When Power Stops Pretending
By Karl Garcia
The world did not abandon the rules-based order overnight.
It watched the strongest state in the system stop pretending it was bound by it.
Long before talk of Venezuela, Panama, or Greenland, the signal was sent to America’s closest allies—and then to its strategic partners.
Canada, the United States’ most reliable neighbor, was hit with tariffs justified on “national security” grounds. The European Union was publicly labeled a trade adversary. NATO allies were treated less as commitments than as liabilities. Long-standing partnerships were reframed as bad deals that required renegotiation under pressure.
Then came India’s disappointment.
India was not an adversary. It was being courted as a strategic counterweight to China, elevated through the “Indo-Pacific” framework, defense cooperation, and diplomatic symbolism. Yet it, too, faced punitive tariffs, the withdrawal of trade preferences, and transactional bargaining that ignored partnership rhetoric.
For New Delhi, the lesson was unmistakable: strategic alignment did not confer economic protection. Shared values, regional cooperation, and long-term convergence mattered less than immediate leverage.
This was not erratic behavior. It was a pattern.
Trump’s approach stripped away the diplomatic etiquette that once softened power politics. Alliances, partnerships, and institutions were no longer treated as stabilizing goods, but as instruments—useful only insofar as they delivered measurable, short-term advantage.
When the United States invoked national security to impose tariffs on Canada, Europe, and later India, it quietly hollowed out one of the postwar system’s core assumptions: that rules would bind friends differently than rivals. Once that line was crossed, every state learned the same lesson—rules apply until they don’t.
That logic reappeared in the withdrawal from the Iran nuclear deal. Agreements became reversible. Enforcement flowed not from collective legitimacy but from dominance over financial networks, currencies, and chokepoints. Iran was punished, but the precedent was global.
Seen together—Canada, the EU, India, Iran, Venezuela, Panama, Greenland—this is not chaos. It is power without pretense.
And the world adapted.
Europe spoke of “strategic autonomy.” India accelerated self-reliance through Atmanirbhar Bharat. Canada diversified trade. Middle powers hedged. Institutions absorbed the shock and continued operating, but with diminished authority.
This adaptation is the future.
Once the leading power demonstrates that rules are conditional—even among allies and partners—the system shifts permanently. Cooperation becomes transactional. Trust becomes provisional. Neutrality becomes fragile. The value of being “right” declines; the value of being prepared rises.
For middle powers, this is the central strategic lesson. If Canada, Europe, and India can be pressured despite alignment, no treaty language offers automatic shelter. Security now rests less on affiliations and more on national capacity—economic resilience, institutional competence, technological depth, and social cohesion.
So when today’s rhetoric sounds blunt, revisionist, or unsettling, the real mistake is to treat it as an anomaly.
It is a revelation.
The rules still exist. The institutions still meet. But the expectation of restraint—especially by the powerful—has eroded. What replaces it is not anarchy, but hierarchy openly acknowledged.
The future taking shape will not be decided by who invokes the rules most eloquently, but by who can absorb shocks, adapt quickly, and act independently when the rules fail.
Power has stopped pretending.
The rest of the world has already begun adjusting.
The Society of Honor by Joe America 
Donald Trump’s interest in annexing Greenland stems from strategic, economic, and geopolitical calculations rather than traditional imperial ambition. Greenland occupies a crucial position in the Arctic, sitting between North America, Europe, and Russia. As melting ice opens new sea lanes and increases military activity in the region, control over Greenland enhances U.S. early-warning systems, missile defense, and power projection. The United States already operates a major military base there, underscoring its long-standing security interest.
Beyond military value, Greenland is rich in untapped natural resources, including rare earth minerals vital for modern technologies and defense industries. Reducing dependence on China for these materials aligns with Trump’s broader emphasis on economic and strategic self-reliance. Greenland’s location also gives it potential importance in future Arctic shipping routes, which could reshape global trade.
Trump framed the idea in blunt, transactional terms—treating Greenland as a strategic asset that could be acquired—reflecting his business-oriented worldview. While the proposal was rejected by Denmark and Greenland and clashed with modern norms of sovereignty, it highlighted a deeper reality: great-power competition in the Arctic is intensifying. Trump’s comments made visible a U.S. strategic interest in Greenland that has existed quietly for decades.
All of these reasons are rationalizations later applied to the original reason why Trump wanted Greenland, which was that he was sick of Americans in Puerto Rico who happened to be moreno skinned after Hurricane Maria (apparently they did not thank him enough) and wanted to exchange Puerto Rico for Greenland, which he thinks is a “White, blonde-haired, blue-eyed” land. I guess he had never been to Greenland, hah-hah (I have). I think too many people (not us obviously, hehe) put too much rationalization into the ramblings of a crazy man propped up by a die-hard core base and the apathy of the majority.
The truth has always been that Trump has no plan and just operates on whim. Which is what happened in Venezuela where a bad hombre (Maduro) was extracted, allegedly with Russian and Chinese acquiescence, leaving… the rest of the Maduro regime in place. The whole “plan” of which is already falling apart.
The apathetic are starting to wake up and some die-hards are losing faith. We Americans thought in 2020 a restoration was good enough. Clearly what is needed is a reformation, not a restoration. Reformations and remakings of which the US have undergone plenty of times. Until then, let’s just hope damage can be minimized.
In every madman there is a pupprt master.
In PH, what do those Senators or Congressmen know about the budget may less then five (hyperbole and sarcasm) really know so the culprits must be from DBM or anyone who is a pupet master.
Both elected and unelected representatives are extensions of the will of some people and the apathy of many others. The cousins resentment and entitlement are powerful emotions that cloud judgement even in areas of personal benefit. Sadly, personal suffering is ultimately the only true antidote. For both Americans and Filipinos who routinely choose bad leaders.
That’s the rub.
The Philippines can be considered a functional equivalent of Greenland in the Indo-Pacific, even though it is far smaller in land area. What matters in geopolitics is not size, but location and strategic effect. Like Greenland in the Arctic, the Philippines sits at a critical crossroads that shapes military movement, trade routes, and great-power competition.
Geographically, the Philippines anchors the First Island Chain, positioned between the Pacific Ocean and the South China Sea. This makes it pivotal for controlling access to key sea lanes through which a large share of global trade and energy flows. Just as Greenland enables early warning and power projection in the Arctic, the Philippines enables maritime surveillance, forward basing, and deterrence in East and Southeast Asia—particularly in relation to China’s naval expansion.
From a security standpoint, U.S. and allied access to Philippine bases strengthens regional balance, similar to how U.S. presence in Greenland strengthens NATO’s northern flank. Both territories serve as strategic sentinels rather than centers of economic power. The Philippines’ value lies in its ability to influence regional stability, not in resource extraction or territorial scale.
However, there are important differences. Greenland is sparsely populated and politically linked to Denmark, making it easier to frame as a strategic asset. The Philippines is a sovereign, densely populated nation with its own political agency, domestic constraints, and regional diplomacy. This makes its role more complex and more sensitive.
In sum, while the Philippines is not the Indo-Pacific’s Greenland in size or political status, it is comparable in strategic function. Both are geographic linchpins whose importance grows as great-power rivalry intensifies.
This is about potential opportunities the Philippines had.
Historically, PH had strategic advantages similar to Singapore:
A geographically strategic location for trade and shipping in Southeast Asia.
Natural resources and an educated English-speaking population.
Early exposure to Western-style governance and education.
The “could have” emphasizes that PH had the ingredients to become a regional economic hub like Singapore.
Example: In the 1960s, before the Marcos era, the Philippines had a per capita income comparable to South Korea and higher than Singapore, suggesting the potential for rapid growth.
This is about what might have happened under different circumstances.
Singapore’s path shows that with effective governance, anti-corruption measures, and long-term planning, rapid development is possible.
The Philippines “would have” been able to industrialize, reduce poverty, and develop world-class infrastructure if institutions were strong and governance effective.
The focus here is more structural: policies, leadership, stability, and investment in human capital determine whether potential turns into reality.
Example: Singapore under Lee Kuan Yew systematically invested in education, infrastructure, and clean governance. The Philippines had periods where similar policies could have been implemented but were undermined by corruption or political instability.
This is more normative: what the Philippines ought to have done given its resources and position.
It emphasizes missed lessons and opportunities—not just external factors.
The “should have” reflects a moral-economic critique: the country had enough to succeed but failed to implement necessary reforms.
Example: PH should have strengthened rule of law, invested in industrialization, improved logistics and port infrastructure, and controlled political patronage systems—things that Singapore prioritized and did consistently.
The Philippines occupies a unique position in Southeast Asia that sometimes earns it the label of a “middle power.” Middle powers are countries that, while not global superpowers, exert regional influence through diplomacy, strategic alliances, and soft power. The Philippines possesses some of these traits: its strategic location in the heart of Southeast Asia, its role in regional security, a globally recognized diaspora, and cultural influence give it leverage beyond its size. It maintains strong ties with major powers such as the United States, Japan, and Australia, and actively participates in ASEAN and other multilateral forums.
Yet the Philippines also faces significant constraints. Its military capabilities and economic capacity are modest compared to other aspirational middle powers. Governance challenges, infrastructure gaps, and uneven development limit its ability to fully project influence. Often, its reliance on external powers in matters of security and economics underscores these limitations.
For Filipinos, this duality invites both pride and introspection. There is reason to celebrate resilience, cultural influence, and international presence; yet there is also a need for critical self-assessment and reforms that would allow the country to fulfill its potential. The Philippines can be seen as a middle power in aspiration, with the tools to rise—but it must invest strategically in governance, defense, and economic capacity to truly step into that role.
In short, the country deserves recognition for what it has achieved, but it must also confront the obstacles that prevent it from fully realizing its potential. Pride and self-critique are not contradictory—they are complementary steps toward becoming the middle power it could be.
Happy Three Kings! This is the last big official holiday over here in Bavaria, and today the ruling party here have their annual Three Kings meet-up, which is a mix of a rant against political rivals and what corporate people call an annual kick-off meeting. It is also the day when the 12 days of Christmas end, and the day in Bavarian folklore when the Rauhnächte or “raw nights” of mid-winter end and St. Nicholas, symbol of order, wins against the Krampusses, symbols of disorder.
Power making the rules may well have started with Pharaohs being the arbiters of who got water and land in ancient Egypt. Other elites calling out power so rules are considered fair started among others with Jewish prophets and Greek philosophers.
As for international rules, in medieval Europe you had the Pope as the arbiter, which is why Italian political families contended to have their nepo babies in that position – or the French capturing the Papacy and installing an own Pope in Avignon, always better if you make the rules haha.
Then you had Protestantism break the Pope’s supremacy, with the 30 years war and its end, the Treaty of Westphalia, creating the idea of national sovereignty. One could also say it was the first sit-down after a mob war if one is cynically inclined.
The next “sit-down” was the Metternichian order after Napoleon was defeated. It kept the peace pretty well until a rising power that felt it had not just to be great again but felt like a victim of especially the French challenged that order. I am talking about Imperial Germany.
The first attempt by Woodrow Wilson to form a new global order under the League of Nations failed as we all know. The UN office in Geneva is the old Palais de Nations of that era. The UN and the order formed after WW2 was more stable but has been shaking in recent decades.
We know that the USA does not recognize the ICC, and China does not recognize UNCLOS. Though the USA did invoke NATO Article 5 to get European assistance in the GWOT, I recall. Europe itself relied a bit too much on rules only good if really followed – even within itself.
Well, not it is not just the US but also Russia and China who want to be great again. Europe is no longer as great as before but wants to be less dependent now. India is a topic for itself. Regional powers like Turkey and Indonesia, maybe even Nigeria, round off the big picture.
No idea what comes next, as history never repeats itself, but rhymes, as Mark Twain once said. There is about as little consensus on international rules now as in a Philippine street basketball game were both sides can’t agree if someone was “charging” or “travelling”. And are shouting.
Happy Three Kings Irineo!
Charging o travelling still equals to turnover. Foul nga lang yung isa.
off topic
https://tribune.net.ph/2026/01/02/why-we-need-a-skyway-for-cyclists-and-e-bikesnow
https://www.abs-cbn.com/news/nation/2026/1/6/chinese-activities-in-the-west-ph-sea-seen-to-continue-in-2026-navy-spox-1547
https://edition.cnn.com/2026/01/05/world/analysis-trump-venezuela-greenland-nato-intl-latam
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2026/jan/06/stephen-miller-donald-trump-threats-take-over-greenland
The end of NATO?
https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2026/1/6/danish-pm-says-us-attack-on-greenland-would-be-the-end-of-nato
NATO has to become European Defense Organization or EDO. NATO is dead without the US, which was always the lead nation. Germany, France, and the UK need to get along, and take over.
Yes , Joe, exactly.
https://news.un.org/en/story/2026/01/1166705
https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/rights-groups-say-least-25-dead-iran-protests-2026-01-06/
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2025%E2%80%932026_Iranian_protests?wprov=sfla1
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Failed_proposals_for_the_purchase_of_Greenland_by_the_United_States?wprov=sfla1
https://odi.org/en/insights/trumps-monroe-doctrine-beijings-next-move/
Lool who is talking, not saying that what the US is right but coming from the master of Grey-zone, what a laugh.
https://www.upstreamonline.com/politics/china-says-us-action-on-venezuela-violates-international-law/2-1-1922857?zephr_sso_ott=0bu6PG
That is amusing. Well, both nations are now liars and thugs so I just shrug at the comedy of it all.
We should all get used to shrugging.