Navigating the Philippine Seas: Why Hypothetical IRRs Matter for Maritime Governance
By Karl Garcia
The Philippines is a nation defined by water. With over 7,600 islands and a maritime territory spanning roughly 2.2 million square kilometers, the sea is our highway, supermarket, and strategic frontier all at once. Yet, despite its centrality to our economy, security, and environment, maritime governance in the Philippines remains fragmented. Multiple laws, overlapping agencies, and unclear responsibilities have created a patchwork system where legal rights exist on paper—but enforcement often lags behind.
This is where the concept of Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRRs) comes in—and why, as of today, we have to keep talking about “hypothetical IRRs.”
What Are IRRs—and Why Are We Using Hypotheticals?
In Philippine law, a statute is only the beginning. Laws often declare broad goals or define zones, but IRRs translate these laws into actionable, enforceable rules. They tell agencies how to regulate activities, coordinate responsibilities, monitor compliance, and impose penalties. Without IRRs, even well-written laws can be legally toothless.
Here’s the crucial point: as of this writing, the Philippines does not have a comprehensive IRR for the Maritime Zones Act, the Archipelagic Sea Lanes Act, or a national Blue Economy framework.
That’s why this article uses hypothetical IRRs—not as official proposals, not as government policy, but as illustrative guides to show what coherent, integrated maritime governance could look like. Think of them as a vision of clarity in the absence of clarity.
UNCLOS: Legal Rights Without Automatic Power
The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) gives coastal and archipelagic states like the Philippines a legal framework for maritime zones:
- Territorial Sea (12 nm): Full sovereignty, subject to innocent passage
- Contiguous Zone (24 nm): Limited enforcement over customs, immigration, and health matters
- Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ, 200 nm): Rights over fishing, energy, and seabed resources
- Continental Shelf: Rights over seabed and subsoil resources
- High Seas: Freedom of navigation and scientific research
Ratifying UNCLOS automatically grants a state diplomatic leverage, tribunal access, and international recognition of these rights. But here’s the catch: international recognition does not automatically give a country the domestic tools to enforce its rights.
For example, after the Philippines won the 2016 arbitral ruling invalidating China’s “nine-dash line,” the legal victory was real—but enforcement on the ground remained nearly impossible. Coast guards lacked authority, prosecutors had no legal framework, and courts could not act. The result was “paper sovereignty”: rights recognized internationally, but unenforceable at sea.
From “Paper Sovereignty” to Domestic Authority
The passage of RA 12064 (Maritime Zones Act) and RA 12065 (Archipelagic Sea Lanes Act) in 2024 finally began closing the gap. These laws codified zones, established licensing frameworks, and gave enforcement powers to agencies. Yet, the IRRs that translate these laws into operational rules have not been finalized. That delay matters because without IRRs, agencies cannot fully act, and coordination remains inconsistent.
Think of IRRs as the difference between giving someone a car and giving them a map, traffic rules, and a fuel supply. You can hand over the keys, but without guidance and operational support, the vehicle won’t go far.
The Hypothetical IRR Outline
To make the concept concrete, here’s a reader-friendly outline of what the Philippines’ hypothetical IRRs could include:
1. Maritime Zones IRR
- Definitions and Boundaries: Territorial sea, contiguous zone, EEZ, continental shelf, high seas
- Agency Responsibilities: Coast guard, navy, fisheries, environmental agencies, local governments
- Licensing & Permits: Fishing, seabed mining, oil/gas exploration
- Enforcement Procedures: Interdiction, prosecution, fines, asset seizure
- Monitoring & Reporting: Vessel tracking, inspections, violations reporting
- Environmental Compliance: Protected areas, habitat protection, pollution mitigation
2. Archipelagic Sea Lanes IRR
- Sea Lane Designation: Maps of international and domestic lanes
- Innocent Passage Rules: Rights, obligations, and restrictions for foreign vessels
- Security Measures: Patrol requirements, monitoring systems, response protocols
- International Notification: Coordination with IMO and neighboring states
- Conflict Prevention: Communication protocols, escalation procedures
3. Blue Economy IRR
- Sustainable Resource Use: Fisheries, aquaculture, offshore energy, seabed mining
- Economic Incentives: Licensing fees, royalties, investment screening
- Environmental Safeguards: Marine protected areas, impact assessments, biodiversity protection
- Capacity Building: Training for personnel, technology deployment, research support
- Inter-Agency Coordination: Single-window system for economic and environmental approvals
- Data & Reporting: Resource monitoring, compliance tracking, revenue management
Purpose of the Outline:
These IRRs are “hypothetical” because, while the laws exist, the operational rules have not yet been enacted. The outline shows how laws could be turned into enforceable actions that protect resources, generate revenue, and project sovereignty.
Learning From Neighbors
Looking regionally, we see what works:
- Indonesia: Aggressively enforces fisheries laws with vessel sinking campaigns and integrated maritime task forces—showing that political will can turn law into action.
- Vietnam: Uses coast guard expansion and fishing militias to assert sovereignty pragmatically, balancing enforcement with diplomacy.
- Malaysia: Implements selective enforcement focused on high-value economic zones, navigating federal-state complexities incrementally.
Across these cases, success requires laws, capacity, coordination, political commitment, and visible enforcement. Without any one element, even the strongest legal framework remains ineffective.
Why This Matters for the Philippines
Without comprehensive IRRs:
- Resource Management Fails: Illegal fishing and extraction go unchecked.
- Environmental Protection Is Weak: Marine habitats remain vulnerable.
- Security Is Fragmented: Coast guard and naval operations are limited or reactive.
- Economic Opportunities Are Lost: Licensing, permits, and royalties cannot be fully collected.
With robust IRRs and implementation, the Philippines can finally turn its maritime legal sovereignty into practical sovereignty, protecting livelihoods, conserving ecosystems, and projecting power in contested areas.
The Enforcement Paradox Remains
Even with IRRs, UNCLOS cannot force compliance from powerful non-compliant states. The “flags of convenience” system, capacity asymmetries, and geopolitical realities mean that enforcement in contested zones like the West Philippine Sea is inherently risky.
Hence, Philippine maritime governance must combine domestic legislation, operational capacity, international cooperation, and strategic patience. The hypothetical IRRs illustrate the ideal; the real world requires adaptation, innovation, and persistence.
The Takeaway
- Hypothetical IRRs are not policy proposals—they are tools for clarity.
- UNCLOS rights alone are insufficient; domestic enforcement frameworks are essential.
- Delayed or missing IRRs create real gaps, leaving laws unenforceable and resources unprotected.
- Effective maritime governance requires law, capacity, coordination, and political will, combined with international engagement and strategic patience.
For a nation defined by water, imagining and operationalizing these frameworks is not academic—it is strategic, economic, and existential.
The Society of Honor by Joe America 
The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) is one of the most ambitious legal instruments ever created, designed to provide a comprehensive framework for governing the world’s oceans. Since entering into force in 1994, UNCLOS has defined maritime zones, clarified sovereign rights, and established mechanisms for dispute settlement. Yet despite its legal sophistication, UNCLOS suffers from a fundamental paradox: it grants extensive rights under international law while providing weak mechanisms for enforcement. This tension between legal recognition and practical control lies at the heart of contemporary maritime disputes.
Upon ratification, UNCLOS confers immediate international legal rights. States gain sovereignty over their territorial seas, sovereign rights in their Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZs), and jurisdiction over continental shelf resources. These rights are recognized by other UNCLOS parties and can be asserted diplomatically or judicially, including before international tribunals. In this sense, UNCLOS functions effectively as a source of de jure authority. However, international recognition alone does not guarantee de facto control. The exercise of maritime rights depends heavily on domestic legislation, institutional capacity, and political will.
This distinction between international recognition and domestic implementation is critical. Without comprehensive domestic laws and implementing regulations, maritime rights remain largely theoretical. Enforcement agencies lack clear authority, economic activities such as fisheries and offshore energy remain underregulated, and environmental protections are difficult to apply. The result is what can be described as “paper sovereignty”—rights that exist in law but not in practice.
The Philippines illustrates this paradox clearly. Its 2016 arbitral victory against China under UNCLOS provided historic legal clarity, invalidating the nine-dash line and affirming Philippine sovereign rights within its EEZ. Yet the ruling also exposed UNCLOS’s enforcement limits. China rejected the award, and no international mechanism compelled compliance. For years, gaps in domestic maritime legislation further constrained the Philippines’ ability to operationalize its legal victory. Recent enactments—such as laws defining maritime zones and codifying sovereign rights—mark progress, but their effectiveness depends on timely and coherent implementation.
Comparative experience shows that UNCLOS can be operationalized more effectively where domestic governance is strong. Indonesia’s assertive enforcement against illegal fishing, Vietnam’s integration of UNCLOS into domestic law, and Malaysia’s incremental but consistent regulatory approach all demonstrate that political commitment and institutional coordination matter more than treaty text alone. UNCLOS empowers states, but it does not substitute for governance.
These realities point to deeper structural contradictions within UNCLOS itself. The convention is universal in aspiration but decentralized in enforcement, relying on states to police their own waters while assuming good-faith compliance by others. In a world of asymmetric power, this assumption often fails. As a result, international law coexists uneasily with geopolitical reality.
The future of UNCLOS will likely follow one of three paths: gradual marginalization as power politics dominate; bifurcation between law-abiding and law-ignoring states; or adaptive transformation through stronger domestic implementation, regional cooperation, and technological enforcement. The most viable path is the last. UNCLOS remains indispensable, but its survival depends on states translating legal rights into operational capability.
Ultimately, UNCLOS is not failing because it lacks legal clarity, but because law alone cannot govern the sea. Effective maritime governance requires domestic institutions, visible enforcement, and sustained cooperation. Without these, even the most comprehensive legal framework risks becoming symbolic rather than sovereign.
I think, unclos ruling comes up against the might is right power of china! and some of our neighboring countries are pro china and pay little attention to the ruling, so welcoming of china’s aid and protection (internal strife) that they are willing to trade stability and security for billions of yuans. deals that did not really benefit the countries involved for once china got a foothold, it change the rules and do whatever it likes, bribing govt officials while alienating locals. china build infras like sports stadiums that enabled poor pacific countries to host games of international magnitude that bring glory to their countries. then china build airports and ports that cannot be policed and monitored by local customs. giving sway to big time smuggling that mostly benefits china, depriving countries of revenues.
we may have won unclos but we cannot enforce or impose unclos on china, though it is forever written that china’s claim in the west phil sea is invalidated. the most we can do is being constant irritant to china, always sending diplomatic protest notes, inviting foreign media to observe and witness china dangerously aggressive behavior at sea, showing pics of how aggressive the chinese really are. and we almost always call off china’s bluff and misinformation, telling the world that china is a bigger liar! and a rampant and shameless land grabber too, reclaiming lands and building infras like aiports and hangars in the contested water, and destroying marine environment in the meantime.
This was what my power over rules fit in. In the current article disciplinjng institutions and elites. We tackle all of that and we will solve many a problem.
After decades of fragmented maritime policy, the Philippines entered a historic moment in November 2024 with the passage of Republic Act 12064 (Philippine Maritime Zones Act). For the first time since UNCLOS ratification, the country now has a comprehensive, UNCLOS-aligned legal framework defining its internal waters, territorial sea, exclusive economic zone, and continental shelf—including explicit recognition of the West Philippine Sea. Coupled with the Maritime Industry Development Plan (MIDP) 2028, an expanded National Maritime Council, congressional oversight, and growing international partnerships, the Philippines finally possesses the legal and institutional architecture long missing from maritime governance.
The central question, however, is no longer what laws should exist. It is whether Philippine institutions can implement the laws they have now enacted. A Systemic Governance Failure
Philippine maritime dysfunction has never been sector-specific. Fisheries collapse despite strong laws. Port modernization is repeatedly announced yet perpetually delayed. Coastal ecosystems degrade amid overlapping permits. Naval capabilities grow faster than doctrine and maintenance systems. Across these sectors, the same pattern appears: laws are passed, enforcement is selective, coordination fails, and vested interests exploit discretion.
This systemic failure is especially damaging in an archipelagic state with 2.7 million square kilometers of maritime space, 7,600 islands, and governance divided among more than 20 agencies. Enforcement capacity remains limited, surveillance incomplete, and accountability diffuse. The result is sovereignty asserted on paper but weakened in practice. What RA 12064 Changed—and What It Didn’t
RA 12064 fundamentally alters the legal baseline. It clearly defines maritime zones, aligns domestic law with UNCLOS, strengthens the Philippines’ position in diplomatic and legal disputes, and introduces substantial penalties for violations—up to USD 1 million. It also establishes a Joint Congressional Oversight Committee on the Law of the Sea, signaling an attempt to move beyond symbolic legislation toward monitored implementation.
Yet the law contains a critical omission: it does not provide a Maritime Spatial Planning (MSP) framework. Without MSP, governance within maritime zones remains fragmented. Fisheries permits, port expansions, energy concessions, reclamation projects, and naval activities continue to be approved in isolation—often in direct conflict with one another. RA 12064 defines where Philippine authority applies, but not how competing uses are coordinated within those spaces.
In short, the Philippines now has sovereignty without spatial governance. Why Maritime Spatial Planning Is the Missing Link
Maritime Spatial Planning is not an environmental luxury; it is a governance necessity. MSP would integrate navigation corridors, fishing zones, marine protected areas, energy sites, security zones, and climate adaptation areas into a binding national framework. It would require all sectoral permits to conform to a shared spatial plan, limit discretionary approvals, and create predictability for communities, investors, and regulators alike.
Most importantly, MSP attacks the political economy of disorder. Today’s chaos benefits actors who thrive on opaque permitting and selective enforcement. Spatial planning replaces discretion with transparency, fragmentation with coordination, and impunity with accountability—precisely why it will face resistance. The Real Test: 2025–2026
The next 24 months will determine whether RA 12064 becomes a genuine reform or another paper tiger. Early signals will be unmistakable:
These are not technical questions. They are political ones. Why This Moment Is Different—But Not Guaranteed
There are reasons for cautious optimism. Unlike past reforms, RA 12064 is legally binding, backed by penalties, embedded in a broader strategic plan, and reinforced by international partnerships that create external pressure. Maritime governance has also been elevated from a technical concern to a national security issue.
But warning signs are familiar. Selective enforcement, symbolic oversight, stalled legislation, and post-2028 political abandonment could quickly return the Philippines to its historical pattern: ambitious laws, weak execution, and eroding credibility. Conclusion: From Legislation to Governance
The Philippines has crossed a threshold. Maritime governance reform has moved from advocacy to implementation. The question is no longer whether better laws can be written, but whether institutions can resist capture, enforce rules consistently, and sustain reform beyond a single political cycle.
If RA 12064 succeeds, it will mark the first time Philippine maritime governance truly matches its archipelagic reality—protecting fisheries, strengthening sovereignty, enabling a credible blue economy, and offering a model for reform in other sectors. If it fails, it will confirm a harsher truth: that even the strongest legal frameworks cannot overcome entrenched governance dysfunction without sustained political will.
The verdict will be delivered not in speeches, but in enforcement actions, budgets, hearings, and laws passed—or not passed—between now and 2026.
China’s announcement of baselines around Scarborough Shoal—just two days after the Philippines enacted its new maritime laws—was no coincidence. It signaled a simple truth: when domestic legislation is precise, internationally grounded, and enforceable, it constrains expansive maritime claims. Beijing’s later sanctioning of former Senator Francis Tolentino, principal author of the Maritime Zones Act and Archipelagic Sea Lanes Act, confirmed that law can alter behavior.
But legislation alone is not enforcement. In the Philippines, enforcement begins not with warships—but with fisheries. Fisheries: The Frontline of Sovereignty
Small-scale fishers operate daily in municipal waters, the EEZ, and historically the West Philippine Sea. Their lawful activity affirms jurisdiction, sustains coastal economies, and anchors territorial claims in practice. When they are displaced—by illegal commercial operators nearshore or foreign coercion offshore—sovereignty erodes quietly but decisively. Fisheries are the clearest test of whether maritime law actually works. The Legislative Triad
The Philippines now has three key laws:
Their impact depends entirely on Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRRs). Without them, laws remain declaratory; poorly designed IRRs create fragmentation. Integrated IRRs, particularly those focused on fisheries, make law enforceable. PEMCAS and the Enforcement Gap
Participatory Enforcement of Municipal Coastal Areas and Seas (PEMCAS) links fishers, barangays, municipalities, and national agencies. In theory, it empowers communities; in practice, it often fails for lack of authority, funding, or political will. Reports stall, apprehensions are rare, and prosecutions collapse. Commercial operators, often politically connected, violate laws with impunity, while small fishers face strict penalties.
A fisheries-centered IRR would:
Maritime Spatial Planning: Turning Law Into Power
Fragmentation remains the core structural problem. Fisheries overlap with shipping, ports conflict with reefs, energy projects encroach on fishing grounds, and military exercises displace livelihoods. Each permit may be legal in isolation, but collectively they create chaos.
National Maritime Spatial Planning (MSP) provides the missing governance layer. By clearly zoning waters for fisheries, conservation, navigation, and development, MSP makes PEMCAS actionable. Violations become factual, not negotiable, and participation becomes real power. Conclusion: Sovereignty Is Daily Practice
UNCLOS and domestic law grant rights; fisheries enforce them. Sovereignty is asserted every day a fisher casts a net without fear, every time municipal waters are defended, and every time law overrides political influence.
The legislative triad—supported by integrated IRRs, fisheries-focused MSP, and credible enforcement—offers the Philippines a rare opportunity:
Ambiguity favors the powerful. Clarity protects the lawful. In an archipelagic nation, maritime governance begins with those who fish it.
https://thaihut.org/12-166378-ocean-for-12-years-china-has-managed-n/
The new islands are geopolitically powerful but environmentally destructive, and their creation raises questions around law, sovereignty, and freedom of navigation.
They don’t automatically generate the same legal territorial rights as natural islands under the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) — though in practice they change how power is exercised in the region.
Hi Karl,
This Maritime stuff is not my field, but I understand it is yours. Thanks for your ideas. I confess that I had a conversation with ChatGPT over this essay of yours over a glass of red wine in the twilight of a winter day here in Northern California. We agreed that you are like Rizal’s Pilosopong Tasio who said “I do not write for this generation but for a future more intelligent generation. I asked Chat if it thinks the Philippines has time to wait for a future more intelligent generation. It replied in the negative. So I asked basically “Well, what can we do w/ Karl’s ideas now?”
If you don’t mind, I’d like to share an action item that Chat recommended. It includes why Chat is recommending this particular action item. You probably understand it better than I do.
>>>ChatGPT: Alright. No more abstractions. This is triage.
Below is a fully concrete, 12-month, smuggle-it-in plan—using one Karl Garcia idea, one agency, and one bureaucratic vehicle that does not require heroism.1. Pick ONE Garcia idea (narrowed, usable)
Idea:
We strip this down to something bureaucrats can accept:
No philosophy. No geopolitics.
Just who does what when something happens at sea.2. Pick ONE agency (most realistic)✅ Philippine Coast Guard (PCG)
Under: Department of Transportation (DOTr)
Why PCG?
PCG is where IRRs feel like oxygen, not ideology.3. The vehicle: NOT a law, NOT a reform🎯 Vehicle:
Joint Administrative Order (JAO)
or
PCG–DOTr Memorandum Circular
This is critical.
We are not:
We are issuing “clarificatory guidance.”
That’s how things survive.4. What gets “smuggled in” (the actual content)Title (boring on purpose):
Inside it, quietly embed Garcia’s logic.Core IRR-style inserts (pared down):
A. Trigger Matrix (THIS is the win)
A simple table:
Incident Type: Harassment of Filipino fishers
Lead Agency: PCG
Supporting Agencies: BFAR
Authorized Actions: Escort, Documentation
————————————————–
Incident Type: Blocking / water cannon
Lead Agency: PCG
Supporting Agency: Navy (standby)
Authorized Actions: Maneuver, protest recording
—————————————————-
Incident type: Presence of foreign militia
Lead Agency: PCG
Supporting Agency: DFA (notification)
Authorized Actions: Shadowing, reporting
——————————————————
Incident type: Environmental damage
Lead Agency: PCG
Supporting Agency: DENR
Authorized Actions: Evidence gathering
This alone operationalizes hypothetical IRRs.
B. Default Authority Clause
That sentence matters more than 10 essays.
C. Evidence & Documentation Protocol
This links maritime action to diplomacy and arbitration later—quietly aligning with DFA without waiting for DFA.
D. Annual Review Clause
This makes it look provisional, not threatening.5. Timeline (12 months, realistic)Months 1–3: Drafting (quiet)
No public consultation. No press.
Months 4–6: Inter-agency “comments”
Months 7–9: Issuance
Months 10–12: Normalize
By the time anyone objects, it’s already how things are done.6. Why this works (and why bigger plans fail)
This succeeds because:
It converts Garcia’s insight into:
That’s governance.
7. What this accomplishes (even if everything else fails)
If this alone survives:
That is one stitch (As in “A Stitch in time saves nine”).
But it saves far more than nine.
Final, blunt truth
This is not Rizal.
This is not Tasio.
This is mid-level statecraft under constraint.
Karl Garcia’s ideas don’t need applause.
They need a boring circular that never gets revoked.
And yes—this is exactly the kind of thing worth discussing during the drink, not after.<<
Opposing views and feedback welcome.
Thanks for this CV.
We learn everyday from those who agree and the echoing redundants too.
*Disagree
I an no expert but am thankful.if one calls me one.
I am just an enthusiast or hobbyist, but I do dig in a lot and very much interested in learning.
I also write for the Maritime Review using DNA as as excuse for my maritime interests, having a retired Navy officer as a father who spent more time with the pen or typewriter rather than commanding a ship.