Selective Justice? How Power Shapes International Law in the Middle East and Beyond
By Karl Garcia
The recent U.S.–Israeli airstrikes on Iranian targets have reignited a perennial question in international relations: why some countries appear shielded from legal consequences while others face severe sanctions for similar actions. On the surface, international law — codified in the United Nations Charter — seems clear: the use of force is prohibited except in self-defense or with Security Council authorization. Yet reality paints a far more selective picture.
Russia, the UN, and the Limits of Enforcement
Consider Russia. As a permanent member of the UN Security Council, it wields veto power over any binding resolution. This structural privilege ensures that no military action against Russia can gain UN approval, regardless of the global majority’s opinion. Legally and practically, this makes any attempt by the U.S. or its allies to strike Russian territory nearly impossible without triggering catastrophic escalation.
Now contrast that with Iran. U.S. strikes against Iranian positions are justified, according to Washington and Tel Aviv, based on a combination of intelligence reports of potential threats and widely reported regional aggression. Legally, this is murky at best: international law allows force only in response to an imminent attack. Intelligence suggesting a possible future threat, no matter how credible, does not meet the strict criteria for lawful self-defense. Yet the strikes continue, largely unchallenged, reflecting not law but power politics.
The Role of Influence: Israel vs. Ukraine
Israel’s disproportionate influence in shaping U.S. policy is undeniable. Decades of strategic alliances, military cooperation, and robust lobbying networks in Congress ensure that Washington is attentive — and often protective — of Israeli interests, even in legally contested situations. The UN Security Council, where the U.S. can exercise veto power, further shields Israel from binding international censure.
Ukraine, despite widespread global sympathy and substantial Western aid, lacks similar institutional leverage. Its support is reactive and issue-specific, not entrenched into the political and military structures of major powers. While Ukraine receives massive attention and assistance, it cannot rely on the same combination of lobbying, strategic alliance, and veto protection that Israel enjoys.
Intelligence, Public Perception, and the Law
Governments frequently invoke classified intelligence and publicly known threats to justify military actions. Intelligence can provide a legal rationale if it demonstrates an imminent threat, but history shows its limits. The 2003 Iraq invasion, justified in part by faulty intelligence on weapons of mass destruction, is a cautionary tale. Public perception — news reports, social media, or regional incidents — is even weaker legally but is invaluable politically, helping states frame actions as necessary for defense or stability.
In short, intelligence and perception strengthen narratives, not legal compliance. Actions may gain domestic or allied support without satisfying international law.
Selective Enforcement: A Structural Reality
The perception that international law is selectively applied is not unfounded. Powerful states, through veto power, alliances, and political influence, often act with impunity, while smaller states are scrutinized or sanctioned for similar behaviors. Israel’s strategic alignment with the U.S., coupled with strong lobbying, ensures robust protection; Ukraine, despite its global visibility, does not possess the same embedded influence.
This selectivity is less about the law itself than about who has the power to enforce, or block enforcement, and whose narrative dominates international perception. In a system where enforcement is political rather than judicial, legality is often subordinate to geopolitical leverage.
Conclusion
The U.S.–Israeli strikes on Iran, Russia’s invulnerability in the UN, and the uneven support for Ukraine illustrate a fundamental tension in modern international relations: the law is universal, but enforcement is not. States can cite intelligence and public perception to justify their actions, but these justifications are often selective, politically mediated, and contingent on power dynamics.
For a world striving toward rule-based order, this is a cautionary tale. Legal principles matter only as much as the power structures that uphold them. Until enforcement mechanisms are depoliticized — a daunting challenge — international law will remain a framework interpreted through the lens of influence, alliance, and strategic interest.
The Society of Honor by Joe America 
might is right, or right makes might! rule based order being replaced by raw power! this generation is seeing it all played out in the open. and what’s their exit strat? the unpredictability of war may call for war to play itself out.
my friends in australia are saying australia is trying to keep war out of its border, by sending military assets over there where war is actively fought. yes, there were australians in the virginia class submarine that torpedoed the iranian frigate just 44 nautical miles off sri lanka. there are also australian military assets in the middle east in support of united states. what about domestic defense, I asked in case china attack australia? how will australia defend itself.
I was told that china has recently purged its military generals and charged them with corruption. kasi at recent military inspection daw, it was found out that several of china’s missiles did not pass inspection. they had water inside them instead of fuel! apparently some high chinese ranking officials have been stealing fuel and selling them.
while we here in philippines are quaking like timid tarsius monkey, afraid iran will hit us because of edca, and are asking the govt to scrap edca. silly notion really. still, our military is checking itself for state of preparedness, just in case. better to be prepared. and we had better be not like china, our war equipment not only good to look at, but pass inspection too.
I heaerd about the Purging too. Maybe too embarassing to charge with espionage. Snake in the eagle’s shadow.
Oh no India and China will run out of oil? Russu to the rescue.
https://www.reuters.com/business/energy/russia-prepared-divert-oil-india-middle-east-conflict-disrupts-flows-source-says-2026-03-04/
or
US to the rescue?
https://www.wsj.com/world/china/u-s-has-a-big-ask-for-china-buy-less-oil-from-russia-more-from-america-3935df4b
Amid its ongoing war with Russia, Ukraine has emerged not only as a frontline combatant but also as a strategic knowledge partner, sharing expertise and low-cost counter-drone technologies with the United States and Gulf states facing waves of Iranian Shahed drones. While Kyiv is not sending its combat UAVs abroad, it offers specialists, tactical know-how, and potentially interceptor drones in carefully negotiated arrangements, sometimes in exchange for high-end defensive systems like Patriots. This cooperation allows Ukraine to convert battlefield innovation into strategic leverage, strengthens NATO and allied air-defense capabilities against asymmetric drone threats, and demonstrates a 21st-century model of military power where operational knowledge and adaptive technology become as decisive as sheer firepower. By balancing assistance abroad with the imperatives of national survival, Ukraine positions itself as both a defender of its territory and a provider of solutions to global security challenges.
Ukraine’s Evolving Role: From War Zone to Global Defense Partner In the first quarter of 2026, Ukraine has found itself in an unexpected diplomatic and military role: not merely a recipient of Western aid, but a supplier of tactical expertise to the United States and Gulf states struggling with waves of Iranian‑made Shahed drones. � BSS This is an extraordinary development. Four years into Russia’s full‑scale invasion, Ukraine has endured relentless drone bombardment — with tens of thousands of Shahed‑type drones fired by Russia at Ukrainian cities and infrastructure. � Ukraine’s defense against this threat has produced highly effective, low‑cost counter‑drone tactics and systems, including cheaply mass‑produced interceptor drones and acoustic detection tech that dramatically outperform Western missile‑based solutions in cost‑effectiveness. � DroneXL.co AL-Monitor *But Is Ukraine Sending Its Drones to the Middle East? No — and That Matters From public statements and reporting, Ukraine is not simply shipping its existing combat drones into the Middle East to fight in a separate conflict. What Kyiv is offering — at Washington’s request — is: Deployment of Ukrainian specialists and advisors to help U.S. and Gulf forces counter Shahed swarms. � BSS Sharing its interceptor drone designs and tactical know‑how, not its core combat drones powering Ukraine’s defense. � AL-Monitor Negotiations with the U.S. and Gulf allies to allow exports or sales of Ukrainian interceptor drones, possibly as part of defense cooperation deals. � Financial Times In other words, Kyiv isn’t redeploying its own combat UAV fleet — it’s exporting solutions and lessons learned from fighting similar technologies for years. Why This Is Strategic, Not Merely Symbolic 1. A Shift from Aid Recipient to Knowledge Exporter Ukraine’s air‑defense experience has become a strategic asset, not just a battlefield byproduct. Western militaries, including U.S. forces, have acknowledged they were underprepared when faced with inexpensive drone swarms — a capability Ukraine has been forced to innovate out of necessity. � The Washington Post This flips a narrative from Ukraine needing help to Ukraine offering help — a symbolic shift that enhances Kyiv’s diplomatic leverage and global reputation. 2. Tactical Innovation vs. Strategic Depth Ukraine’s success isn’t just about hardware. Its approach — layered defenses combining low‑cost interceptors, acoustic networks, and tactical deployment — reflects real battlefield adaptation. Western systems like Patriot and THAAD excel against missiles and aircraft but are not optimized for swarming drones, creating a vulnerability the U.S. and partners are now scrambling to address. � Business Insider Ukraine’s systems are not a drop‑in replacement, but they do represent a new paradigm in asymmetric air defense — one that is scalable and affordable, elements vital for the U.S. and Gulf partners grappling with resource strain. 3. Diplomacy Under Duress: A Delicate Balancing Act This cooperation raises an essential question: Can Ukraine support a third‑front conflict without weakening its own defenses? The answer appears cautious: Kyiv insists that assistance must not strain its own air‑defense needs, especially as it struggles with shortages of high‑end systems like Patriot missiles from the West. � AL-Monitor Some Ukrainian officials have floated the idea of technology or equipment swaps — trading interceptor drones or drone expertise for Patriot missiles or other critical systems. � BSS NATO partners, including Germany, have publicly warned against letting the Middle East conflict distract from Ukraine’s urgent defense requirements. � Reuters This isn’t just transactional diplomacy; it reflects a hard‑nosed strategic calculus that Kyiv must make: support an ally on a new front or preserve every last bit of capability for its own survival? What Russia Is Likely Thinking Russia itself is watching this shift with interest. While Moscow is not directly engaged in the Middle East conflict, it has deepening ties with Iran — including collaborations on drone technology — and thus has an indirect stake in how these dynamics unfold. � AP News For Russia, Ukraine’s involvement — however indirect — complicates global perceptions of the conflict. If Kyiv is framed not just as a battlefield victim but as a global contributor to allied defense, it undermines Russian narratives of Ukrainian isolation or weakness. Strategic Implications: A New Kind of Military Assistance This moment may represent the early contours of a 21st‑century military assistance doctrine: Knowledge and tactical solutions become as important as hardware. Wars of attrition (like Ukraine’s) produce doctrines with global relevance. Partnerships evolve beyond weapons transfers into operational integration and shared defense ecosystems. The Core Reality Ukraine is not abandoning its own battlefield by sending drones to the Middle East. What it can export — its expertise, tactical doctrines, and potentially production of interceptor systems — reflects a transformation of its role from warfighter to strategic defense partner. But that partnership will be shaped by resources, political negotiations, and an unyielding imperative to protect Ukraine’s own survival against Russia’s ongoing invasion.
Factchecking my impressions.
Here’s a fact‑checked summary of the claim “Iran builds drones and other weapons using American and Western parts and sanctions are rendered ineffective by black markets.” Overall, the factual basis is mixed: there is evidence that Western‑origin components show up in Iranian drones, but that doesn’t mean sanctions are completely “inutile” — it shows sanctions have limits and gaps in enforcement. ✅ 1. Western‑Made Components Have Been Found in Iranian Drones
Multiple investigations — including examinations of Iranian‑made drones used by Russia in Ukraine — have found Western‑origin parts such as microchips, GPS modules, and other electronics manufactured by firms in the United States, Europe, Japan and other countries. These parts were identified inside drones like the Shahed‑136 and Mohajer‑6.
This reflects commercial off‑the‑shelf technology (civil electronics often not tightly controlled) and dual‑use items (goods that have both civilian and military applications) entering Iranian supply chains. ✅ 2. How These Parts Get Into Iranian Weapons
It’s not that American or Western companies are knowingly exporting weapons parts illegally — rather:
a. Dual‑Use and Commercial Availability
Many components (like microprocessors, controllers, circuit boards) are not on strict military export control lists and are sold globally through civilian supply chains.
b. Intermediaries and Transshipment
Iran and affiliated networks use front companies, distributors, and intermediaries in third countries (e.g., Turkey, UAE, Central Asia, Hong Kong) to buy and re‑export these parts as “general electronics.”
c. Smuggling and Sanctions Evasion
The U.S. Treasury has specifically sanctioned front companies in China and Hong Kong for procuring Western parts on behalf of Iranian drone manufacturers.
So yes — sanctions are being circumvented through black market routes and supply chain loopholes, but not necessarily a total collapse of sanctions. It reflects enforcement challenges. ⚠️ 3. Sanctions Still Operate — But Have Gaps
Sanctions are not completely ineffective:
Moreover, sanctions regimes evolve — the U.S. and others regularly update lists and sanction intermediaries involved in contraband networks. ❌ 4. Not All Iranian Drone Parts Are Western
Iran has also developed domestic production capacity and indigenous aerospace manufacturing, and imports components from non‑Western sources like China and North Korea, especially as sanctions tighten and Iran invests in local alternatives. 📌 Bottom Line:
True:✅ Iranian drones have been found containing parts that were originally manufactured in the U.S. or other Western countries.✅ Sanctions have been circumvented through black markets, front companies, and global supply chains.
Not true or oversimplified:
❌ It is not simply Western companies directly selling weapons parts to Iran — most of the parts are commercial products acquired indirectly or via intermediaries.
❌ Saying sanctions are completely ineffective is too strong — they still constrain Iran but have enforcement gaps.
Here’s a grounded look at your question, based on the current geopolitical context (as of early March 2026): 📌 Would Russia openly support Iran if Ukraine gets involved in the Middle East (even just with expertise)? Short answer: Russia is unlikely to openly and militarily support Iran, even if Ukraine or its allies become more involved in the Middle East. Instead, Moscow’s support for Tehran is likely to remain limited, cautious, and primarily strategic rather than overt military backing. Here’s why: 🇷🇺 1. Russia’s relationship with Iran is pragmatic, not a formal alliance Russia and Iran cooperate on various fronts — arms transfers, defense technology (e.g., drones) and diplomatic coordination — but analysts describe this partnership as fragile and interest‑based, not a binding military alliance. Moscow’s support historically has been rhetorical and conditional, rather than automatic military intervention. � DGAP Even when Iran was under direct U.S. and Israeli military pressure, Russia did not rush to militarily defend Tehran, instead offering verbal support and diplomacy rather than boots on the ground. � Pravda 🧠 2. Russia has bigger constraints and conflicting priorities Russia’s top priority remains the war in Ukraine. A direct intervention in a Middle East conflict (e.g., sending troops or major military forces to support Iran) would stretch Russian resources further, a risk Moscow is unlikely to take. � UNIAN Russia currently faces other strategic risks: it has already seen its regional influence decline with the weakening of other allied regimes (like Assad in Syria), and a prolonged Middle East war could complicate Moscow’s position with other Gulf states. � CEPA 🔄 3. Russia prefers indirect or symbolic support, not open warfighting What we have seen recently is condemnation of attacks on Iran and limited diplomatic expressions of support — not direct Russian military assistance or deployment. Moscow has voiced concern about Western actions and preservation of international law, but hasn’t committed Russian forces to Iran’s defense. � CEPA +1 If Iran were to face wider conflict, Russia could increase covert aid or arms transfers, but open, public support with troops or direct confrontation with Western forces is improbable because that could escalate into a broader conflict Russia does not want right now. 📊 4. Ukraine’s involvement in the Middle East doesn’t change Russia’s calculus much Ukraine offering expertise — for example, military advice or defensive cooperation with Gulf partners — might alter U.S./Western engagement in the region, but Russia’s decisions about Iran are shaped more by its own strategic limits and global risks than by Ukraine acting outside Europe. Far from rallying Russia to defend Iran militarily, increased Ukraine involvement in the Middle East would more likely distract Western attention and complicate global diplomacy — something analysts note could indirectly benefit Russia’s position in Ukraine by splitting Western focus, but not by triggering direct Russian intervention in the Middle East. � UNIAN 🧩 Summary Aspect Likelihood Russia openly militarily supports Iran Low Russia increases covert or conditional support Moderate Russia uses diplomatic and strategic cooperation with Iran High Ukraine’s involvement causes Russia to escalate support to Iran publicly Unlikely In essence: Russia’s relationship with Iran is strategic but cautious. Moscow sees value in cooperating with Tehran, but open military support — especially against Western powers — would risk a broader war and stretch Russian capabilities already focused on Ukraine. Russia is far more likely to continue rhetorical backing and behind‑the‑scenes cooperation, rather than overt intervention. �
Here’s a clear, grounded take based on the current geopolitical context (as of early March 2026):
Short answer: Russia is unlikely to openly militarily support Iran, even if Ukraine becomes involved in the Middle East (even just with expertise). Moscow’s support for Tehran is expected to remain limited, strategic, and cautious, rather than overt or automatic military backing. Key reasons:
Russia and Iran cooperate on arms transfers, defense tech (e.g., drones), and diplomacy, but this partnership is interest-based and fragile, not a binding military alliance. Historically, Moscow has provided rhetorical and conditional support, not direct intervention—even when Iran faced U.S. or Israeli pressure.
Russia’s main focus remains the war in Ukraine. Committing troops or major forces to a Middle East conflict would stretch Russian resources and risk complications with other Gulf states. Moscow also faces declining influence in the region and wants to avoid a wider, unpredictable war.
Recent Russian actions show diplomatic expressions of support and condemnation of attacks rather than deployment of forces. If conflict escalates, Russia might increase covert aid or arms transfers, but direct confrontation with Western powers is highly unlikely.
Ukrainian military advice or defensive cooperation with Gulf partners could shift U.S./Western engagement in the region, but Russia’s decisions on Iran are driven by its own strategic limits. Increased Ukrainian activity might distract Western focus, potentially benefiting Russia in Ukraine indirectly—but it won’t trigger direct Russian intervention in the Middle East.
Likelihood summary: Aspect Likelihood Russia openly militarily supports Iran Low Russia increases covert or conditional support Moderate Russia uses diplomatic/strategic cooperation with Iran High Ukraine’s involvement triggers public Russian escalation Unlikely
Bottom line:
Russia sees value in cooperating with Iran but is cautious. Open military support against Western powers is improbable. Moscow is far more likely to continue rhetorical backing and behind-the-scenes cooperation than to deploy forces.