Alliances Under Strain: Building a Philippines That Can Keep Functioning When the World Is Disrupted
By Karl M. Garcia
The Philippines is entering a strategic environment in which crises can no longer be treated as separate events.
A confrontation in the Taiwan Strait can affect shipping, insurance, semiconductor supplies, migration and regional trade. A prolonged conflict in the Middle East can affect oil prices, shipping routes and inflation. A crisis on the Korean Peninsula can redirect American and allied attention and capabilities. Tensions in the South China Sea can intensify while the same countries we rely on are responding to problems elsewhere.
Cyberattacks, satellite disruptions, subsea cable damage, attacks on ports and interruptions to energy infrastructure can turn a military problem into an economic and social problem within hours.
The lesson is not that global war is inevitable. Nor should we assume that any particular maritime chokepoint will remain physically closed for decades.
The more useful planning assumption is that disruption itself may become a persistent feature of the international system.
A chokepoint can reopen while its consequences continue.
Ships may take longer routes. Insurance may become more expensive. Fuel consumption may increase. Delivery schedules may become less predictable. Companies may hold larger inventories or establish alternative suppliers.
The disruption may end, but the adaptations it creates can remain.
In this environment, national security is no longer simply the ability to defend territory.
It is the ability to keep the country functioning when important routes, systems, infrastructure and partners become unreliable.
From a stable network to a stressed network
For much of the globalization era, international commerce was optimized around efficiency, specialization and predictable transportation.
Goods moved through a network of ports, canals, straits, shipping lanes, energy terminals, telecommunications systems and financial infrastructure that businesses generally assumed would remain available.
That assumption is becoming harder to sustain.
Modern maritime disruption can come from interstate conflict, non-state actors, mines, missiles, drones, cyberattacks, accidents, sanctions, extreme weather and infrastructure failures.
Several can occur simultaneously.
The technology of disruption is also becoming cheaper.
Seriously threatening commercial shipping once generally required substantial naval forces. Today, relatively inexpensive unmanned aerial and surface systems, mines and precision weapons can impose disproportionate costs on commercial shipping and on the forces attempting to protect it.
The Red Sea demonstrates the problem.
Commercial shipping has faced sustained security threats despite international naval deployments. Protecting a waterway remains important, but protection does not automatically restore the economic conditions that existed before the threat emerged.
When ships take longer routes, the consequences appear in fuel consumption, freight rates, insurance, delivery schedules and inventory requirements.
The disruption spreads far beyond the waterway itself.
The multi-chokepoint problem
One disruption can often be absorbed through rerouting.
Several disruptions occurring simultaneously are much harder to absorb.
Hormuz is central to global energy flows. Bab el-Mandeb connects the Red Sea to the Indian Ocean and the Suez route. The Panama Canal links Atlantic and Pacific trade. Malacca is critical to Asian energy and commercial shipping. The Taiwan Strait sits alongside one of the world’s most important manufacturing and technology regions.
These are not isolated pieces of geography.
They are nodes in a network.
If one route becomes difficult, traffic can be diverted. If several routes are simultaneously constrained, alternatives become progressively more expensive, congested and insecure.
The real vulnerability is therefore not simply that a ship cannot pass through one narrow waterway.
It is that there may be no equally cheap, fast and secure substitute.
The Philippines has its own version of this problem.
We depend on imported fuel, international shipping, critical components, major ports, subsea telecommunications cables, centralized energy infrastructure and concentrated logistics.
A warship does not have to be sunk for national security to be affected.
A damaged cable, unavailable fuel supply, closed airport, disrupted port, compromised satellite link or prolonged power interruption can reduce national capacity just as surely as the loss of a military asset.
National resilience is therefore part of national defense.
Climate adds another layer of uncertainty
Geopolitics is not the only source of disruption.
Climate and extreme weather can turn infrastructure into temporary chokepoints.
The Panama Canal’s experience with drought demonstrated how water availability can constrain infrastructure fundamental to global trade.
The lesson extends beyond one canal.
Ports, airports, roads, bridges, power plants, telecommunications systems and logistics hubs all operate within environmental conditions. A changing climate can alter their reliability even when no adversary is deliberately attacking them.
At the same time, changing Arctic conditions could make northern maritime routes more commercially relevant while creating new strategic competition and infrastructure requirements.
The geography of global trade is therefore not fixed.
For the Philippines, this matters enormously.
An archipelago cannot simply assume that an alternative road, railway or neighboring land border will always be available when one route fails.
Our geography creates advantages, but it also creates dependencies.
A resilient archipelago must therefore possess multiple ways of moving people, information, energy, food and equipment between islands.
When disruption becomes an economic condition
The global economy is already adapting to greater uncertainty.
Companies that once optimized almost entirely for the lowest transportation and inventory costs increasingly have reasons to maintain safety stocks, diversify suppliers and establish alternative production locations.
This does not mean just-in-time logistics has disappeared.
It means resilience now has a higher economic value than when major disruptions were assumed to be exceptional.
Rerouting ships around Africa instead of using the Suez route can add thousands of kilometers and substantial time to voyages. The effects can appear in fuel consumption, freight rates, insurance, inventory requirements and eventually consumer prices.
Some costs disappear when a disruption ends.
Others become embedded in business decisions.
A company that establishes a second supplier or production location because of repeated geopolitical uncertainty may not completely return to its previous model.
For the Philippines, this means resilience cannot be treated only as disaster response.
It has to become part of economic planning.
Energy security, food security, port redundancy, domestic manufacturing, telecommunications resilience, stockpiles and emergency logistics are not separate from national security.
They are components of it.
Alliance is not the same as guaranteed availability
The United States remains an essential security partner for the Philippines.
The Mutual Defense Treaty, Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement, interoperability, intelligence cooperation, exercises, logistics and access to American capabilities provide advantages that the Philippines cannot reproduce quickly on its own.
But an alliance is not the same as guaranteed availability of every capability at every moment.
The United States has global commitments.
Its ships, aircraft, intelligence assets, logistics networks and political attention can be required in multiple theaters simultaneously.
The question for Manila is therefore not whether the Philippines should choose between America and self-reliance.
The better question is:
How do we build a Philippine system that becomes stronger because of alliances without becoming helpless when an ally is temporarily constrained?
That is a more useful way of thinking about alliance management.
The issue is not whether America will help.
The issue is whether Philippine planning should depend on the assumption that every desired American capability will always be available exactly when needed.
It should not.
Alliance, autonomy and redundancy
Three ideas need to operate together:
Alliance. Autonomy. Redundancy.
Alliance means working with countries that provide capabilities the Philippines cannot efficiently create alone.
Autonomy means retaining enough national capacity to make decisions, protect territory, maintain essential services and respond to emergencies without waiting for someone else to arrive.
Redundancy means having alternatives when one route, platform, base, supplier, communications system or partner is unavailable.
These are complementary, not contradictory.
A strong alliance should make Philippine resilience greater, not make Philippine resilience unnecessary.
The objective is not autarky.
The Philippines cannot and should not attempt to reproduce every advanced capability domestically.
The objective is strategic optionality.
We need enough national capacity and enough alternative relationships that the failure of one assumption does not bring the whole system down.
This is especially important for an archipelago.
If one airport is disabled, another should be usable.
If one port is disrupted, another should be capable of taking traffic.
If one communications pathway fails, another should exist.
If one supplier becomes unavailable, another should be qualified.
If one partner is temporarily constrained, other partners should be capable of contributing.
Redundancy is not about duplicating everything.
It is about identifying the failures that would be catastrophic and building practical alternatives around them.
Taiwan, Korea, Russia and the problem of strategic distraction
The Taiwan Strait illustrates why this matters.
For the Philippines, Taiwan is geographically close and economically significant, with consequences for regional shipping, trade, migration and supply chains.
A Taiwan contingency could affect Philippine interests even if Philippine forces were not directly engaged in combat.
The Korean Peninsula presents another form of risk.
A serious crisis could absorb American, Japanese and South Korean attention and military capacity.
Russia’s war in Ukraine demonstrates how a conflict in one region can consume large quantities of ammunition, intelligence and logistics while affecting energy, food and industrial markets far beyond the battlefield.
The point is not to predict which crisis will occur.
The point is to design for a world in which several crises can exist simultaneously.
Philippine planners should therefore stop thinking exclusively in terms of a single contingency.
The relevant question is increasingly:
What happens when the contingency we planned for occurs while something else is already happening?
That is where resilience becomes more important than the sheer size of an inventory.
The American variable
American political change also matters to allies without making the alliance irrelevant.
Different US administrations can place different emphasis on alliances, burden-sharing, overseas deployments, trade, deterrence and domestic priorities.
Philippine planning should therefore avoid assuming that American engagement will always take exactly the same form.
This does not mean abandoning the alliance.
It means designing an alliance relationship that remains useful under a range of circumstances.
If American forces are available, Philippine capabilities should be able to integrate with them.
If American forces are heavily committed elsewhere, Philippine forces should still be able to see, communicate, move, sustain themselves and respond.
If another partner provides assistance, the Philippine system should be able to absorb it.
If a partner’s political circumstances change, the Philippine system should not collapse.
That is alliance resilience.
Indonesia’s carrier: a case study, not a shopping list
Indonesia’s acquisition of the former Italian Navy Giuseppe Garibaldi, now designated KRI Sriwijaya, offers an interesting case study for the Philippines.
Indonesia’s decision is important to examine not because Manila should automatically copy Jakarta, but because it raises a larger question:
What does an archipelagic country actually need to remain mobile and connected during a crisis?
A large aviation ship can potentially provide a mobile aviation and command platform.
Depending on its configuration and available aircraft, such a platform can support surveillance, search and rescue, medical evacuation, disaster assessment, communications, emergency logistics and military operations.
For an archipelagic country, mobility itself has strategic value.
But the ship is not the capability.
The capability is the entire system surrounding the ship.
A platform is not a capability
Aviation ships require aircraft, pilots, deck crews, maintenance personnel, spare parts, aviation fuel, safety systems, communications, escorts, replenishment, training, doctrine and sustained funding.
Without the surrounding system, the platform cannot deliver its advertised capability.
Thailand’s experience with HTMS Chakri Naruebet illustrates the same principle.
The ship was designed around Harrier aircraft and helicopters. After the Harriers became unsustainable and were withdrawn, the ship continued to serve, including in helicopter operations and humanitarian assistance.
The lesson is not that carriers are inherently unsuitable.
The lesson is that owning a platform is not the same as owning the capability the platform was supposed to provide.
That distinction should be embedded in every Philippine modernization decision.
A ₱10-billion or ₱100-billion platform is not really a ₱10-billion or ₱100-billion decision.
It is a decision about decades of aircraft, ammunition, fuel, maintenance, training, personnel, infrastructure, upgrades, spare parts and operating costs.
The platform is merely the visible part.
Define the capability first
Before asking whether the Philippines needs a carrier, ask what problem it would solve.
How many helicopters would it operate?
How many days could it remain at sea?
How would it be supplied?
Who would maintain the aircraft?
Where would its escorts come from?
What would happen when its aircraft were undergoing maintenance?
Could it operate after a major disaster when shore infrastructure is damaged?
Could it integrate with amphibious ships, Coast Guard vessels, patrol aircraft, drones and civilian agencies?
How much would the entire capability cost over its service life?
And most importantly:
What additional national capability would it generate?
The answer may involve helicopters rather than a carrier.
It may involve amphibious ships, logistics vessels, maritime patrol aircraft, unmanned systems, distributed bases, hardened fuel storage, mobile communications, satellite connectivity and prepositioned emergency supplies.
It may involve civilian ferries, commercial shipping and civilian aviation being incorporated into a national emergency logistics plan.
A large aviation ship could eventually be considered if rigorous capability analysis demonstrates a genuine gap that other combinations cannot fill as effectively.
The sequence matters:
Define the capability first. Choose the platform second.
The real carrier is the network
Imagine a major typhoon destroys an airport in an island province.
Aviation access disappears.
Roads are blocked.
Communications fail.
Fuel deliveries stop.
Hospitals are overwhelmed.
A large aviation ship offshore may be useful—but only if helicopters can operate, supplies can be loaded, communications can connect to people ashore, medical teams can be deployed, fuel can be replenished and the ship can coordinate with the Coast Guard, military, local governments and civilian agencies.
An amphibious ship may be better suited to landing heavy engineering equipment.
A logistics vessel may be better suited to bulk supplies.
A drone may be the fastest way to survey damage.
A satellite link may be more important than any of them for restoring communications.
A helicopter may evacuate patients.
A patrol aircraft may identify isolated communities.
A civilian ferry may move hundreds of people.
That is a network.
The large ship, if present, is only one node in that network.
The same principle applies to warfare.
A missile battery without targeting information is incomplete.
A radar without communications is incomplete.
An aircraft without fuel and maintenance is incomplete.
A ship without logistics is incomplete.
A command center without redundant communications is incomplete.
A military force without civilian infrastructure resilience can be strategically constrained even when its weapons remain intact.
The real capability is the network.
Stress-test the assumptions
This suggests a practical exercise for Philippine planners:
Conduct an annual multi-theater resilience exercise in which some external capabilities are deliberately assumed to be unavailable.
One scenario could be called the American Absence Stress Test—not as a prediction, but as a planning condition.
What happens if American aircraft are committed elsewhere?
What happens if access to a particular foreign facility is temporarily unavailable?
What happens if commercial shipping is disrupted?
What happens if a subsea cable fails?
What happens if fuel imports are delayed?
What happens if several airports are simultaneously unusable?
What happens if satellite communications are disrupted?
What happens if a crisis in Taiwan, the Middle East or another theater absorbs the attention of principal partners?
The same stress test should apply to economic continuity.
What happens if a major port is closed for thirty days?
What happens if fuel prices surge?
What happens if shipping insurance becomes substantially more expensive on a major route?
What happens if a critical supplier becomes inaccessible because of war, sanctions or transport disruption?
What happens if two disruptions occur simultaneously?
These are not merely military questions.
They are questions of national continuity.
And they should not be answered only through tabletop exercises.
They should become measurable planning requirements.
Measure readiness, not procurement
Counting ships, aircraft, missiles and radars is easy.
Measuring usable capability is harder.
For every major capability, the Philippines should measure whether it can:
- detect a problem;
- understand what is happening;
- communicate the information;
- make a decision;
- respond quickly;
- survive disruption;
- replenish fuel, ammunition and supplies;
- reinforce another unit;
- recover damaged infrastructure; and
- learn from the event.
In other words:
DETECT → UNDERSTAND → DECIDE → RESPOND → SURVIVE → REPLENISH → REINFORCE → RECOVER → LEARN.
A system that performs across that entire chain is more useful than one that merely looks impressive at the procurement stage.
This also gives government a better way to evaluate modernization.
Instead of asking only how many ships were purchased, ask:
How many days can the fleet sustain operations?
How quickly can a damaged runway be restored?
How much fuel can be delivered if the principal terminal is unavailable?
How quickly can communications be re-established?
How many alternative ports can handle military and humanitarian logistics?
How many aircraft can actually be generated for operations?
How quickly can replacement parts arrive?
How many trained personnel are available?
How long can the country maintain essential services under disruption?
These are harder questions.
They are also much closer to actual readiness.
Archipelagic defense is civilian resilience
The Philippines should resist separating military resilience from civilian resilience.
The same helicopter that carries soldiers can evacuate civilians.
The same drone that watches maritime activity can map a flooded community.
The same communications system used by military commanders can restore connectivity after a disaster.
The same logistics ship used during exercises can deliver generators, water and food after a typhoon.
The same airfield used for defense can support humanitarian evacuation.
The same engineering units that build defensive infrastructure can restore bridges, ports and roads.
This is why dual-use capability is particularly valuable for an archipelagic state with limited resources.
It allows investments to serve the country in peacetime, during disasters, during gray-zone competition and during armed conflict.
The boundary between civil defense and military defense should therefore be more integrated.
Energy agencies, telecommunications companies, port operators, airlines, shipping companies, hospitals, local governments, the Coast Guard, the Armed Forces and disaster-response agencies all form part of national resilience.
A crisis does not care which agency owns the infrastructure.
The system either functions or it does not.
Build a distributed Philippines
Archipelagic defense points toward dispersion, geography and the ability to operate across the country’s maritime space.
The next step is to extend that thinking beyond the Armed Forces.
The Philippines needs:
Distributed fuel.
Distributed communications.
Distributed energy.
Distributed logistics.
Distributed command centers.
Distributed emergency supplies.
Distributed maintenance capacity.
Distributed data and backup systems.
And multiple international partners capable of contributing interoperable capabilities where practical.
This does not mean duplicating everything everywhere.
Redundancy has a cost.
The objective is to identify systems whose failure would produce disproportionate national consequences and give those systems credible alternatives.
For example, not every island needs a major port.
But strategically important regions should have alternative ways to receive fuel, food, medical supplies and equipment.
Not every community needs a military airfield.
But the national aviation system should have contingency arrangements for using multiple airports during emergencies.
Not every facility needs its own satellite network.
But critical government communications should not depend on a single pathway.
Resilience is therefore a design principle.
It should be incorporated when infrastructure is built rather than added after a crisis.
A network of partners, not a collection of dependencies
The Philippines therefore has an interest in a broad security network involving the United States, Japan, Australia, South Korea, ASEAN partners and other countries willing to cooperate on maritime awareness, disaster response, logistics, cybersecurity, communications, Coast Guard operations and defense-industrial capability.
This does not require treating every partner as a military ally.
Different countries can contribute different things.
One may provide intelligence.
Another may provide maritime surveillance.
Another may provide disaster-response equipment.
Another may provide shipbuilding or maintenance expertise.
Another may provide satellite services.
Another may provide training.
Another may provide financing or industrial partnerships.
The objective is not to create a mini-American military.
Nor is it to isolate the Philippines from external security cooperation.
It is to build a Philippine system that can plug into many networks without becoming dependent on only one.
That is the distinction between interoperability and dependency.
Interoperability means our systems can work with others.
Dependency means our systems cannot function without them.
The first should be pursued.
The second should be managed.
From presence to resilience
The objective should not be permanent American presence everywhere.
It should not be dependence on American presence everywhere.
And it should not be Philippine isolation.
The objective should be a Philippine defense and resilience system that becomes more capable through American and other partnerships while remaining functional when external assistance is delayed, redirected or temporarily unavailable.
That is the strategic meaning of redundancy.
One partner should not be the only source of intelligence.
One satellite should not be the only communications pathway.
One port should not be the only logistics gateway.
One fuel terminal should not be the only energy lifeline.
One aircraft type should not be the only means of moving people.
One command center should not be the only place where decisions can be made.
And one platform should never be mistaken for an entire capability.
The Philippine test
The ultimate question for Philippine defense planning should therefore be simple:
Can the Philippines continue to see, decide, move, communicate, supply, protect and recover when conditions are worse than expected?
That is the test of an archipelagic defense system.
It is also the test of an alliance.
And it is the test of every major defense acquisition.
Indonesia’s carrier is interesting not because the Philippines should copy Indonesia.
It is interesting because it forces us to think about what an archipelagic state actually needs.
Thailand reminds us that a sophisticated platform can lose much of its intended capability if the surrounding system cannot be sustained.
Indonesia is now testing whether an aviation ship can be transformed into a useful helicopter, drone, command and disaster-response platform.
The Philippines can learn from both without necessarily buying what either country bought.
And the wider maritime environment teaches an even larger lesson.
We should expect disruption without assuming permanent closure.
We should expect allies to help without assuming they can always be everywhere.
We should expect technology to create new capabilities while also making disruption cheaper.
The response should therefore be neither isolation nor dependence.
It should be integration with resilience.
Capability, not symbolism.
Resilience, not dependency.
Integration, not accumulation.
Redundancy, not duplication for its own sake.
America will remain an important variable in Philippine security.
China will remain an important variable in the regional environment.
Taiwan, Korea, the Middle East, Russia, global shipping, energy markets, climate and technology will create additional variables that Manila cannot control.
But there is one variable the Philippines can influence directly:
how resilient its own national system is.
The Philippines does not need to be able to do everything alone.
It needs to be able to keep functioning while working with others.
That is the difference between having allies and having resilience.
And in a world of multiple fronts, multiple chokepoints, contested networks and uncertain availability, resilience is not a backup plan.
It is the foundation on which an alliance becomes useful.
President Marcos seems to operate under these guidelines, perhaps because they are reasoned, and reasonable, and he has good guidance. DFA’s deft handling of China’s protest of Philippine approval ofTaiwan’s proposed Cebu consulate is a good example. The gist of the Philippine positioning:
Marcos has built defense alliances and economic exchanges among many nations. The Philippines is far less isolated than under Duterte yet somehow has built its own strength of national character rather than undermining it. The relationship with the US is being handled maturely, without hissy fits.
It’s all fairly impressive, frankly.
It seems Trump told the world that after the mid-terms he will decide whether it will be peace or annihilation.
I am no longer believing any word Trump says because he is sooooo flexible.
hah, you got me worried, I thought you said trump is gullible! flexible pala, sorry. treated like a king and praised like one, and trump hums with pleasure. anybody who can sing trumps’ tune will likely be heard. macron seems to be one foot out and one foot in, whereas burnam of uk is greener than a horn, and has yet to find his political feet, burnam seems to be anti semite and fearful of the burgeoning muslim vote in uk, while the german chancellor is facing election backlash.
I am not sure if Joey was serioys in the unli munitions of the US, I still say they have a replenushmenr problem and our Typhons stocked here might be pulled out, the Houthis are not like Hezbollah they have a mind of their own.
Trump is a world class bullshitter, but for now he seems to be much more occupied with “building his legacy” with his planned monuments and building renamings than any serious policy.
The Iran War is a serious crisis for the global economy, and it is Trump’s fault for starting it after being goaded by Israel and Saudi. Saudi turned out to be a paper tiger. There is some truth that the Europeans probably should take a pragmatic stance and help more, but it’s not helpful when Trump keeps insulting them. There were signs in the defense chiefs meeting between the US, Israel, Arab states, and Europeans a few days ago, but for the Europeans appearing to come to Trump’s aid would be political suicide, especially with the rise of European far-right parties. The whole authoritarian axis (including Trump, and Duterte before) and Western far-right parties is not an organic phenomenon but one pushed by the Russians through online misinformation and buying political parties, something that analysts have been saying for 10 years and people are waking up to.
In Asia, USINDOPACOM is a stable presence, along with other democratic allies. Yes, those democratic allies are reaching out to reassure Taiwan and the Philippines with demonstrated military overtures, but USINDOPACOM (and the US) is the driving coordinating force. Trump may not be that interested even in Asia, but people in his administration are. US SECDEF Hegseth is another jerk, to the Europeans, but he is very diplomatic to Asian allies, including the Philippines. One outlier was Trump getting mad at the South Koreans (just a week after his administration called South Korea a “model ally” in comparison to the Europeans), but that too looks like it has passed. All in all, I think Asian allies are much more pragmatic than the sometimes prideful Europeans. There is even serious talk that the US Navy will buy a new class of frigates from the Japanese or South Koreans. In times like this, pragmatism and biding one’s time is needed. Things will change a lot after the midterms as Democrats even if only winning the US House will be able to restrict all budgets. After that, only 2 more years of pain until this cancer is excised. Americans are waking up. Even MAGAs. Since culture wars and hating immigrants doesn’t buy gas, diesel, or food.
As for the EDCA stockpiles (including Typhon, NASAMS, HIMARS, etc.), I doubt those will be pulled out for now, if at all. The most needed weapons are high-end interceptors, such as THAAD and Patriot, which are defensive rather than offensive like the EDCA stockpiles. The other weapons stockpiled in EDCA sites are also not that useful in the Middle East unless there is a ground invasion. The main problem the Philippines (and Taiwan) has is not that the US won’t come to help in case greater conflict breaks out; it’s that the US is far away geographically and would take time to arrive on scene, which was the purpose of stockpiling stuff at EDCA that was “forgotten” but really was an informal defense articles transfer to the Philippines (so China can’t lob false accusations that the Philippines is arming) to defend the Philippines until the US and other allies rush over.
I doubt China could successfully invade Taiwan, because if they could they would’ve. The terrain of Taiwan is really unsuitable for beach landings except at specific sites, which are heavily defended. Instead, China’s plan is to capture the Taiwanese KMT party (they invited the traitor leader of KMT to China for a summit) and if that doesn’t work then an economic blockade encirclement, but that assumes South Korea, Japan, Australia, and the US won’t do anything about it. I know certain Chinese diaspora observers have been predicting the CCP’s collapse for decades now, but to be honest in the videos smuggled over the Great Firewall I’ve seen, things are not looking good internally for China. Social unrest everywhere and Chinese people openly and sarcastically mocking the government on Chinese social media (which is heavily monitored). Recently there is a flood of such videos on American social media as well (chiefly X/Twitter). Who knows. We can only hope our governments are getting prepared and staying vigilant.
The Japanese and South Korean frigates in question:
https://www.twz.com/sea/the-three-foreign-frigates-being-studied-for-possible-u-s-navy-service
There are also large multilateral procurements such as icebreakers (Finland, Canada, US). Continued purchases of F-35s by Europeans. Armament co-development. Drone co-development. Drone CCA “fighters” are being discussed with technology sharing between US-NATO. France wants to lead a “unified Europe” but only if France gets to lead it, which rubs other Europeans the wrong way. Franco-German 6th gen fighter project falling apart recently because as usual the French want the Germans to pay for everything while France gets to build it. So a lot of the stuff we see on the news is political posturing for domestic audiences in each respective country. Alliances seem to be working as they should. I don’t see any reason why the Europeans need to officially help in the Iran War as that would be politically bad for them, especially with liberal governments feeling shaky in face of Russian-sponsored far-right parties — likely what will happen is Europe will set up its own independent force that works with the US in the Middle East where objectives align, like always and like it should be.
The Houthis is a different story for the UK, so it seems. They will assist the Saudis.
AFAIK the UK has only promised aerial refueling for the Saudi Air Force, the same as the USAF is currently providing. Which is a bit strange as the Saudi Air Force has 10 brand new Airbus A330 Voyager refuelers vs the Royal Air Force having 14 of the same aircraft (and not being able to task all 14 to the Middle East at the same time). I think the Iran War exposed the Saudi military as being entirely incompetent despite having around 450 top tier fighter jets and fighter bombers from the US, UK/Germany, and France.
macho! saudi arabia needs to increase participation of women in the military. at the moment, women’s number is limited though the crown prince’s vision 2030 encourages more participation of women, but we are not in 2030 yet. female boots are needed now whether gay, lesbian, widow, spinters, hetero or whatever. the crown prince can lead example by having his own royal sisters join the military instead of imprisoning them in the royal enclave of women, the royal women seems to be unhappy with their lot, rarely heard and seen, so much time spent on useless pursuit like shopping, my thoughts.
in world war 2, women stepped up to keep nations going, while men went to war.
When I worked in the Middle East petrochemical area, I observed that Middle Eastern oil shiekhdoms are indolent and think they can pay for everything. Everyone is on state welfare, their form of ayuda, where even the “poorest” families can afford to hire a Filipino, Indonesian, Malaysian, or Indian helper. Sometimes more than one helper. Almost no Arab in those countries work, except for higher-ranking tribal sons who have an official position as a manager but day-to-day work is done by a foreign manager. So their armies are the same — ghost soldiers drawing a salary, the only effective soldiers being the royal bodyguard and hired mercenaries. High-end military equipment is mostly for-show to domestic audiences. They are people made lazy by easy oil money. Perhaps Paul can speak more on that as he is an actual petrochemical engineer with a lot of experience in the Middle East, while I worked there in IT doing projects for multinationals where I just happened to have a project there.
Here’s a short overview of how the rentier system works in GCC countries:
In oil-exporting Middle Eastern nations, the phenomena of ghost workers and ghost soldiers are highly prevalent. These practices are deeply rooted in the region’s rentier economic models, where oil revenues fund vast patronage networks, state-subsidized employment, and military structures.
👻 Ghost Soldiers (Military Sector)
In conflict-affected oil states, military payrolls are frequently inflated by fictitious or absent troops. This allows corrupt commanders to pocket the extra salaries or lets soldiers work civilian jobs while giving a cut to their officers.
🏢 Ghost Workers (Civil Service & Private Sector)
In wealthier Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) oil monarchies—such as Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Oman—the “ghost worker” phenomenon takes on a different form. Rather than simple military fraud, it functions as a mechanism of wealth distribution or a loophole to bypass strict labor laws.
I asked a different question but quite related
Saudi Arabia does not have a Universal Basic Income (UBI). While the Saudi government provides an extensive social safety net, its cash transfers are not universal; they are means-tested and targeted toward lower- and middle-income nationals.The fact-check behind how Saudi citizens interact with state support reveals a shifting economic landscape:1. The “Citizen Account Program” (Welfare)The claim that a vast portion of the population relies on state assistance stems from the rollout of the Citizen Account Program (Hissab al-Mowaten).When the program launched, roughly half of the Saudi population qualified for and received these monthly cash transfers.Why it isn’t UBI: A true Universal Basic Income is paid to every citizen regardless of wealth or employment status. The Saudi program is specifically designed to buffer low- and middle-income families against rising costs from newly introduced taxes (like VAT) and reduced utility subsidies. Wealthier citizens do not receive it.2. Public Sector Employment vs. WelfareHistorically, Saudi citizens haven’t relied on traditional “welfare” handouts as their primary income, but rather on government jobs.The state has long used its massive oil revenue to fund a bloated public sector.Roughly two-thirds of employed Saudi citizens have historically worked in government positions, which offer stable salaries and generous benefits. This is often described by economists as a form of indirect wealth distribution.3. Broad State SubsidiesEven without a UBI, Saudi nationals benefit from cradle-to-grave state provisions funded by energy exports. These include free healthcare, free higher education, and historically heavily subsidized fuel, water, and electricity—though the kingdom has been scaling back these subsidies under its Vision 2030 economic reforms to diversify away from oil.
Yes Karl, I suppose it is more correct to say that most Saudis are technically not on welfare/ayuda. The rentier system is a make-work system and effectively is a welfare system though. For example on one of my stints in the ME, my official title was “assistant to the project manager” with the Saudi guy who was from a prominent tribe being the “project manager;” in practice I was the project manager, getting paid very high rates even compared to the US consulting rate, while the Saudi “project manager” preferred to drink tea and not show up to work, while getting paid even more than I did. A few years back when Vision 2030 was first rolled out the expectation that Saudis take up more of the work burden nearly toppled MBS’ rule, forcing MBS to promise to ramp up the work requirements much more slowly. That’s how entrenched the rentier system is there. All GCC countries have a type of rentier system but the Saudi one is next level.
For your reading pleasure (and because I’m running meetings at work today):
the shenanigans done by the middle eastern arabs have come back to bite them. they had mostly looked toward the west namely, united states to provide them with peace and security in their respective countries. they just did not see this coming, with trump being president of the most powerful nation on earth, uppending world order and putting americans first.
and surprise! middle east is being crippled with their oil nowhere to go, hemmed in by the marauding houthis and the iranians.
trump does not seem to be doing a thing to contain the houthis. so long as the houthis wont attack americans, trump wont attack the houthis.
There are some theories floating around intelligence analysts that Trump is crippling Saudi Arabia on purpose to boost US oil exports, namely in diesel. The observation is like in the 1970s following the OPEC embargo, it would provide short term gains for the US oil industry while crippling US oil trade for decades (last time it took about 40 years to recover). Who knows? The only two choices to stop Trump is the US Congress, which is Republican controlled and supine, or the American people booting Trump allows out of power in November. It will need to be the latter.
Without knowing how to use all of them what’s the use of having an armada. China will be exposed one day of having zero war experience.
china may have zero war experience but let us not be fooled. I heard along the grape vine that top rank but retired personnel of both the american military as well as australian military are paid bigger bucks to train chinese in the art of flying close combat in the sky, they are apparently training in budapest, hungary.
Former U.S. Air Force Officer Is Accused of Training Chinese Military Pilots – The New York Times https://share.google/GVXkoFSo3yIceFuTo
US, ‘Five Eyes’ allies warn China recruiting Western military trainers | Reuters https://share.google/AyRlgr2fJYb2t6Rlr
If I may
Whether foreign trainers can compensate for China’s lack of combat experience is one of the most heavily debated topics among global military strategists, and the short answer is that it can narrow the gap, but it cannot entirely replace the crucible of real warfare.The People’s Liberation Army (PLA) has not fought a major war since its brief conflict with Vietnam in 1979. To overcome this “peace disease”, Beijing has aggressively recruited foreign military personnel—ranging from hiring former Western fighter pilots via South African flight schools to exchange programs with combat-tested partners like Russia.Military analysts view the effectiveness of this strategy through two distinct lenses.Where Foreign Trainers Help: Tapping Into Western and Russian ExpertiseForeign trainers act as a significant “capability multiplier” for China in several key areas:Understanding Adversary Tactics: By recruiting former pilots and air operations personnel from Five Eyes alliance nations (the US, UK, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand), the PLA gains direct, unclassified insights into how Western militaries train, structure their flight operations, and execute carrier landings.Absorbing Modern Battlefield Lessons: Joint exercises and training programs with Russia allow the PLA to study data and tactics emerging from high-intensity, large-scale maneuver warfare, such as the conflict in Ukraine.Standardizing Technical Skills: Trainers can fast-track the PLA’s ability to operate complex, modern hardware. It is far faster to have a veteran instructor teach advanced aerial maneuvers than to figure them out through trial and error.Why Trainers Cannot Fully Replace War ExperienceDespite these gains, intelligence agencies and think tanks like the RAND Corporation point out that classroom instruction and controlled drills cannot replicate the chaotic realities of a real battlefield:The Psychological Reality of Friction: A foreign instructor can teach a commander how a system should work, but they cannot simulate the psychological toll of losing comrades, managing broken logistics under fire, or dealing with communication blackouts.Command Flexibility vs. Political Control: The PLA possesses a rigid command structure heavily overseen by Chinese Communist Party (CCP) political cadres. Foreign training often emphasizes decentralized, flexible decision-making (like Western mission command), which clashes structurally with the PLA’s top-down political architecture.The Unpredictability of Great Power Conflict: The US military has spent decades adjusting its tactics through active operations in the Middle East and observing recent dynamic conflicts, such as the war in Iran. China’s reliance on simulated training means its operational doctrines remain entirely unproven against a live, adapting adversary.Ultimately, foreign trainers help China build a highly sophisticated, technically competent foundation. However, history shows that when a military goes to war for the first time in decades, the first few weeks are defined by steep, bloody learning curves as theoretical training collides with unpredictable combat realities.Would you like to explore how Western governments are legally cracking down on former pilots training the PLA, or would you prefer an analysis of how China uses massive simulation centers like Zhurihe to mimic real combat?
China’s Military Has No Combat Experience: Does It Matter? | RAND https://share.google/GAVurjWsZdh2qRvFZ
I would put China’s public bravado similar to the Asian Games China-Japan men’s basketball game the other day, where Chinese state media trumpeted with great confidence the match as “righting historic wrongs.” Following the huge defeat of team China, all mention of the matchup was scrubbed from Chinese social media.
But then again China has a huge population of military-aged males, as it always had throughout history. My dad, who graduated military academy in strategy, observed that no matter how incompetent the Chinese military is (China usually only won in its history when led by a foreign emperor), the Chinese army could still line up at the border and stop their pants to take a piss, and the resultant tidal wave would be calamity in itself.
I dont know if this count was no combat experience but china has been in constant war drills with russia and north korea, and even with india. china has done numerous military drills right near the strait of taiwan, and also in the sea just off japan, much to the consternation of both taiwan and japan.
few years back, china had military skirmishes with india re border dispute. there were casualties on both sides, india has five, china refused to say the number of chinese casualties. china even practiced firing live missiles into the sea near australia and fired live missiles into the sky too, australia sent protest as well as new zealand as chinese missiles nearly caused havoc to commercial airliners plying their air routes. the missiles were only detected by foreign pilots and duly reported back to control tower who then warned pilots to keep away.
That plus hope of deescslation
And plus a little bit of this
The support builds on the UK’s existing military contribution to Saudi Arabia’s air defence, including the deployment of air defence equipment and UK personnel helping to protect against missile and drone attacks.
Saudi Arabia and Yemen are long-standing partners of the United Kingdom and play a vital role in regional stability. It is in the UK’s interest to protect regional stability, protecting vital trade and energy supplies and encouraging a diplomatic resolution to the conflict in Yemen.
I think, saudi arabia is only one of the three key actors in yemen, the iran backed houthis, and the part of yemen backed by the united arab emirates are the other two. the houthis control the capital city of sanaa, also a large part of northern and eastern yemen where most country people live, houthis also control the red sea and has been busy hitting saudi arabia with missiles as well as burning western ships in the red sea, and bringing death to filipino sailors aboard those ships.
That sums it all up perfectly.
Yes, all true as to what you said.
The Saudis are lazy and think they can buy everything with oil money (the “oil sheikhs” I wrote about before), but since energy is a global market it’s still in the national interest of other countries to help deescalate, even though doing so basically helps Iran and its proxies survive. The recognized Yemeni government is Saudi-supported — the Houthis are a criminal tribal gang that transformed Yemen’s most productive coffee lands (the Port of Mokha was what the name of coffee “mocha” comes from) to production of khat, an addictive drug they use to control populations under them.
The US, which is “oil independent,” still can’t escape global prices. US national gas price is now $4.48/gallon (P74.35/liter) and diesel price is now $6.53/gallon (P108.38/liter). Just insane prices for the US. MAGA is breaking over this, but I feel bad that the rest of the world needs to suffer also.
it’s probly understandable if trump is recently decoupling from south korea and giving south korea the cold shoulder. kasi, the new president of south korea seems to be pro-china in approach, unlike his predecessor who was mostly western in both approaches and attitude. noticed how the new president of south korea did not seem please with our defense chief gilbert teodoro when teodoro was in south korea giving a speech about west phil sea? teodoro was rebuffed by a chinese heckler who tried to derail teodoro in midspeech by handing teodoro a note. teodoro was supposed to capitulate to chinese demand and change his speech, but did not and went on to call off the bullying chinese.
I would characterize the current South Korean government as taking an approach of pragmatic engagement — after all China is a huge trading partner for South Korea too. On the South Koreans’ displeasure of Teodoro’s disarming of the Chinese note, I haven’t seen any South Korean statements beyond clarifying that the note did indeed come from the Chinese embassy military attache. In South Korean media there has been nothing but high praise for Teodoro and the Philippines in standing up to China.
ah, I was talking about the south korean president, his face was wooden, whereas the south korean populace were generally taken by our teodoro, their comments in social media were favorable, I supposed they have not seen the likes of teodoro who was unbendable to the chinese.
I wouldn’t read too much into South Korean President Jae-myung’s wooden facial expression — Koreans are famous for being stern-faced especially in formal situations, which the conference was. Rather I look to South Korean state press releases and newspapers of record, which all heavily criticized China for having bad manners (echoing Teodoro’s remarks on the same). Under Jae-myung South Korea has greatly increased defense and economic cooperation with the Philippines; in contrast with the verbally theatrical criminal ex-president Yoon who made promises but did not follow through fully. In East Asian cultures they usually don’t release bombast and theatrics is frowned upon, except for Mainland China which lost its culture through the Cultural Revolution. If one wants to know what the “real Chinese culture” is like, it is preserved in Taiwan.
Long ago I once dated a daughter of a rich South Korean businessman, who I thought hated me since he never once smiled around me — I only found out later he saw me as a potential son who could take over his business. The mother not once praised my Korean cooking, responding only with a grunt while finishing the food, which a Korean explained to me was equivalent to high praise. I thought that was an outlier, until I worked in South Korea and realized stern looks are typical of Koreans.
you could be right, though I hope your president trump is not taken by all that woodenness to scale back relations with south korea, and cutting military exercises quoting the high cost of drills. and not because south korea refused to join in the war against iran.
Trump bleats out what he wants when he feels like it. I would not assign a US president, even Trump who has illegally taken powers unopposed by Congress, as having dictatorial powers. Almost immediately, USINDOPACOM, USFK, DoD, State Department, UN Command (leftover of original UN-sanctioned mission to defend South Korea), and representatives of the US-South Korea-Japan trilateral put out statements of reassurance and set up alternative exercises. Besides the exercises were not cut as substantially as Trump demanded in the first place as the DoD “slow-walked” the command. In the US, just like in South Korea, the functioning of the state and the military don’t depend on only one man (the president). The Eastern alliances are intact and doing just fine, just like NATO is doing fine. Otherwise the US wouldn’t be reaching out to buy frigates from South Korea and Japan, or icebreakers and other weapons from the Europeans.
as for the frigates, others seen it as competition between south korea, japan and turkiye as to who among them can best build a frigate the meet american standard and demand. and the competition is still open. I think, trump is trying to piss off south korea for leaning towards china, for trump is now trying to be diplomatic with north korea’s kim jum un and has picked up their stalled relationship with a proposed visit.
Personally I like the Japanese frigate, especially the lengthened version that has more missile tubes. The South Korean frigate is well-balanced and practical. The Turkish frigate isn’t really proven yet so I worry it will be chosen based on Trump’s relationship with Erdogan.
I don’t see South Korea as leaning towards China at all. They are balancing their trade and many of South Korea’s decoupling trade from defense is quite similar to Vietnam. One cannot ignore the huge country right at the border (North Korea being a Chinese proxy). I don’t think much will come from Trump’s overtures to Kim Jong Un. His goal is to get the Nobel Peace Prize.
Thanks for this
Philippine Insurgent Records with Associated Records of the U.S. War Department, 1967–1967 OT, the USA has just made the records it has of the Katipunan and the Philippine-American War available to the general public online.. great for research.
I downloaded a document in one of the files. Two gigabytes of PDF, lol, took five minutes. The document is a collection of mostly handwritten notes from 1897(?). This would be fascinating stuff to rummage through, but the handwriting escapes my interpretation. I suspect there are some poignant jewels, as the series I was reading seemed to detail the troubles troops were having meeting time schedules laid down by superiors. One bewailed that they had to hunt down water buffalo to cary their packs across flooding rivers. Another reported that they ate poisoned chicken.
Here’s an excerpt from a typed note I was able to reconstruct:
“While the Pay is writing the request I have time to write a line. I am sure you would be grieved to see the Prince at present –he rides all day in his pajamas and tan shoes; he has lost a great deal of his majestic presence & you can hardly see his truly royal moustache in the shadow of the beard that has grown on him.
We are enjoying ourselves in spite of a few disconforts — We all got poisoned on a chicken yesterday & the whole party of seven sought the lee rail and moaned for about an hour — Today is the first clear day we have had.
Truly y—
(Signed)
SARGENT.”
being able to download digitalized copies of original documents is a huge advancement from how researchers of old had to work – either handling the originals with gloves after being given them by the archivist, sometimes weeks after having requested them – or later going through microfilms of the originals. Just having to PHYSICALLY go to Madrid (Spanish war archives) or Sevilla (Spanish colonial archives) or Washington was something only few researchers from the Philippines could do because of visa/cost constraints.
Doing basic research still is a slog even digitally, I never had the patience for that. Unlike my brother who went through the 19th century shipping schedules of Hapag Lloyd in Hamburg, Germany for his doctorate on German businesses in the Philippines from the late 19th century to 1916 (when Germans in Manila either had to become Filipino citizens or have their assets seized as enemies when the USA joined WW1) to find out how often their ships came to Manila. Or my mother who among other things slogged through the Jesuit files at the Bavarian State Archive in Munich for her doctorate on European studies of Philippine languages, finding some gems but also a lot of curious stuff like Austrian and Bavarian Jesuits BESEECHING their superiors to be sent somewhere else than the Philippines (as an order founded by a soldier, Jesuits were bound to obey so all they could do was beseech higher-ups) as in those days, it was about a year of travel by ship from Europe (one was almost on another planet) while Latin America was just 2-3 weeks away.
We who write journalistically about history might utilize scholarly sources but often don’t realize how THEY had to pan for gold in a lot of slush. People who read journalistic summaries based on scholarly sources, or even worse those who check out social media summaries of journalistic or academic work, often take all that totally for granted. The worst are of course those who believe they can pass judgement based on extremely little knowledge, while the scholars themselves know how incomplete their knowledge is.
Thanks Irineo for sharing.
One of the greatest unrecognized strengths of the Philippines is the extensive record-keeping done by people such as escribanos and ladinos starting from the Spanish period. Such bureaucratic habit can morph into something overbearing, like spawning a plethora of clearances today which are sometimes used as a gatekeeping mechanism, but the habit also captures a picture of the Philippines that may appear mundane at the time but is useful for later study. Americans have a similar habit of recordership.
Something I’ve been interested of late is diving into the research on the Champa Empire, Khmer Empire, and the Empire of Đại Việt, all 3 empires previously having an extensive recordkeeping bureaucracy whose records were lost in a centuries-long succession of Mainland SEA wars and foreign occupation (the French weren’t that interested in preserving records of the occupied). In Mainland SEA, records often need to be reconstructed from Chinese records which obviously are heavily biased, though Ayutthaya/Siam (Thailand) which avoided colonization does also have a large source of records (also biased though as Ayutthaya/Siam was rival to the previously 3 mentioned pre-modern states).
The availability of contemporaneous first-hand accounts makes me scratch my head sometimes at why certain Filipino scholars feel a need to exaggerate (going as far in some cases as fantasized conjecture around a Western-envy frame). This behavior, sometimes quite pronounced, sometimes less so but existent, among writers of the educated classes may be a cultural interpretation of feelings of inadequacy (as relates to the Western-envy frame), but it overlooks the strengths of the Philippines that are present even in the mundane everyday. That’s why William Henry Scott will always be one of my favorite writers on the Philippine topic, where Scott went through original records in order to reconstruct what really happened, pointing out what is good.
The point about disruption becoming structural rather than episodic has direct implications for how Philippine businesses plan their operations. When shipping routes lengthen and delivery schedules become unpredictable, the companies that absorb the shock fastest are those with integrated visibility across procurement, inventory, and finance, while fragmented, spreadsheet-based workflows tend to break precisely when the pressure is highest. The conversation around ERP software in the Philippines has historically been framed as an efficiency argument, but the scenario this article describes reframes it as a resilience one: firms that can see their supply chain position in real time and respond automatically are simply better positioned to keep operating when the external environment turns unpredictable.
Thanks for your insights Roniele.