The Society of Honor by Joe America

By Karl Garcia

The Philippines is once again confronted with a familiar question: should we acquire an aircraft carrier? At first glance, it seems appealing—prestige, visibility, and the aura of great‑power status. But history, regional experience, and strategic reality point to a different conclusion.

Aircraft carriers are symbols, not solutions, for an archipelagic country facing daily gray‑zone pressure, disasters, and resource theft.

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The Carrier Trap: Symbol vs. System

Aircraft carriers demand not just ships, but escorts, air wings, logistics, maintenance infrastructure, and sustained budgets. Brazil’s carrier proved financially unsustainable. Thailand’s carrier became largely ceremonial. Even ASEAN states exploring carriers view them as niche, dual‑use assets, not war‑winning platforms.

China, by contrast, operates carriers as part of a massive, integrated system designed for power projection. For the Philippines to acquire even a second‑hand carrier would be to confuse symbolic parity with strategic effectiveness.

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Salami Tactics: The Threat We Actually Face

The Philippines is not facing an imminent amphibious invasion. It faces salami tactics—incremental, gray‑zone actions that change facts on the water without triggering open war:

• Persistent coast guard and militia presence
• Gradual exclusion of Filipino fishers
• Harassment and normalization of intrusions

A carrier does little against this. What’s needed are persistent, everyday capabilities that deny normalization and impose costs quietly.

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The Porcupine Strategy: Make Coercion Painful

This is where the Porcupine Strategy applies. The goal is not to defeat a great power at sea, but to make coercion costly, uncertain, and unattractive.

A Philippine porcupine does not bristle with prestige platforms. It bristles with:

• Offshore Patrol Vessels and Fast Attack Missile Craft
• Mobile anti‑ship missiles
• Drones, radars, and maritime patrol aircraft
• Submarines and naval mines

Each “quill” is modest alone. Together, they impose disproportionate risk.

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Naval Mines: Shaping the Battlespace

Naval mines are often dismissed as outdated or escalatory. In reality, they are one of the most cost‑effective tools in a porcupine arsenal—not as a stop‑gap for submarines, but as a permanent layer of sea denial.

In an archipelago of narrow straits and predictable approaches—Bashi Channel, Verde Island Passage, key West Philippine Sea approaches—defensive minefields:

• Channel hostile movement
• Raise uncertainty and clearance costs
• Operate continuously without constant presence

Mines shape the terrain. Submarines exploit it. One does not replace the other.

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The Cabbage Strategy: How Pressure Is Applied

China’s cabbage strategy—layering civilian, coast guard, and naval forces around a contested feature—has proven effective precisely because it avoids escalation.

The Philippine response must mirror this logic defensively:

• Coast Guard presence first
• Navy and Air Force as overwatch
• Legal, diplomatic, and information layers reinforcing the physical ones

This layered response requires numbers, persistence, and integration—not a single, high‑value asset.

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National Resilience Framework: Security That Serves Citizens

The smarter path lies in a National Resilience Framework—a distributed system that serves both defense and civilian needs:

• OPVs and fast attack craft for daily sovereignty patrols
• Helicopters and C‑130s for disaster response and mobility
• Maritime domain awareness networks integrating radars, drones, satellites, and AIS
• Submarines and naval mines for credible, quiet deterrence

These assets deliver value every day, not just in wartime.

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Conclusion: The Right Kind of Strength

The Philippines does not need to look powerful. It needs to be hard to coerce.

Aircraft carriers invite symbolic comparison and catastrophic loss. Porcupine forces impose constant friction. Against salami tactics and cabbage encirclement, resilience beats prestige.

Strategic focus—not spectacle—will protect Philippine waters, livelihoods, and sovereignty. The future of maritime defense is not a floating symbol, but a layered, stubborn, and citizen‑serving system.

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