, or become the limiting factor that turns new ships and legal victories into symbols rather than operational advantages.
By integrating legal strategy, diplomatic engagement, modular basing, and innovative platforms, the Philippines can advance a more resilient maritime posture—one that reinforces sovereignty, supports environmental stewardship, and contributes to long-term regional stability in the South China Sea.
This isn’t choosing between awareness and action. It’s converting awareness into sustained strategic advantage.
The Society of Honor by Joe America 
The Philippines’ maritime challenge is no longer one of awareness alone. It is a challenge of sustained, credible, and lawful presence.
For more than a decade, policy discussions have been trapped in false binaries: rent versus own, military versus civilian, awareness versus presence. These distinctions obscure the real issue. Maritime sovereignty in the 21st century is not secured by single platforms or isolated agencies, but by integrated systems that translate awareness into continuous operational control.
From Awareness to Presence: A Strategic Framework
A credible Philippine maritime posture rests on five mutually reinforcing pillars:
Sovereign basing
Strategic hubs such as Subic are not merely real estate assets; they are the backbone of fleet sustainment, logistics, training, and power projection. Without deep, secure basing, ships remain tactically impressive but strategically constrained.
Distributed Forward Operating Bases (FOBs)
Smaller, networked facilities across the archipelago enable rapid response, maritime domain awareness, and persistence in contested waters. Distribution reduces vulnerability while extending reach—critical in an archipelagic battlespace.
M4 platforms (multi-mission, multi-agency, modular)
Presence does not always require gray hulls. Platforms that integrate civilian and military functions—law enforcement, logistics, environmental monitoring, disaster response—allow the state to maintain continuous, lawful presence while reducing escalation risks.
Institutional reform
The greatest friction in Philippine maritime strategy is not technological, but bureaucratic. Overlapping mandates between security, development, environmental, and infrastructure agencies dilute effectiveness. Reform must align incentives, planning cycles, and authorities across government.
International partnerships without sovereignty dilution
Partnerships should amplify capability—through interoperability, access, training, and financing—without substituting for national control. Sovereignty is weakened not by cooperation, but by dependence without agency.
Sovereignty as an Operational Reality
Sovereignty is not defined by land titles, press releases, or legal victories alone. It is operational control exercised daily—through continuous presence, effective administration, and the integration of security, economic activity, and environmental stewardship.
The modernization of the Philippine Navy is already underway. New ships, sensors, and legal tools are entering service. But without corresponding investment in strategic infrastructure—both traditional bases and innovative platforms—these gains risk becoming symbolic rather than decisive.
Ships without sustainment are transient. Law without presence is aspirational.
The Strategic Inflection Point
By integrating legal strategy, diplomatic engagement, modular basing, and innovative civilian-military platforms, the Philippines can move beyond episodic responses toward a resilient maritime posture—one that reinforces sovereignty, protects marine ecosystems, supports economic activity, and contributes to long-term regional stability in the South China Sea.
This is not a choice between awareness and action.
It is the conversion of awareness into sustained strategic advantage.
Subic was a happy accident.
The activation and subsequent operation of a naval operating base Subic is in line with the Navy’s scaled-up maritime operations to support the needed base services of the deep draft vessels such as Jose Rizal class frigates, Del Pilar class patrol ships and Tarlac class landing docks, the Navy said in a statement.
“We have been buying capital ships but we don’t have a place to park them. They’re at South Harbor, squatting there. But recently, the Navy got the northern part of Hanjin. The Navy is happy because they have a place of their own where they can park their capital ships,” Defense Secretary Delfin Lorenzana said at the Philippine Navy anniversary last Friday. Capital ships are the Navy’s most important warships and are generally larger compared to other members of a fleet.
https://newsinfo.inquirer.net/1602734/navy-makes-strategic-move-to-subic-shipyard-facing-wps
Philippine Navy Use of Commercial Ports: Interim Reality, Structural Constraint
The Philippine Navy (PN) is already operating under a hybrid basing model, relying on leased and shared commercial port facilities to sustain a rapidly expanding fleet. While functional in the short term, this arrangement exposes deeper institutional and infrastructure gaps that constrain naval power projection.
Naval Operating Base Subic (NOBS):
Since May 2022, the PN has leased approximately 100 hectares of the former Hanjin Heavy Industries shipyard—now operated as Agila Subic—at an estimated cost of ₱1.1 billion annually.
Operational Value:
The site’s deep-water port, extensive quay length, and industrial footprint allow the PN to berth its largest surface combatants, making it the most capable naval staging area currently available.
Structural Limitation:
Despite its scale, Subic remains commercially owned and contractually leased, limiting:
security control,
long-term infrastructure investment,
integration of classified systems,
and assured access during crises.
In effect, Subic functions as a strategic enabler without sovereign permanence.
Modernization Mismatch:
The PN is acquiring more hulls faster than it is acquiring bases, dry docks, and MRO capacity.
Current Stopgaps:
Several PN vessels remain informally berthed in Manila South Harbor, a situation Defense Secretary Gilberto Teodoro Jr. has bluntly described as ships “squatting” in commercial ports.
Core Issue:
This is not a funding problem—it is an infrastructure sequencing failure, where platforms arrive before sustainment ecosystems.
PPA Constraints:
PN vessels operating from Philippine Ports Authority (PPA) facilities often lack automatic priority access, sometimes waiting up to 48 hours for berthing clearance.
Strategic Risk:
In peacetime this causes inefficiency; in crisis, it becomes a command-and-control liability.
Legislative Signals:
Senators have begun pressing both the PPA and private port operators to institutionalize priority access for naval vessels, highlighting the absence of a clear civil–military port doctrine.
This reflects a whole-of-government coordination gap, not mere bureaucratic delay.
Temporary by Design:
PN leadership has consistently stated that Subic is a transitional solution, not an endpoint.
Planned Developments:
New permanent naval bases, including one in Misamis Oriental
Acquisition of floating dry docks
Gradual establishment of organic MRO capability
Strategic Objective:
Reduce long-term reliance on commercial shipyards and leased ports while restoring sovereign control over fleet sustainment.
Strategic Bottom Line
The Philippine Navy is already doing what many analysts merely propose: leveraging commercial infrastructure to compensate for state undercapacity. However:
Leasing ports ≠ owning basing
Access ≠ assured availability
Berthing ≠ sustainment
Presence ≠ endurance
Until permanent naval bases, dockyards, and logistics hubs are built in parallel with fleet expansion, the PN’s modernization risks becoming platform-heavy but infrastructure-light.
Mahatao Forward Operating Base (FOB) — Philippines (2025)
Overview
The Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP), through its Northern Luzon Command (NOLCOM), established a new Forward Operating Base in Mahatao, Batan Island, Batanes Province on August 28, 2025. This military installation marks a significant enhancement of the Philippines’ northern defense posture.
Location
📍 Mahatao, Batan Island — the northernmost major island of the Philippines, situated in the Luzon Strait, a strategic waterway between Luzon and Taiwan.
Purpose & Strategic Roles
Territorial Defense
Strengthens the defense of the Philippines’ northern frontier and sovereign territory against external threats.
Maritime Domain Awareness
Enhances surveillance and monitoring of activities in the Luzon Strait, one of the Indo-Pacific’s most critical maritime chokepoints.
Humanitarian Assistance & Disaster Response (HADR)
Provides rapid response capability for emergencies, typhoons, and other disasters affecting Batanes and surrounding waters.
Logistics & Operations Hub
Supports AFP units operating in the northern Philippines by serving as a forward staging and sustainment point.
Facilities
Available imagery and official reporting indicate the base includes:
Helipads
Small dock and boat launch ramp
Support infrastructure for operations and logistics
These facilities enable both maritime and aerial operations in the Luzon Strait region.
Personnel & Units
The base hosts AFP elements, particularly from the Philippine Navy and Philippine Marine Corps, including units such as Marine Battalion Landing Team-10 (MBLT-10) under Northern Luzon Command.
Geostrategic Importance
The base’s proximity to Taiwan—only a few hundred kilometers to the north—makes it a key site for observing and responding to regional security developments, especially amid heightened military activity in the surrounding region.
It reflects a strategic shift toward greater deterrence, forward presence, and sustained operational reach in the northern approaches of the Philippines.
While not formally designated as part of the Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement (EDCA), the base complements broader cooperative security frameworks and enhances interoperability with allied and partner forces.
Local & Defense Leadership Perspective
AFP and NOLCOM leadership have emphasized the base’s role in strengthening territorial security and improving disaster preparedness for Batanes, underscoring the government’s commitment to protecting national sovereignty and local communities.
The Philippine Navy (PN), in collaboration with allies such as the United States, is actively enhancing its maritime capabilities through the development and revitalization of strategic ports, particularly in and around Subic Bay. These locations serve as critical hubs for fleet expansion, logistics, joint exercises, and operations in the West Philippine Sea (South China Sea). Rather than relying solely on leased facilities, the PN emphasizes reoccupying and modernizing former sites—including sections of the former U.S. Naval Base at Subic Bay—through domestic initiatives and international agreements like the Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement (EDCA). While specific lease arrangements remain classified, U.S. support frequently includes infrastructure upgrades and prepositioning of equipment for mutual defense purposes. Key Locations and Activities
Subic Bay
Naval Station Jose Andrada (Manila)
Naval Operating Base Subic (NOB Subic)
Sangley Point (Cavite)
Strategic Significance
Maritime Security
Expansion and Modernization
International Cooperation
Summary
The Philippine Navy is actively revitalizing strategic ports such as Subic Bay, moving beyond mere leasing arrangements to build a modern, credible naval force. This effort aligns with broader U.S.-Philippine initiatives to strengthen deterrence in the Indo-Pacific, though it contributes to heightened geopolitical tensions with China. Late-2025 updates indicate accelerated timelines, with U.S. facilities expected to become operational by 2026 amid ongoing modernization and joint activities.
Yes — beyond Mahatao Forward Operating Base in Batanes, Philippine and allied planning points to additional forward operating positions and base developments in both the Luzon Strait / northern approaches and the West Philippine Sea (WPS). Here’s a structured picture of what’s lined up as of late 2025:
🛡️ 1. Mahatao FOB — Luzon Strait (Operational)
Established August 2025 on Batan Island to enhance surveillance, maritime awareness, territorial defense, and humanitarian response in the Luzon Strait region. �
Wikipedia
📍 2. Planned / Emerging Sites in the Luzon Strait Area
Joint Philippines–U.S. Operational Access & Expansion
Philippine and U.S. military officers have surveyed Mahatao for joint defense operations, indicating this site could be developed further for allied interoperability and shared missions in the northern maritime corridor. �
Naval News
Forward Positions via Exercises
During Balikatan and other cooperative activities, U.S. Marine units practise expeditionary advanced base operations (EABO), which simulate the dispersal of mobile fire and sensor elements across island chains like Batanes and Northern Luzon. These are not fixed bases but generate forward-capable operating positions that contribute to deterrence and rapid response. �
Army Recognition
🌊 3. West Philippine Sea & South China Sea Forward Posts
Naval Detachment Oyster Bay (Palawan)
Plans are underway to enhance this facility to support manned and unmanned surface vessel operations that observe and patrol contested waters in the West Philippine Sea. Broader infrastructure upgrades are expected to turn this into a more robust maritime domain awareness outpost. �
Army Recognition
Naval Stations & Expanded Bases
Philippine Navy expansion includes preparing or activating a series of additional naval stations and bases stretching across the archipelago — including Subic Bay, Mindanao, and multiple West Philippine Sea-facing points — to support patrols, logistics, and sustainment operations. �
Naval News
Balabac and WPS Nodes
The AFP is accelerating upgrades at Balabac Island in southern Palawan to support enhanced naval presence close to contested features, tying into broader maritime defense posture in the western maritime frontier. �
Defense News
📘 Strategic Framework & Concepts Underpinning These Sites
Comprehensive Archipelagic Defense Concept (CADC)
The CADC calls for distributed defense positions that cover both the West Philippine Sea and Northern maritime approaches, aligning basing and force posture with the Philippines’ 200-mile EEZ and key strategic chokepoints. �
SunStar Publishing Inc.
Naval & Air Dispersal Strategy
Philippine Navy and allied planning increasingly emphasizes dispersed forward operating locations, not just large fixed bases — especially in the South China Sea and Luzon Strait — to improve responsiveness, resilience, and domain awareness.
📌 Summary of Notable Forward Sites & Plans (2025)
Region
Site / Concept
Status
Luzon Strait
Mahatao FOB (Batanes)
Operational �
Wikipedia
Luzon Strait
Joint PH-US operational access at Mahatao
Assessed / Developing �
Naval News
Northern Luzon
Exercise-driven dispersed advance nodes
Operational concept / exercised �
Pacom
West Philippine Sea
Naval Detachment Oyster Bay (Palawan)
Upgrading / Support facility �
Army Recognition
WPS Peripheral Bases
Balabac Island
Upgrading / strategic node �
Defense News
Multiple locations
Bases & naval stations (Subic, Mindanao, others)
Planned / in development �
Naval News