Power Over Rules: Navigating a Fragmented World
By Karl Garcia
The global order has not collapsed—but it has quietly mutated into something far more ambiguous and, in many ways, more dangerous. Institutions still exist: the United Nations, World Trade Organization, International Monetary Fund, climate regimes, security alliances, development banks, and multilateral forums. Summits are held, communiqués issued, resolutions passed, and treaties preserved. Yet these structures increasingly fail to determine outcomes.
Power—material, technological, demographic, informational, and coercive—has reasserted primacy over process. This is not a temporary disruption or cyclical crisis. It is a structural transformation in how the world actually works.
For nearly eight decades after World War II, the international system rested on a central wager: that institutions could tame power politics. Rules would constrain behavior, norms would socialize states, and collective mechanisms would penalize transgression. Liberal internationalism assumed that predictability would replace raw competition.
That wager is now visibly fraying. Great powers bypass formal mechanisms in favor of deterrence, gray-zone operations, economic coercion, cyber pressure, and selective enforcement. Trade disputes are settled through subsidies, sanctions, industrial policy, and export controls—not adjudication. Climate agreements rely on voluntary pledges with no binding penalties. Security guarantees are hedged, conditional, or transactional.
As strategist George Friedman bluntly observes, states act first and calculate risk second; institutions follow power rather than constrain it. Institutions still matter—but as tools, not referees. They legitimize outcomes already shaped by force, leverage, and capability. When power aligns with rules, institutions function. When it does not, rules bend—or are ignored.
Why Rules Erode
This shift is not accidental. It is well-documented across international relations, political economy, and strategic studies.
Realists from Thucydides to John Mearsheimer argue that in an anarchic system, survival and dominance override norms. Kenneth Waltz shows that structure—not intent—drives state behavior. Hedley Bull warned that international society rests on fragile consensus, not enforceable law.
Political economy deepens the diagnosis. Daron Acemoglu and James Robinson demonstrate how institutions decay when captured by elites. Joseph Stiglitz exposes how global economic rules systematically favor advanced economies, hollowing out legitimacy elsewhere. Dani Rodrik’s trilemma shows that globalization, democracy, and sovereignty cannot be maximized simultaneously. Karl Polanyi reminds us that unrestrained markets provoke social and political backlash.
Civilizational and systems thinkers sharpen the stakes. Jared Diamond links collapse to ecological stress and elite miscalculation. Vaclav Smil emphasizes material constraints—energy, food, logistics—that underwrite all power. Niall Ferguson notes that institutions rarely fail suddenly; they decay through slow loss of coherence and confidence.
The conclusion converges: institutions are not self-sustaining. They require power, legitimacy, competence, and adaptability. Remove any one, and rules become ornamental.
Why We Forgot This: Liberal Amnesia
The belief that rules could substitute for power did not arise from theory alone. It emerged from an unusually forgiving historical moment.
After 1945, American material dominance, allied reconstruction, and institutional design aligned so tightly that enforcement became invisible. Power worked so reliably through institutions that many mistook the mechanism for the cause. What was in fact a historically contingent alignment of power, legitimacy, and capacity was recast as a universal and permanent condition.
This produced a form of liberal amnesia. Because institutions delivered stability, they were assumed to be self-sustaining. Because rules were obeyed, they were believed to be binding. Because enforcement was rarely contested, it faded from view.
Over time, bureaucratic insulation deepened the illusion. Legalism replaced strategy. Process substituted for preparation. Moral language masked asymmetry. Institutions became ends in themselves rather than instruments of power. When enforcement grew costly or politically inconvenient, it was deferred—yet expectations of compliance remained.
Today’s disorder feels shocking only to those raised within this postwar consensus. But it is not aberrational. It is structural reversion. When power disperses, institutions lose coherence. When enforcement weakens, rules become aspirational.
Power Before Rules: A Historical Reminder
This pattern is not new. For most of history, power announced itself openly—through conquest, spectacle, and coercion. Rules followed force, not the other way around.
In antiquity, authority fused violence, religion, and hierarchy. Egyptian pharaohs ruled as gods. Assyrian reliefs depicted terror as policy. Rome perfected law, but law followed conquest.
In medieval worlds, power fragmented. Authority was personal and sacred. Loyalty mattered more than legality; violence enforced order. Institutions existed, but none consistently constrained sovereigns.
Early modern empires globalized raw power. Trade followed cannon. Law followed flags. Chartered companies wielded private armies. Slavery and extraction were not deviations—they were systemically embedded.
Industrialization amplified this logic. States mobilized entire societies for total war. Bureaucracy merged with violence. Rules emerged—but largely among victors.
The post-1945 order briefly obscured this truth by aligning power with rules. As that alignment weakens, history reasserts itself—not as repetition, but as rhyme.
Middle Powers in a Fractured World
For middle powers such as the Philippines, this transformation is not theoretical. They are rule-takers in a rule-breaking world. Climate exposure, demographic pressure, maritime disputes, supply-chain vulnerability, and external economic shocks converge simultaneously.
Alignment alone is insufficient. Treaties do not move ships, feed populations, stabilize grids, or restore trust during crises. The strategic question becomes brutally practical: how much shock can the system absorb?
Can food systems withstand trade disruption?
Can energy grids survive price spikes or sabotage?
Can maritime territory be defended without catastrophic escalation?
Can institutions maintain legitimacy during disaster, inflation, or conflict?
Fragmented governance amplifies fragility. Disciplined administration, redundancy, long-term planning, and public investment build resilience. Social trust becomes a strategic asset. Competence matters more than rhetoric.
Power, Institutions, and the Road Ahead
The era when institutions could substitute for national capacity is over. Power mediates outcomes. Institutions follow capability. Resilience—not alignment, not ideology—defines strategic advantage.
History is unforgiving toward societies that mistake rules for protection. Those that invested early in state capacity, social cohesion, infrastructure, and foresight tend to adapt. Those that outsourced security, planning, and competence to abstract systems often discover—too late—that rules without power are suggestions.
History does not punish cynicism; it punishes illusion. Those who mistake rules for protection discover, in moments of stress, that written commitments do not move ships, stabilize currencies, feed populations, or deter coercion. Power does. Institutions endure only when anchored to capacity, legitimacy, and resolve. When those erode, rules become petitions.
The coming era will not reward moral certainty or procedural faith. It will favor societies that prepare for shock, invest in competence, and understand the world as it is—not as it wishes it to be. In such a world, resilience is not merely a policy choice. It is the boundary between adaptation and irrelevance.
The Society of Honor by Joe America 
A very powerful statement of our current situation. The Philippines is a chip, not a player, because the nation has no power and little competence. This article is a wake-up call.
Nice essay, Karl. Now it is time for a beer….I’d recommend Red Horse. It has a nice kick. Cheers!
Cheers!
It is a troubling essay, Karl.
“History does not punish cynicism; it punishes illusion.” – Karl G.
The Philippine Constitution declares: “Sovereignty resides in the people and all government authority emanates from them.”
An illusion per your essay, right? Is the entire Constitution an illusion?
A Constitution is only as alive as it is actually implemented in practice.
I know this is very Kantian categorical imperative thinking but let’s face it.
Even the preamble which contains “just and humane society” does not reflect reality.
It is a bit like the nice Bible verses many Filipinos have on their social media profiles.
Split-level Constitutionality, a bit like the split-level Christianity defined by Jaime Bulatao, SJ.
Ultimately if the people do not vote for good-faith leaders and then proceed to hold those leaders accountable, a constitution is just an aspirational piece of paper. The Russian, PRC, and even the North Korean constitutions likewise define extensive and clear rights and responsibilities, even if reality is the complete opposite.
Americans don’t have great track records in election turnout; American elections usually hover between 60-65% participation rate and are won on the margins. At the surface level one would think that a country such as the Philippines with election turnout regularly shooting past 80% would be a much better run country, so clearly high voter participation is not the singular answer either.
As I was taught back in the day by the Servites in a criticism of non-denominationism which glorifies the text, the only reality is the reality which is practiced.
“A Constitution is only as alive as it is actually implemented in practice.” – Irineo
So true, even here in the US. Just look at how Trump blatantly violates the Emoluments Clause in the US Constitution. Past presidents took great care not to even give the appearance of financially benefiting from being president.
Trump shamelessly threw the Clause at us Americans and guess what? We let him get away with it!
Every now and then I see Pinoys suggest that the solution to a problem in the Philippines is to place a law in the Constitution. I like to remind them of essentially what Irineo says above.
Constitution: Living Document or Illusion?
A constitution is often called a “living document,” but its vitality depends entirely on practice, not words. A law on paper has no power unless society, institutions, and leaders respect it. Rule makers can break it, rule takers can suffer from it, and power often bends around it. As Irineo once said, “A Constitution is only as alive as it is actually implemented in practice.”
Consider the United States. The Emoluments Clause is clear: presidents must not profit from foreign governments. Yet, Donald Trump’s blatant disregard for this clause illustrates that even the most established constitutional systems can falter when enforcement is weak and the public does not insist on accountability. The law existed, but its power was hollow without societal pressure.
The Philippines offers a similar lesson. Many suggest that placing laws or provisions into the Constitution will solve deep problems. But history shows that implementation is key. Sovereignty may lie in the people, but if citizens and institutions do not actively enforce constitutional limits, the document remains an illusion—a beautiful text with little practical effect.
Ultimately, a constitution is only truly “living” when the people, empowered by its principles, hold rulers accountable. Otherwise, it is no more than a symbolic promise. Words without action are powerless.
Here’s a clear breakdown of how Donald Trump’s actions were widely discussed in relation to these emoluments clauses:
1. Foreign Emoluments Clause (Art. I, § 9)
What it says: No federal officeholder may accept gifts, payments, or titles from foreign governments without Congress’s consent.
Trump-related issues:
Trump owned businesses (hotels, golf courses, and real estate) that foreign governments patronized while he was president.
Examples: Foreign diplomats staying at Trump hotels in Washington, D.C., or renting properties for events.
Critics argued that these payments could create a conflict of interest, because foreign governments might try to influence U.S. policy by spending money at his properties.
Lawsuits were filed claiming that Trump violated the clause, but courts struggled with standing, and some cases were dismissed or ongoing when his term ended.
2. Domestic Emoluments Clause (Art. II, § 1)
What it says: The President may not receive any additional compensation or benefits from the U.S. federal or state governments beyond their official salary.
Trump-related issues:
Trump’s properties were sometimes used by federal agencies or state entities, e.g., government officials holding conferences at Trump properties.
Critics argued this created indirect payments to the president from government funds, potentially violating the domestic emoluments clause.
Again, the legal outcome was complicated by questions of standing (who has the right to sue) and the clause’s precise scope.
3. Ineligibility Clause (Art. I, § 6)
What it says: Members of Congress cannot be appointed to offices where the emoluments of that office were increased during their term.
Trump-related issues:
This clause is less directly relevant to Trump since it concerns members of Congress moving into executive positions, not the president’s conduct.
Bottom line:
The main legal controversy centered on the foreign and domestic emoluments clauses. Trump did not formally receive approval from Congress for foreign payments, and his businesses profiting from governments while he was president raised legal and ethical concerns. Courts never definitively ruled on all claims while he was in office, so much of the debate was around potential violation and conflicts of interest, rather than a formal conviction.
Thanks for this on the Emoluments Clause in the US Constitution. Some years ago one of my favorite national news anchors was Peter Jennings. He was originally a Canadian who became a naturalized American citizen. He proudly carried a copy of the US Constitution in one of his pockets all the time, AND he was very very familiar with its contents.
Here is a brief report on him:
>>According to the information available, Peter Jennings was a prominent, Canadian-born journalist who served as the sole anchor of ABC World News Tonight from 1983 until his death.2 He fit the description you provided in several ways:
His commitment to the document was so well known that during the dedication of the National Constitution Center in 2003, Justice Antonin Scalia reportedly told him, “Not bad for a Canadian,” to which Jennings whispered back that he had just become an American citizen.8
It is fascinating to imagine how a journalist of Peter Jennings’ era and temperament would interpret today’s political landscape. While we can’t know his exact thoughts, we can look at his lifelong commitment to the Constitution and his documented journalistic philosophy to get a very good idea.
His Commitment to the Document
For Jennings, the Constitution wasn’t just a prop; it was the “user manual” for his adopted country. He carried it because he believed that citizenship was an active, informed duty. When he became a U.S. citizen in 2003, he did so with a deep, almost “convert’s” zeal for the American experiment.
Based on his career, here is how he likely would have approached the issues you (CV) mentioned:
A Different Era of News
Jennings belonged to the “Big Three” era (alongside Tom Brokaw and Dan Rather) where the anchor’s job was to be the “arbiter of facts.” He often expressed concern about the “narrowing” of news—where people only listen to viewpoints they already agree with.
He would likely be most distressed by the erosion of shared truth. In his view, the Constitution only works if the people understand it and the press holds the powerful to it. If he were here today, he would probably be less concerned with the “politics” of Trump and more concerned with the precedent being set—that the “user manual” he carried in his pocket was being treated as optional.<<