The South China Sea: Maritime Rights Are Not Allocated by Population, and Diplomacy Must Not Rewrite International Law
The 2016 Arbitral Award, China’s proposed fishing concessions, the unfinished ASEAN–China Code of Conduct, and the challenge of turning international law into maritime security
By Karl M. Garcia
Introduction: A dispute about more than territory
The South China Sea dispute is often presented as a contest over territorial sovereignty, maritime boundaries, military presence, and competing historical claims. But recent discussions reveal another dimension: the growing effort to influence how maritime rights, resource access, and regional cooperation are understood.
At the November 2026 Manila Dialogue on the South China Sea, Chinese scholar Dingli Shen raised the issue of China’s relatively limited maritime space per capita compared with the Philippines. He suggested that China’s population and fishing requirements could provide a basis for negotiating access to Philippine waters, potentially through paid fishing permits.
The proposal deserves examination, particularly because it introduces a possible economic arrangement where diplomatic and legal disagreements have persisted for years.
However, it also raises a fundamental question: Can a country’s population size become a justification for access to another country’s maritime resources?
At the same time, the Philippines has been pursuing another major diplomatic objective: concluding the long-delayed ASEAN–China Code of Conduct (COC) for the South China Sea.
The two developments are connected.
One concerns the legal and economic basis for accessing maritime resources. The other concerns the rules governing behavior among countries operating in a contested maritime environment.
Both test whether the Philippines can pursue practical cooperation without compromising its legal position.
The central challenge is not choosing between diplomacy and defending maritime rights. It is making the two reinforce each other.
1. The 2016 Arbitral Award: The legal foundation remains
July 12, 2016, marked a turning point in the South China Sea dispute.
The arbitral tribunal constituted under Annex VII of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), following the Philippines’ initiation of proceedings in 2013, issued its unanimous award.
The decision was significant, but its actual scope must be understood accurately.
The tribunal did not decide sovereignty over every disputed island or feature. Neither did it delimit a complete maritime boundary between China and the Philippines.
It addressed the legal basis of China’s historic-rights claims, the status of selected maritime features, maritime entitlements, and certain activities in the South China Sea.
Among its major findings:
- China’s claims to historic rights within the nine-dash line had no lawful effect insofar as they exceeded the maritime entitlements permitted under UNCLOS.
- None of the Spratly Islands’ high-tide features was capable of generating an entitlement to an exclusive economic zone of its own.
- Mischief Reef and Second Thomas Shoal are low-tide elevations and cannot independently generate territorial seas or EEZs.
- China’s interference with Philippine petroleum exploration and fishing rights in certain areas violated the Philippines’ sovereign rights.
- China’s large-scale island-building activities caused severe harm to coral reef ecosystems and violated its environmental obligations.
- Traditional fishing rights at Scarborough Shoal, including those of Filipino and Chinese fishermen, were recognized.
The last finding is particularly relevant to the present debate.
The award did not prohibit every form of Chinese fishing throughout the South China Sea. It recognized traditional fishing rights at Scarborough Shoal while distinguishing these from broader claims to maritime jurisdiction.
The distinctions between territorial sovereignty, traditional fishing rights, sovereign rights within an EEZ, and freedom of navigation must be maintained.
The award is final and binding on China and the Philippines under UNCLOS. China’s rejection of the decision does not invalidate it.
The practical difficulty is enforcement and compliance, not the absence of a legal ruling.
Ten years later, the Philippines should treat the award as an established legal foundation, not merely a negotiating position that can be exchanged for short-term economic or diplomatic concessions.
2. The per-capita argument: Equity is not maritime entitlement
Shen’s proposal raises an interesting economic question but a problematic legal premise.
China has an enormous population, substantial seafood consumption, and a large fishing industry. Food security is a legitimate national concern.
The Philippines, however, also has legitimate food-security requirements, coastal livelihoods, and responsibilities to conserve its marine resources.
The difference is that international maritime law does not allocate EEZs according to population.
Under UNCLOS, a coastal state may establish an EEZ extending up to 200 nautical miles from its baselines, subject to the Convention’s rules on maritime entitlements and delimitation.
The legal basis is geographical, not demographic.
Where maritime entitlements overlap, delimitation must be pursued under applicable international law to achieve an equitable solution. This does not mean that maritime boundaries are automatically determined by coastline length, nor that every country receives an equal maritime area.
Population is not a criterion for generating an EEZ.
Otherwise, a country with a much larger population could argue that its demographic needs justify access to the maritime resources of smaller coastal states.
That would establish a dangerous precedent for island nations and countries whose economies depend heavily on fisheries.
There is, nevertheless, a legitimate provision for negotiated access.
Article 62 of UNCLOS addresses the utilization of living resources within an EEZ. Where a coastal state lacks the capacity to harvest the entire allowable catch, it must give other states access to the surplus through agreements or other arrangements, subject to the conditions established by the coastal state and the Convention.
This is not an automatic right for another country to enter.
The coastal state determines its allowable catch, harvesting capacity, conservation requirements, and the conditions under which foreign fishing may be permitted.
The availability of surplus cannot be established simply by comparing populations.
It requires scientific assessments of fish stocks, sustainable harvesting limits, domestic fishing capacity, and the needs of local fishing communities.
The proper question is therefore not how many people China has relative to the Philippines.
It is whether a particular fishery has a scientifically established surplus that can be harvested sustainably without undermining Philippine food security or ecological protection.
A country’s resource shortage can justify negotiations. It cannot independently establish an entitlement to another country’s resources.
3. Fishing concessions: A commercial opportunity or a strategic vulnerability?
There is nothing inherently unlawful about the Philippines negotiating fishing access with another country.
UNCLOS itself provides a framework for such arrangements.
But a fee-based fishing agreement with China would require much more than an agreement on prices and allowable catch.
The environmental record of the South China Sea cannot be ignored.
The 2016 tribunal found that Chinese authorities had failed to prevent Chinese nationals and vessels from harvesting endangered species and causing severe environmental damage through destructive practices, including giant-clam harvesting.
These findings are directly relevant to any proposal involving foreign fishing access.
A permit fee is not compensation for ecological destruction, nor is it a substitute for effective enforcement.
Any proposed agreement would need to establish:
- Scientifically determined quotas and seasonal restrictions.
- Vessel registration, identification, and monitoring.
- Restrictions on destructive fishing gear and practices.
- Inspection and enforcement authority.
- Protection of spawning grounds and endangered species.
- Liability and compensation for environmental damage.
- Suspension and termination provisions for violations.
- Transparent reporting of catches and participating vessels.
The Philippines must also determine whether it has sufficient capacity to monitor and enforce such an arrangement.
A paper agreement without effective enforcement could become an instrument for legitimizing activities that the country cannot adequately control.
There is also a strategic concern. A bilateral agreement between two countries with substantially unequal economic and maritime capabilities must account for the possibility that commercial access could gradually become an instrument of political influence.
This does not mean that cooperation should automatically be rejected.
It means that cooperation must be structured around Philippine law, measurable benefits, environmental sustainability, and enforceable conditions.
The Philippines should not sell access to resources it cannot adequately monitor or protect.
4. The Manila Dialogue: Two different approaches to the maritime dispute
The discussion between Dingli Shen and University of the Philippines maritime law expert Jay Batongbacal illustrates the differences in how the dispute is understood.
Shen’s approach emphasizes population requirements, food security, and negotiated compromise. His proposal for paid fishing permits suggests that economic arrangements might provide an alternative to continued confrontation.
Batongbacal’s position emphasizes the primacy of UNCLOS and the 2016 award, while questioning whether fishing concessions would be appropriate given the environmental record and the unequal bargaining conditions.
These positions represent different approaches to managing the dispute.
There is merit in exploring fisheries cooperation, but it must be distinguished from accepting a legal argument that population creates maritime entitlement.
Batongbacal’s concerns about environmental damage and enforcement are particularly important because the Philippines would be assuming responsibility for allowing and regulating foreign fishing activity.
There is also an important distinction between negotiating access and negotiating sovereignty.
The Philippines can consider foreign fishing permits where UNCLOS permits them without recognizing China’s expansive maritime claims.
Conversely, an agreement should not be interpreted as establishing a Chinese right to fish within Philippine maritime zones independently of Philippine authorization.
The proper framework is cooperation under international law, not accommodation through ambiguity.
5. The Code of Conduct: Will an agreement actually change behavior at sea?
The Manila Dialogue took place as ASEAN and China approached another important stage in their negotiations over the South China Sea Code of Conduct.
The 2002 Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea established principles of peaceful settlement, self-restraint, and cooperation.
It was an important diplomatic achievement, but it did not establish a sufficiently robust system to prevent repeated confrontations.
More than two decades later, maritime incidents continue.
The proposed COC is intended to address this deficiency by establishing clearer rules for managing maritime activities, preventing incidents, and reducing the risk of escalation.
The Philippines made concluding the agreement a priority during its 2026 ASEAN chairmanship.
However, negotiations were not completed.
On November 15, Foreign Affairs Secretary Ma. Theresa Lazaro reported that approximately 80% of the draft paragraphs had reached provisional agreement.
On November 17, President Ferdinand Marcos Jr. gave a more optimistic assessment, saying that negotiations had reached approximately 85–90%, with definitions and terminology among the remaining matters.
These are successive government assessments of negotiating progress, not independently verified measurements of how much substantive disagreement has been resolved.
The distinction matters.
As security analyst Dr. Chester Cabalza observed in his November 2026 interview with Pinky Webb on Bilyonaryo News Channel, the prospects of concluding the agreement remained 50-50.
His skepticism deserves attention.
The easiest provisions to negotiate are often those involving broad principles: peaceful cooperation, communication, environmental protection, search and rescue, and maritime safety.
The difficult provisions concern actual behavior, strategic freedom, legal obligations, and competing maritime interests.
The remaining provisions could determine whether the COC becomes meaningful or merely symbolic.
The critical questions include:
- What geographical areas will the Code cover?
- Will it be legally binding?
- What specific activities will be prohibited?
- Will its provisions cover coast guards, maritime militia, naval forces, and other government vessels?
- How will violations be identified and addressed?
- Will it preserve legitimate military exercises, joint patrols, resource exploration, and lawful maritime operations?
- How will the rights of third parties be protected?
- What happens when a signatory repeatedly refuses to comply?
The percentage of completed negotiations cannot substitute for answers to these questions.
6. The geographical scope: The most consequential negotiating issue
The South China Sea is not simply a disputed body of water.
It contains territorial seas, exclusive economic zones, continental shelves, international navigation routes, and strategically important maritime features.
China’s extensive maritime claims overlap with the maritime entitlements of several Southeast Asian countries, including the Philippines, Vietnam, Malaysia, Brunei, and Indonesia.
Indonesia is not a claimant to the Spratly Islands, but it has important maritime interests around the Natuna Islands, where China’s expansive claims have generated tensions.
The geographic scope of the COC is therefore a fundamental issue.
If the agreement adopts geographical language that implicitly recognizes claims unsupported by international law, it could create a serious problem for the Philippines and other coastal states.
Conversely, a Code that clearly distinguishes the geographical area in which behavioral rules apply from the question of sovereignty and maritime entitlements could provide a workable basis for cooperation.
Regulating conduct does not require recognizing another country’s territorial claims.
The COC should complement UNCLOS, not become an alternative framework for determining maritime rights.
It must also preserve the rights of third parties, including countries that are not signatories but whose lawful activities could be affected by the agreement.
7. Legally binding: Necessary, but not sufficient
Cabalza’s concern about whether the COC will become legally binding raises another important question.
The 2002 Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea was a political declaration rather than a binding treaty.
Its principles were important, but the continued confrontations demonstrate the limitations of relying on general commitments to self-restraint.
A legally binding COC would provide a stronger foundation for accountability.
However, legal bindingness alone does not guarantee compliance.
An agreement can be legally binding while lacking effective monitoring, verification, dispute-resolution procedures, or meaningful consequences for violations.
The Philippines should therefore push for five institutional elements.
First, clear obligations.
The agreement must define prohibited conduct rather than rely exclusively on broad expressions such as self-restraint and peaceful cooperation.
Second, monitoring and verification.
There should be agreed procedures for documenting, reporting, and investigating maritime incidents.
Third, incident management.
Direct communication channels among coast guards, navies, foreign ministries, and relevant maritime authorities should be institutionalized.
Fourth, dispute resolution.
The agreement should provide consultation, investigation, and other agreed procedures when violations occur.
Fifth, compliance review.
Signatories should regularly assess implementation and address repeated violations through agreed mechanisms.
The objective is to move beyond diplomatic declarations toward measurable maritime behavior.
The Philippines should also ensure that the Code does not restrict the rights of coastal states to conduct lawful activities under UNCLOS or impose obligations that effectively favor the more powerful party.
8. ASEAN’s structural limitations and China’s strategic interests
The challenge is not simply a disagreement between Manila and Beijing.
It is also a test of ASEAN’s ability to maintain regional unity when its members have different economic, political, and security relationships with China.
China is a major trading partner, investor, and economic actor throughout Southeast Asia.
ASEAN countries have legitimate reasons to maintain economic cooperation with Beijing while protecting their sovereignty and maritime interests.
These objectives are not necessarily incompatible.
However, the differences in national priorities make consensus difficult.
Some ASEAN members are directly involved in maritime disputes. Others are more concerned with maintaining economic relationships, regional stability, and freedom of navigation.
China, meanwhile, negotiates as a major power with its own unified national strategic position.
This creates an institutional asymmetry.
ASEAN negotiates collectively, often through consensus, while China approaches the negotiations with a centralized national position.
This does not make ASEAN cooperation futile.
It means that ASEAN must strengthen its ability to formulate common positions before entering negotiations.
A divided ASEAN risks producing an agreement that accommodates the negotiating process more than the actual security requirements of its members.
The solution is not to abandon ASEAN centrality but to make it more substantive.
Regional unity must be built around common legal principles, shared maritime interests, and practical commitments.
The Philippines should work with Vietnam, Malaysia, Indonesia, Brunei, Singapore, and other ASEAN partners to establish a minimum common standard on maritime conduct.
This should include respect for UNCLOS, protection of existing maritime entitlements, effective incident-management procedures, environmental obligations, and the rights of third parties.
The objective is not to create an anti-China coalition.
It is to establish a regional environment in which no country can impose its interpretation of maritime rights through superior power.
9. Singapore’s 2027 chairmanship: An opportunity, not a guarantee
The Philippines had hoped to conclude the COC during its 2026 ASEAN chairmanship.
That did not happen.
Negotiations will continue in 2027 under Singapore’s ASEAN chairmanship.
Cabalza expressed optimism about Singapore’s potential role, partly because it is not a claimant state in the South China Sea.
Singapore brings diplomatic experience, institutional capabilities, and a strong interest in maintaining an open and rules-based regional order.
Its non-claimant status may help it facilitate discussions without being directly involved in the territorial disputes.
Nevertheless, Singapore cannot resolve fundamental disagreements simply by assuming the ASEAN chairmanship.
The remaining challenges involve political decisions by the negotiating parties.
The next phase will require consensus within ASEAN, constructive engagement with China, and resistance to pressure to settle for an agreement that is merely convenient to conclude.
There is also a practical consideration: the Philippines should not assume that Singapore can finish negotiations on a predetermined timetable.
The objective should be a substantive COC, not a deadline-driven diplomatic accomplishment.
The Philippines should welcome Singapore’s leadership while continuing to advocate for the legal and institutional safeguards necessary for a meaningful agreement.
10. Competing narratives: Provocation, sovereignty, and gray-zone pressure
The South China Sea dispute is also a contest over how events are described and interpreted.
The Philippines views China’s coast guard and maritime militia activities, dangerous maneuvers, water-cannon incidents, interference with resupply operations, and pressure against Filipino fishermen as coercive efforts to establish control without triggering open military conflict.
China, in turn, accuses the Philippines of provoking tensions through maritime patrols, resupply missions at Second Thomas Shoal, expanded defense cooperation with the United States, and efforts to publicize confrontations.
These positions must be understood, but they should not be treated as legally equivalent.
Beijing’s historical claims do not become valid simply because they are repeatedly asserted.
Equally, Philippine actions should be assessed against international law and the actual circumstances of each incident rather than automatically presumed legitimate merely because they are undertaken by Philippine authorities.
The work of maritime journalists, researchers, and analysts, including Marites Vitug, is important in understanding how historical narratives, political messaging, and competing interpretations shape public perceptions.
The dispute extends beyond military encounters.
It involves information campaigns, legal arguments, economic pressure, diplomatic influence, and efforts to shape international opinion.
The term gray-zone activity describes conduct intended to advance strategic objectives below the threshold of conventional armed conflict.
It can involve coast guard deployments, maritime militia, administrative measures, economic pressure, and information operations.
This is why transparency matters.
Publishing verified incident reports, documenting environmental damage, making maritime information available, and maintaining consistent legal explanations are instruments of accountability.
But transparency must be accompanied by professional discipline.
The Philippines should distinguish verified facts from allegations, avoid exaggeration, and maintain credibility in its public communications.
Credibility is a strategic asset.
11. Beyond the COC: Building an independent Philippine maritime capability
Here lies the more important strategic lesson.
The Philippines should pursue the COC, but it should never make its maritime security dependent on the success of negotiations.
Diplomacy and deterrence are complementary instruments.
A functioning COC could reduce misunderstandings, establish predictable procedures, and lower the risk of accidental escalation.
But it cannot replace the capacity to monitor, protect, and enforce Philippine maritime rights.
This requires a coordinated national maritime security architecture.
First, strengthen maritime domain awareness.
The Philippine Coast Guard, Philippine Navy, Bureau of Fisheries and Aquatic Resources, NAMRIA, and other relevant agencies should develop an integrated maritime picture.
Automatic identification systems, vessel monitoring systems, coastal radar, satellites, aerial surveillance, and information-sharing arrangements should help identify suspicious movements and document incidents.
The objective is to know what is happening at sea, where it is happening, and which agency should respond.
Second, strengthen the Philippine Coast Guard.
The PCG needs ships, aircraft, communications, personnel, and logistical support for sustained maritime law enforcement and search-and-rescue operations.
A persistent, professional, and lawful presence is essential.
Third, modernize the Armed Forces of the Philippines.
The Philippine Navy and Air Force must develop credible maritime and air surveillance, coastal defense, communications, and deterrence capabilities.
Modernization should be guided by realistic operational requirements rather than prestige acquisitions.
Fourth, institutionalize interagency coordination.
Maritime security cannot be treated as the exclusive responsibility of the Navy or Coast Guard.
It involves fisheries, environmental protection, customs, ports, shipping, foreign affairs, intelligence, and local governments.
A whole-of-government approach should connect these institutions through shared information, clearly assigned responsibilities, and coordinated response procedures.
Fifth, strengthen international partnerships.
The Philippines should continue maritime cooperation with Japan, Australia, the United States, India, and other partners.
Joint exercises, coast guard cooperation, information-sharing, maritime training, and capacity-building contribute to a more stable regional security environment.
These partnerships should complement ASEAN diplomacy, not replace it.
12. ASEAN integration must become operational
The South China Sea issue exposes a broader weakness in regional integration.
ASEAN has numerous declarations, dialogue platforms, cooperative frameworks, and institutional mechanisms.
But the existence of these instruments does not automatically translate into coordinated action.
This is a recurring governance challenge across Southeast Asia.
Regional cooperation requires more than periodic summits and joint statements.
It requires:
- Shared operational standards.
- Interoperable communication systems.
- Regular joint exercises.
- Reliable information exchange.
- Clearly assigned institutional responsibilities.
- Measurable implementation targets.
- Accountability for commitments.
The COC could become a useful institutional platform for advancing these objectives.
Practical cooperation in maritime environmental protection, marine scientific research, search and rescue, navigational safety, and combating transnational crime could generate tangible benefits even while territorial disputes remain unresolved.
The ASEAN–China framework should distinguish between areas where cooperation is immediately possible and issues where fundamental disagreements remain.
Not every maritime problem needs to wait for a final political settlement.
The same principle applies to fisheries cooperation.
The Philippines can explore arrangements that produce economic and environmental benefits without compromising its legal position.
But every arrangement must have clear rules, transparent implementation, and measurable outcomes.
13. The danger of diplomatic symbolism
There is a temptation in international relations to measure success by the number of agreements concluded, declarations signed, and summits hosted.
But a signed agreement is an input, not an outcome.
The more important indicators are whether:
- Maritime confrontations decline.
- Communication improves.
- Fishing and research activities proceed lawfully.
- Incidents are addressed promptly.
- Environmental damage is reduced.
- Parties comply with their commitments.
- Coastal communities become more secure.
- Maritime resources are managed sustainably.
This is the difference between diplomatic activity and diplomatic effectiveness.
A weak COC could even create a false sense of security if governments assume that a signed document has resolved problems that remain operationally unresolved.
The Philippines must avoid this trap.
It should not reject an agreement merely because it cannot resolve every dispute. Nor should it accept an agreement simply because negotiations have consumed decades and political capital.
The standard should be whether the final document advances peace without sacrificing legal rights or practical security.
The same standard should apply to proposed fishing concessions.
Revenue from foreign access is not automatically a national gain if the arrangement undermines local fishing communities, damages marine ecosystems, or weakens regulatory control.
Conclusion: Cooperation without surrender
The 2016 Arbitral Award, the proposed fishing-access arrangement raised at the Manila Dialogue, and the unfinished ASEAN–China Code of Conduct represent different dimensions of the same strategic challenge.
The first establishes important legal rights and obligations.
The second raises the possibility of practical economic cooperation.
The third seeks to regulate conduct and reduce the risk of maritime confrontation.
They should reinforce one another, not become competing diplomatic instruments.
China’s population is a legitimate consideration in its domestic food-security planning. It may also be relevant to negotiations over fisheries cooperation.
But population does not create an independent right to harvest resources within the Philippines’ EEZ.
The Philippines should remain open to negotiated arrangements where international law permits them. Such arrangements must be scientifically justified, environmentally responsible, transparent, enforceable, and protective of Filipino fishing communities.
Similarly, the COC should not be rejected simply because it cannot resolve every territorial dispute. A workable agreement could still improve communication, reduce dangerous encounters, and create more predictable rules.
But legal bindingness, clear geographical scope, effective compliance mechanisms, and consistency with UNCLOS must remain central.
Chester Cabalza’s 50-50 assessment is a useful reminder that diplomatic progress should be judged by substance rather than percentages.
The reported 80–90% progress is encouraging, but the remaining provisions could determine whether the agreement becomes meaningful or merely symbolic.
Singapore’s 2027 chairmanship offers another opportunity. ASEAN and China should use it to resolve outstanding issues and produce an effective and substantive agreement consistent with international law.
But the Philippines must prepare for every possible outcome.
If the COC succeeds, the country should use it to strengthen maritime stability and regional cooperation.
If negotiations stall, Philippine maritime security must continue.
If an agreement is signed but violations persist, the Philippines must retain the legal tools, institutional capacity, and diplomatic support to respond.
The strategic objective is neither confrontation with China nor accommodation at any cost.
It is the protection of Philippine rights while preserving regional peace, economic stability, and the long-term sustainability of shared marine resources.
Ultimately, the South China Sea is not merely a diplomatic problem. It is a governance, economic, environmental, and national security challenge.
The Philippines needs diplomacy that produces rules, institutions that implement them, and capabilities that protect the country’s legitimate interests.
International law establishes the framework. Diplomacy creates opportunities for cooperation. National capacity makes both meaningful.
A Code of Conduct should not simply tell countries how to behave at sea. It should establish a credible framework that makes responsible behavior more predictable, violations more accountable, and maritime cooperation more sustainable.
The measure of success is not how quickly ASEAN and China sign the document.
It is whether the waters become safer, the rules become clearer, and the rights of coastal states are respected.
An agreement is only as meaningful as the behavior it changes.
And cooperation is only sustainable when it does not require a country to surrender what international law already protects.