The US and Philippines are kissing cousins
Analysis and Opinion
By Joe America
The term “ironclad relationship” drives me nuts. So trite, so lacking in specifics. It is used to keep China guessing, a subtle threat I suppose. Well, no worries. The US is clearly building on EDCA, the proverbial foot in the door, to expand its military foundation in the Philippines.
- The US proposes that the Philippines manufacture munitions in Subic. Great for both nations if tons of nitroglycerine don’t bother you.
- The US proposes that the Philippines gas up its warships in Mindanao, something like a 42 million gallon commitment. Rather biggish. Also good for the Philippines.
- The US has left behind some missile systems after training, and AFP undoubtedly loves the idea. China does not.
- Defense Secretary Teodoro is pushing Philippine interests, seeking more robust US assistance during the damaging storms that rake across the nation like raptor claws across a brontosaurus’ neck.
- The US dropped 1% off the Philippine tariff rate, dropping it from 20% to 19%. Whoopie. Japan got a bigger cut, so it’s just like post WWII, the Philippines is a second class ally. Do take note.
- President Trump dissed ICC guest Duterte and thanked President Marcos, definitely a warm embrace. Trump thinks the Philippines should not cozy up to China. Boy will President Sara be a wrench in the harmony.
So we are kissing cousins for now, not brothers in arms. Useful to one another.
President Marcos is well-served by being respected in America. Good for restoring the family reputation. And the Philippines can get real jobs from the US intrusion here, not flake jobs like pogos or Chinese rail projects that never get built.
Is the US knitting a security blanket or a bulls eye target over the Philippines? I don’t know, and my bookie has disappeared again, chasing skirts I suppose. So he’s no help. Risk assessments and guessing are also kissing cousins, I figure.
The US will take care of the US. The Philippines must be firm in getting value for the services it chooses to provide to the US. Chooses. The Philippines is the master of its destiny, not the US. Or should be anyway.
My confidence level in Defense Secretary Teodoro is 95%, extraordinarily high for any human in government service. For President Marcos, it’s 85%, which beats the 35% I had when he was first elected. Sara Duterte is at 3% and Senate President Escudero is at rock bottom 0%.
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Cover photo from South China Morning Post article “US missile system to remain in Philippines to give China ‘sleepless nights’”
The Society of Honor by Joe America 
ahem, I dont know what ironclad exactly is, though I have an idea. america is there when needed, we are assured, but we are summat hesitant to cross that bridge. fear of the unknown? fear of commitment? fear of summat losing our sovereignty? though our sovereignty can be greatly enhanced with the backing of estados unidos. they have the resources we lack, the knowhow we dont have, the technology and whatnots. our the status quo seems okay for now, help is coming and our country is still ours. and in our own way, we do our own heavy lifting and continue to do so.
kissing cousins, that would be too presumptuous for me due to the implication that cousins are on the same side of the family, etc. we may have similar core values, but.
I always thought our relationship with estados unidos is to be treasured, not brought down to the level of cousins, let alone kissing cousins. we have our own secrets, estados unidos most likely have theirs too, and there are parts of our psyche we dont want others to pry, and we have borders. maybe not for long if we let technology get the better of us. with neuralllink, it is highly possible that our last frontier of privacy, what’s in our most inner thoughts, in our minds, will become open secret for anyone to access, assessed and canvassed.
yes, we are friends and ally with estados unidos but I draw the line at kissing cousins. though I will take the lead of estados unidos and so far, trump has not said we are kissing cousins, so I’ll take his lead and refrain myself from saying so. this is just the humble filipino in me saying, just being cautious and dont wanna offend the world’s big daddy.
joeam being american may well be the kissing cousin of his fellow americans, but for filipinos like me, I know my place. I’m never good in beso beso.
This strikes a balance.
Watched Ambassador Romualdes interview with Channel news Asia and said that Trump is willing to go down to fifteen percent. Senator Imee Marcos wants it down to ten percent.
I think my dream of friendshoring defense materiel to the PH manufacturing will push through even just a small part of it.
Refuelling must be paid somehow, no free lunch as Trump himself keep on hammering.
The companies that import Philippine products will pay the tariffs or stop buying from the low-cost Philippines. That’s out of Philippine control. What the Philippines can do is find other markets for products and identify products with high labor content where tariffs don’t hurt so much because the labor cost advantage offsets them.
Ah, thanks so much!
We have to find the Middle ground and make most of it.
We have to find Middle Earth again.
And be hobbits
In regards to friendshoring defense production, ammo production will be a start. Small arms ammo, then 105mm and 155mm artillery shells, then rocket/missile bodies. I think a big mistake thinkers among Filipino policy makers have made for decades is since they themselves often live in a “first world” bubble, they somehow think the Philippines can get to the finish line all in one jump. South Korea’s defense industry got started by following the above — being a supplier for lower end defense matériel for the US and for themselves.
For the proposal of refueling, the Philippines would be wise to adopt the model Japan, South Korea, Germany, Italy, and UK use. The immense economic opportunity for the local economies adjacent to US bases supplying services, foodstuffs, and eventually perhaps maintenance contracts is a benefit in itself. But the ultimate benefit is having US troops acting as a tripwire against Russian or PRC aggressors. If the USN and USCG don’t need to go back to Yokosuka, Japan or to Singapore to refuel and rearm area assigned warships, then those ships have more time on patrol, creating a deterrence effect against PRC. It was not a coincidence that 3 years after the USN was forced out of Subic Bay, the PRC started encroaching on the territory of the militarily weakest ASEAN nation. I’m of the school of thought that experience and innovative tactics trump quantity and even quality; having the USN and USCG onsite also creates learning opportunities for the PN and PCG, further upgrading the Philippines’ own capabilities.
They say reach for the stars. Mybe we are reaching way beond that. Low lyig fruits often fall to the ground first so tey got thrown away most of the time.
Yes, but also consider that the ripened fruits that fall first are often the sweetest and are used to make kiamoy. The best local dried mangos (not the export ones) are made from fruits that fall at the slightest touch.
To reach the stars one must first build up the know how and manufacturing facilities to create rocket ships and rocket fuel. Astronauts need to be trained from expert (aerospace) pilots.
In the context of Philippines defense, we may follow the logical path that if the Philippines wants to build an indigenous assault rifle suited for Filipino soldiers, then first ammunition manufacturing must be perfected. If the PN is to have a capable defensive naval force, then first smaller boats such as patrol boats for the PCG must be manufactured to gain experience.
Agree on all points
Kissing cousins. Italians do it in public, I suppose. The French French kisses so they say. LCX might say this is incest, then so it goes.
I cannot picture myself kissing mousolini, haha. and I hated liberty, equality, fraternity, it caused frenzied violence of a mob, and caused the life of a young dauphin and his mother with both of them dying in a very horrific way.
Haha another nice one.
Duterte was seen in the US as a blowhard, even among most Trumpistas. In my own conversations with fellow Americans, while liberals have reservations towards the Marcos family legacy, the common comment I hear is that Americans are pleasantly surprised with Marcos Jr. Time will tell if that sentiment holds, and that is up to Marcos Jr. to shape his own destiny.
Now obviously most people are proud of their nation. Sometimes that pride is based on historicity; other times the pride is based in empty nationalism. Sometimes it is a combination of both. No one likes to have themselves talked badly of — and by extension their country.
Those who espouse the view of equality and liberty can have a view that the essence which makes a person is inherently equal and that all people deserve human rights. However, the way nations interact often has an trade basis. Not trade in a purely economic sense, but trade in the exchange of benefits (which may include economic benefits). In that trade relationship there is often a senior partner and a junior partner. The senior partner may respect the junior partner if the senior is generous, but the junior partner should exercise caution as to not offend the senior partner from who they derive more benefits from than is given back in the present moment.
Clearly the Philippines has many issues that the Philippines can either (slowly) fix by her own efforts and willpower of selfless politicians. Or the Philippines can leverage her relationship with the US in order to accelerate progress and reduce risk of inevitable roadblocks along the way. I have often found the Japanese and Koreans to be very prideful peoples, but they know when to temper their pride in relationships in order to gain benefits sooner. There is a reason why Japanese governments since 1952 (when US military administration of post-war Japan ended) and South Korean governments since 1987 (when South Korea transitioned to democracy from military dictatorship) have made efforts to reduce empty nationalist sentiments among their peoples. If a people already feel like they are “the best” and “most unique” people on this Earth, there is no amount of effort any government can exert in order to advance the country away from its existing problems. Humility is what allows one to see one’s own flaws so that the flaws may be corrected.
Filipino pride chicken is different I believe from Japanese, Korean or even German pride (which HAD to accept a huge blow in 1945, for good reason) in that it is based more on what Joe called face and power, meaning image, than on values and substance.
Germany took a blow to its pride, had to cooperate with those who defeated it, learned a lot from the USA in the Western part, and rebuilt to actually have substance to be proud of.
The wrong kind of Filipino pride will wait for a foreigner who happened to stare at a drunken Pinoy the wrong way in a bar at the next streetcorner, or shoot a neighbor because she sings “I don’t care” to your daughter, see article below.
The second case shows how little it is the fault of colonialism, of the kanluranin or Westernized Filipinos, or anyone else that there is that kind of wrong pride there.
The Indonesian cousins of the Filipinos can also have enormous pride, but they for instance had the likes of Habibie who initiated a gradual technology and skill transfer with German industrial partners he knew from having studied there. BTW there are a lot of Indonesians studying in Germany, probably more than in Holland, the old colonizer. There might still be more open wounds to pride in the relationship with the Dutch but there are clearly none with regards to their German cousins.
I am on the record BTW for having always favored the Philippines having a multilateral approach, yes building a good relationship with Uncle Sam the AFAM (joke lang) but also reaching across the sea to Vietnam as allies (even if that is hard as there is a history of conflict as well between the two in the sea, and Filipinos lack the cool to make alliances even locally so it is hard to realize), working with Taiwan and Japan (check, is working) and learning from Indonesia as the cultural DNA is similar, no excuse that “those recipes are only for da white pipol.” So secure things on many sides in case “McArthur leaves again” which is the argument some have, that McArthur left the Philippines when it was in need. C’mon the USA does leave at times when it has to, especially when overstretched.
The expectation that international relations work like how they worked between Manila and Brunei before Spain came, to some extent between Spain and the principalia for centuries, and with early 20th century USA, as a kind of rajah-datu patronage, should be abandoned, but also the insistence on absolute sovereignty that no longer exists today. Even Switzerland has accepted a number of EU rules, of course with full referenda on them, in their democratic and VERY sovereign tradition. The Philippines will have to learn to define its interests and work for them maturely, not in a dependent way. But then again it has difficulties growing up even in its institutions, as the last days have shown. I won’t even get into the excitability and gullibility of the public there, no new rants.
P.S. relinking Joe’s classic on Face and Power below.
Heneral Luna BTW when he wasn’t a general yet and even when he was one had the immature attitude, looking for fights and duels with Spanish journalists in Madrid, for instance. Once he even challenged Rizal to a duel, who would have easily killed him as he was better in both sword and pistol, but Rizal told him to sleep off his drink and think about it the next morning – he apologized, didn’t run to Singapore.
I have dabbled a bit with a childhood fascination in Polynesian cultures, in which there is a concept of “mana” that is tied closely to magic and the supernatural. The Polynesian chiefs of old and warriors would engage in feats of strength and bravery in order to collect mana. But an insult could also be taken as reducing one’s mana — as an enemy stealing one’s mana. The Cebuano and Ilonngo term “gahum” seems to have a similar and close relation to the Polynesian mana, and surely there existed similar concepts in the root proto-Philippine languages.
As such when I observe pride in a Filipino context, it often appears to be an expression of gahum, which does lose some of its meaning when expressed in English as “face” and “image” in conflation with East Asian concepts of face and image which is rooted in systems of morality rather than magic. While modern Filipinos may have lost the direct connection to the magical aspect, collection of power is inherently magical.
So one may see some connection between Filipino indignation of the “colonizer” pushing the Philippines around when let’s say, the US or EU have certain human rights conditions before economic aid is disbursed, or when nationalistic Filipinos feel “insulted” that gifts in military equipment are “hand me downs.”
As to regional alliances it might be high time to revive SEATO and do it right this time. Unlike the last time around where the Philippines was in a much better position, the Philippines probably needs to accept she will not have a leading role in a regional alliance. Equality of respect should be good enough, if policy deciders are smart. Silly arguments like Sabah or the status of where the territorial sea should be demarcated between the Philippines and Vietnam should be discussed with respectful diplomacy. If based on historical claim alone as some Filipino nationalists demand, Vietnam has the stronger claim to the Eastern Sea/West Philippine Sea being a unified state since ancient times that exerted actual naval control in her near maritime compared to the Philippines which is an amalgamation of disconnected pre-Spanish local polities that are still in the process of unifying to this day. Vietnam, Indonesia and Malaysia are all militarily stronger than the Philippines by far having more modern navies, with more unified states, yet they chose to take the diplomatic route regarding territorial disputes between the SEA maritime. And so too should the Philippines. Pragmatic neighbors would consider historical precedent as well as present circumstance. Otherwise neighbors end up like Thailand and Cambodia, two revisionist countries warring over slivers of land and sea (which are clearly Cambodian) for nationalistic purposes.
the thailand – cambodia border clashes bombardment is now in its 4th day. I find it weird that china has much infras in cambodia like airports, modern ports and pontoons, etc, and yet is staying silent despite missiles being fired. as well, there are also lots of chinese in cambodia, so why china’s silence! when china water cannoned our supply ship bound for the shoal, united states personnel was nearby, ready to lend a hand. all we have to do is ask, but did not and escalation is averted. china must have been very disappointed with us, we deny china the opportunity to showcase the might of its navy.
apparently the border dispute between thailand and cambodia is to be addressed at a summit in united states. I thought china would be heehawing by now! telling thailand to back off. instead of just leaving it to the rest of the world to figure out a peace deal for the two warring nation.
ah, now I think I got it! china promise to defend cambodia is not ironclad. had it been ironclad, cambodia would have gotten prompt military intel from china, and would have been prepared before the 1st thai missile breached cambodia’s air space. not scrambling at the last minute when action trounced decision, the time for critical thinking is no longer an option.
china did not have cambodia’s back.
Going back thousands of years agreements with Han governments have always been one-sided in favor of the Han. An integral part of the Han myth is they are at the center of the universe (hence, “Middle Kingdom”), and they have a Mandate of Heaven over everything they touch and do not touch. Simply establishing diplomatic relations was seen as submission, and as such to this day there is a strain of Chinese nationalism that believes the PRC has a right to the Ryukyus, Formosa, the entirety of Vietnam, the Koreas, Myanmar, Thailand, Cambodia, Laos, and so on simply because some random ancient Han went there and touched it before. You get my drift.
In mainland SEA the territorial situation is quite complicated. The Khmers (Cambodians) have a cultural memory of being a powerful empire and are quite upset at the Siamese (Thais), Burmese, but especially upset at the Vietnamese for carving off chunks of their former empire. In Cambodia there is a sentiment that the Vietnamese are so hated that even a Siamese or Han (also hated) are more trusted. Then the Siamese and Vietnamese don’t like each other. Both don’t like the Burmese, and right backatcha. Keep in mind all these states are quite warlike and duked it out for millennia, though the Vietnamese are probably the most “peaceful” among the mainland SEA, but paradoxically are the most aggressive when provoked. Bad blood against the Vietnamese who had been the regional dual-hegemon together with Siam for centuries until the final peace accords in 1991 often causes things to come to a boil. Such is the hate against the Vietnamese by Khmers that they let the Chinese infiltrate their country, and while Siam had long ago stopped at the prior colonial borders, the recent discovery of new temples hidden under the jungle has caused the Siamese nationalists to demand the seizure of that territory, although the temples are of clear Khmer design. You see both the Siamese and Khmers consider themselves as the protectors of Theravada Buddhism, but so do the Burmese! Ironically the temples whose underlying territory is of dispute were originally Mahayana Buddhist…
Compared to all that, the Philippines is and has always been a relatively peaceful place. Historical isolation and distance from trade routes may inhibit progress, but also provide safety.
philippines is not landlocked unlike vietnam, thailand, cambodia, india, pakistan, etc. they shared borders.
surrounded by bodies of water, philippines is by her lonesome but has strong allies like japan, south korea, united states, etc. china is our trade partner but not ally.
sec of state blinkin had reiterated that US – Phil alliance is ironclad, that united states has ironclad security commitment to the philippines. that is very heartening to hear. the bodies of water that surrounds our country is open and must be kept open not only for trade and navigational purposes but for our national security as well. by ironclad I take it to mean philippines have a seat on the table and participate in our allies collective planning, we are not kept knowledge poor, can avoid making false assumption, and may well be prepared to make critical decision when time comes.
My worry is that in a potential scenario of war breaking out in Asia over PRC aggression, it will be in tandem with Russia and North Korea. South Korea will be busy plugging the DMZ, while Japan needs to secure the Sea of Japan. Taiwan and the Philippines would probably experience another “I will return” MacArthur moment. It would simply take time to race manpower and assets across the Pacific; such is the tyranny of distance.
Which makes all more important the need to work more closely with SEA neighbors both in the mainland and in the maritime who are closer physically. Nationalism in Vietnam, Indonesia and Malaysia with respect to the East Sea/West Philippine Sea is discouraged by those governments. They probably see that it’s not productive to squabble over atolls and sea mounts at this moment. While the Philippines might not be the leader in such a SEA alliance, it likely is in the Philippines’ best interest to work together on such things like joint patrols and military exchange.
Nokor is arming russia with considered obsolte weapons thatsomehow are still useful to Russia and providing special forces to fight Ukraine, as leverage to help them with Sokor and the west.
CRINK has reason to volt-in.
Instead of reasons let us call it ammunition.
Iran’s nuclear program busted, the west fighting back by sanctions and war preparations, now this Indo-Pacific with India aligned with te West militarily, but with BRICS economically.
https://geopoliticalfutures.com/chinas-strategy/
Han China is surrounded within China by regions populated by what are essentially other nations. The four most significant are Tibet in the southwest, Xinjiang in the northwest, Inner Mongolia in the north, and Manchuria in the northeast. The first three are recognized by Beijing as autonomous regions while Manchuria is a larger region made up of three northeastern provinces. Obviously, there are Mongolians who live in Han China and Han Chinese who live in Inner Mongolia. No region is homogenous, but these four regions, with the limited exception of Manchuria, are not dominated by ethnic Han Chinese. About half the territory of what we consider China actually consists of Han Chinese people…..
https://geopoliticalfutures.com/china-and-the-philippines/
Eased tensions between the two reveals some of the dynamics at play between China and the United States. China’s strategic problem is that it depends on international trade, particularly for minerals, and on exports, particularly to the United States. Exports account for about 20 percent of China’s gross domestic product.
From this, it follows that the most important Chinese imperative is to maintain exports, and the greatest threat to its exports is if China were denied access to the global sea lanes. The ports on China’s east coast are the key to China’s economy. If they were closed or interdicted for any reason, the Chinese economy would be stunned at least and shattered at most.
There is a sense in the United States and elsewhere that China is a potentially offensive nation. In fact, it is a fundamentally defensive nation. Its fear is that the U.S. would try, by military action or otherwise, to close China’s ports or prevent its ships from transporting goods. This necessitates from China a military strategy designed to limit U.S. access to the South China Sea and guarantee its own access to the Pacific.
The line of islands running from Taiwan to Indonesia is the key to solving China’s strategic problem. The islands provide limited passage into the Pacific and are narrow enough that U.S. naval forces could block the relatively narrow gaps they create. There is a great deal of discussion about China’s intentions toward Taiwan. An invasion of Taiwan would require amphibious forces to move across the Taiwan Straits, where they would be vulnerable to Taiwanese or American anti-ship missiles….
old articles,but the more things change,the more they stay the same.
In mainland East Asia “Han” has more nuance. There are the Han who originated from the northern plains of China (Beijing is within this area), and then there are others who the PRC government says are Han but don’t identify as Han themselves. The latter are sizable in number and are descend from non-Han ethnicities that were forcibly assimilated over a period of 2,000 years, i.e. the Yue of the southern coasts or the Tai of the inland south.
Until the recent end of the imperial period, Peking (Beijing) considered Vietnamese and Koreans to be “Han” as well and tried to unsuccessfully force assimilation for about 1,000 years. And Beijing stopped overtly trying to force Han identity on Vietnam and South Korea because both countries have a credible military that while might not win against PRC if alone, would put a whole world of hurt like when the PRC tried to invade Vietnam in 1979. So if we were to ask a Hongkonger, Hokkien, Hakka, Teochew, Cantonese, Taishanese if they are Han, they would emphatically say no even if the PRC officially identifies them as Han.
There are many PRC nationalists, of which a good number are indirectly employed by the PRC government as wumao information commissars online and in public, who still carry a corrupted version of that sentiment and it drives nationalism within the PRC. An expression of that nationalism is a main driver of the aggression towards the Philippines.
5 Maps That Explain China’s Strategy
ByJohn Mauldin,
Former Contributor. President of Mauldin Economics
Feb 25, 2016, 08:12am ESTFeb 25, 2016, 10:01am ESTShareSave
This article is more than 9 years old.
The sharp decline in Chinese stock markets on Monday is a reminder of two things. The first is the continued fragility of the Chinese market. The second is that any economic dysfunction has political implications, both in Chinese domestic and foreign policy. This, in turn, will affect Chinese economic performance. It is essential, therefore, to understand Chinese national strategy.
The People’s Republic of China (PRC) has been portrayed as an increasingly aggressive country prepared to challenge the United States. At the same time, aside from relatively minor forays into the South and East China Seas, China has avoided significant involvement in the troubles roiling in the rest of Eurasia. There is a gap between what is generally expected of China and what China actually does. To understand what China’s actual national strategy is, it is helpful to follow the logic inherent in the following five maps.
Let’s begin by defining what we mean by China. First, there is the China we see on maps. But there is also the China inhabited by the Han Chinese, the main Chinese ethnic group. Maps of the Chinese state and the ethnic group would look very different.
Han China is surrounded within China by regions populated by what are essentially other nations. The four most significant are Tibet in the southwest, Xinjiang in the northwest, Inner Mongolia in the north, and Manchuria in the northeast. The first three are recognized by Beijing as autonomous regions while Manchuria is a larger region made up of three northeastern provinces. Obviously, there are Mongolians who live in Han China and Han Chinese who live in Inner Mongolia. No region is homogenous, but these four regions, with the limited exception of Manchuria, are not dominated by ethnic Han Chinese. About half the territory of what we consider China actually consists of Han Chinese people.
These four regions are a buffer around China, providing strategic depth to repel invaders. All four, at one time or another, resisted Chinese domination, as Tibet and Xinjiang still do today. Xinjiang is predominantly Muslim, and an insurgency and terrorist movement is particularly active there. Tibet is less active but no less opposed to Chinese domination. Inner Mongolia and Manchuria are generally content at the moment. The mood in these regions varies, but China must always be concerned to maintain control.
Not incidentally, a very similar geography emerges when we look at rainfall patterns. Roughly 15 inches of annual rainfall is needed to maintain an agricultural economy. This line, called the 15-inch Isohyet, is shown in the next map along with areas of population density in the People’s Republic of China.
The area east of the 15-inch Isohyet is Han China plus parts of Manchuria. The area to the west and north are the buffers along with some Han Chinese regions that are lightly populated. So one of the reasons Han China can dominate the buffer states is its relative population advantage. But this also means that the population of China, totaling 1.4 billion people, is crowded into a much smaller area than an ordinary map would show and much farther from most neighbors of the PRC. But for now, the rainfall line roughly defines the limits of what we think of as the Chinese.
The next map adds to this picture. It is a map of annual per capita income by province. It shows an underlying division in China east of the 15-inch Isohyet. First, the economic difference between Han China and the rest of the PRC is striking. Per capita income in the western buffers is between 30 and 50 percent lower than the median income in the rest of China. And the area in China that is above the median—some more than 100 percent above the median—is a thin strip of provinces along the coast. The interior of Han China is not as bad off as the western buffers, but is still well below conditions along the coast. Economically, only the coast is above the median. Every other area is below it. And this defines a division in Han China itself.
However, per capita income is not a measure of economic well-being since it doesn’t tell us anything about the distribution of wealth. A better measure is household income. According to World Bank data, over 650 million Chinese citizens live in households earning less than $4 a day. Just under half of those live in households earning less than $3.10 a day—or about $1,000 a year.
This alone doesn’t capture the true reality. Obviously, the overwhelming majority of these people live outside the coastal region since the coastal region is much wealthier. Put another way, most Chinese wealth is concentrated 200 miles from the coast. The next 500–1,000 miles west is a land of Han Chinese living in Third World poverty. The China that most Westerners think about is the thin strip along the coast. The fact is that China is an overwhelmingly poor country with a thin veneer of prosperity.
We can already see some strategic realities emerging, but before we turn to that, we need to consider the next map—a terrain map of the areas surrounding China.
China’s southern border consists of the Himalayas in the west and hilly jungle country in the east. It is impossible to conduct major military operations in the Himalayas, so talk of a Chinese-Indian conflict is only possible for those who have never tried to supply an army. Similarly, as the British and Americas have discovered, conducting military operations in the hilly jungles of southeast Asia is a nightmare. China can’t invade anyone through the south over land, nor can it be invaded. Southern China is protected by a true Great Wall.
To the north, the PRC is bordered by Siberia. In the far east of Siberia, it is possible to conduct war, but no country has ever tried or conceived of waging an extended war, including invasion into Siberia, nor has any country attempted to mount an invasion from Siberia. Therefore, except for the Pacific Coast, China is secure and contained.
There is occasional talk about Chinese military operations in Central Asia. First, this would have to take place through the hostile territory of Tibet or Xinjiang. The major forces and supplies would have to be transported over 1,000 miles from the industrial base in Han China to the Chinese border. The supply lines would pass through desert and mountains. An invasion of Astana in Kazakhstan would require travelling a distance of at least 700 miles through mountains and near desert grasslands. Fighting in these ranges is as unlikely as invading over the Himalayas.
In effect, China is an island in Eurasia. It can move money around and sometimes technology, but not large modern armies. Therefore, China is not a threat to its neighbors, nor are they a threat to China. China’s primary strategic interest is maintaining the territorial integrity of China from internal threats. If it lost control of Tibet or Xinjiang, the PRC’s borders would move far east, the buffer for Han China would disappear, and then China would face a strategic crisis. Therefore, its goal is to prevent that crisis by suppressing any independence movement in Tibet or Xinjiang.
An equally urgent task is to assure that social conflict does not arise between the coastal region and the Han interior. The loss of foreign export opportunities has placed pressure on the coast. Beijing’s interest in maintaining stability in the interior requires transfers of money from the coast. However, the coast’s interests are focused on the United States, Europe, and the rest of Asia since these are the coast’s trading partners and the interior is incapable of purchasing the coast’s products. No stimulus imaginable can raise the interior’s income levels to the point that this area could become a market for the coast given the poverty they live in currently. This would be a multi-generational project.
This is not a new problem for China. Prior to Britain and the Opium Wars in the 19th century, China was enclosed, isolated, and relatively united. When the British opened China, massive inequality between the coast and the interior arose with the coastal region being more integrated into the global economy than into China’s economy. This led to regionalism and warlords, as each region had unique interests. Mao went into the interior on the Long March, raised a peasant army, destroyed the regional leadership, and enclosed China. China was poor but united. With his death, China went into the next phase of its cycle—reopening itself and betting that this time the coastal-interior split wouldn’t arise.
The split has arisen, but the political consequences have not yet played themselves out, and the strategy of the Communist Party is to forestall this by a combination of repressing any sign of opposition and a massive purge among the economic leadership. This is designed to both hold the coastal wealthy and the interior poor in check. Whether this will work depends on whether the People’s Liberation Army, essentially a domestic security force, can withstand the forces tugging it in various directions. Notably, a purge and reorganization has just begun in the PLA.
The core strategy of China is internal. It has only one external strategic interest—the seas to the east.
China has vital maritime interests built around global trade. The problem is the sea lanes are not under its control, but rather under American control. In addition, China has a geographic problem. Its coastal seas are the South China Sea, south of Taiwan, and the East China Sea, to its north. Both seas are surrounded by archipelagos of island states ranging from Japan to Singapore with narrow passages between them. These passages could be closed at will by the US Navy. The US could, if it chose, blockade China. In national strategy, the question of intent is secondary to the question of capability. Since the US is capable of this, China is looking for a counter.
One counter would be to establish naval bases elsewhere in Asia. However, isolated by a US blockade from these bases, this would be of little use besides shaping regional psychology. Ultimately, the Chinese must create a force that would make it impossible to block access to the Indian and Pacific Oceans. The Chinese are aiming to build a navy that could match the US; however, there are two obstacles to this. First, building warships and support vessels and facilities is fiendishly expensive, and China has put an urgent priority on domestic issues in the interior. Second, building ships is not the same as building a navy. Ships must be forged into fleets, and this requires commanders and staffs experienced in very complex warfare. China has little naval tradition, and building those staffs without a tradition to draw on is not something that would take a generation. Admirals who know how to fight carrier wars are as essential as aircraft carriers.
China’s stop-gap measure is its large number of anti-ship missiles. These missiles are designed to push the United States back from crucial choke points in the seas surrounding China. The problem with these missiles is that the US can destroy them. The US can’t close the choke points while the missiles are there, but the US has the capability to map China’s anti-ship network and attack it before moving into the choke points. China then must control at least some of these strategic passages from air, sea, and land on the islands of the archipelago. And the key island, Taiwan, is beyond China’s ability to seize.
The Chinese currently are unable to break through the cordon the US can place around the exits. China is, therefore, buying time by trying to appear more capable than it is. Beijing is doing this by carrying out strategically insignificant maneuvers in the East and South China Seas, which should be considered less engagement than posturing. China will maintain this posture until it has the time and resources to close the gap. Under the best of circumstances, this will take at least a generation, and China is not operating under the best of circumstances.
China, therefore, has three strategic imperatives, two of them internal and one unattainable in any meaningful time frame. First, it must maintain control over Xinjiang and Tibet. Second, it must preserve the regime and prevent regionalism through repressive actions and purges. Third, it must find a solution to its enclosure in the East and South China Seas. In the meantime, it must assert a naval capability in the region without triggering an American response that the Chinese are not ready to deal with.
The Chinese geopolitical reality is that it is an isolated country that is also deeply divided internally. Its strategic priority, therefore, is internal stability. Isolation amidst internal disorder has been China’s worst case scenario. The government of President Jinping Xi is working aggressively to avert this instability, and this issue defines everything else China does. The historical precedent is that China will regionalize and become internally unstable. Therefore, Xi is trying to avert historical precedent.
Yes, gahum is indeed used as a term by Pantayong Pananaw, a bit of a concession I guess to the growing.. gahum of Visayans within the nation. MLQ3 uses the malakas/mahina model as the main drivers of Philippine society, meaning being perceived as malakas is a win and being perceived as mahina is a loss. Words matter a lot in that context, there is even research about how inuman sessions are about the status of the people within the group. In his old essay “Maybe is No”, my father wrote that insults are “tantamount to destroying the person himself”, and thus “he rises in defense of his life” – in the context of insults to Filipinos by colonial powers.
A lot of things fall neatly into place with gahum/mana, including why the masa respected Bong Revilla openly flaunting NOT abiding by the rulings against him and dancing budots across the country. It was a big FU to the law and a show of gahum.
You mentioned in another comment that morality isn’t that strong yet in the Philippine context and yes, gahum is the reason. If one looks at Game of Thrones or the Netflix series Vikings, these people to had more tribal “power” values. I have compared how DDS look down upon Filipino liberals with how the Vikings invading Northern England looked down upon the Anglo-Saxons and their priests.
Somehow Marcos Jr. and his clique understand gahum better. Contrast how Mar Roxas responded to challenges by Duterte in 2016 vs. how General Nicolas Torre responded to the challenge by Baste Duterte when it came to boxing. Thas is remiscent to how in the conflict with the Vikings, the Anglo-Saxons found back to the values of some generations before and fought back.
Back to relationships between neighbors, it is difficult to reconcile diplomacy with gahum. PNoy was often portrayed as servile towards foreign partners because he was just being polite. Well, he was a bit like.. who was that in Vikings, the Anglo Saxon ruler Ecbert vs. the Viking warlord Ragnar. A Filipino leader who wants to not lose gahum internally has to somehow find a way to portray a deal with the Malaysians, the Vietnamese etc. as a “good deal” a la Trump. Germany managed similar sleights of hand by for instance de facto accepting borders after 1949 but appeasing the archconservatives here by defining that a permanent solution would have to wait for full sovereignty and German unity.
Modern Filipinos (similar to the Anglo-Saxons in “Vikings”) need to use more “gahum” in dealing with the “Vikings” among their fellow Filipinos. Marcos Jr. and his group did that better by for instance arresting Quiboloy, breaking his gahum. Similar with how they broke the gahum of Duterte, making him a helpless old man imprisoned in the Hague, no matter how much his followers dance magical budots in front of that jail. By that same model, they made for instance De Lima indirectly subordinate to Marcos Jr. by a) releasing her and b) Remulla asking the DOJ prosecutors to back down. It is like telling one’s big dog not to attack a person.
Once one is perceived as “malakas” or having “gahum” one can make deals with others without being perceived as a pushover. Quezon in a gentlemanly way that wasn’t that gentle, Magsaysay in a folksy way and Ramos in a military way all understood these unwritten rules of Philippine society and politics. Javanese like every Indonesian President so far are probably also perceived as magical in their society, maybe it is a more evolved, modern form of magical power. That isn’t as established in the Philippines yet. I used to joke that the Philippines missed the chance of making Ramos into the constitutional monarch of the Philippines. He did have some resemblance to the late King Bhumibol of Thailand.
general torre won the bout! baste has gone to singapore reminiscent of a dog with tail between his legs, kinulang ng gahum.
https://newsinfo.inquirer.net/2087701/gen-torre-wins-by-default-in-boxing-match-with-baste-duterte?utm_source=(direct)&utm_medium=gallery
Consider also the “ultimate gahum,” that is to say, elevation to pseudo-demigod whereupon the subject lives on long after his death as echoes in the memory of his followers’ beliefs. Sometimes seemingly harmless elevation of let’s say, Rizal, ends up being detrimental as it takes away from Rizal’s real accomplishments turning him into some kind of abstract saint so full of goodness one can never hope to emulate. It’s much easier to emulate something, someone who seems more ordinary. People perform small feats of unacknowledged bravery, generosity, empathy, sometimes on a daily basis. Someone like Digong who portrays himself as an Everyman tribune of the people are in my view, the most dangerous candidates to receive this ultimate gahum that will survive long after he is gone.
When in Visayan (and Tausug) places once I get to know my hosts, at times I’ve been described as having gahum in demeanor, but also “isug.” Isug as you may know from Bikolano, has a primary meaning of brave courage and fierceness, but like many words in Visayan languages there is a dual meaning — a positive aspect and a negative aspect that coincides with the spiritual (Cham culture is like this also, as this seems to have a proto-Austronesian root). The negative aspect of isug is a mindless violence that may border on cruelty. There appears to often be a duality of meaning in words closer to the root culture.
Morality is a human construct and not inherent to “human-ness.” For example the concept of “human rights” has Enlightenment roots, and its expectation across the world is more of an imposition of Western values from a globally dominant group of cultures which derived from that Enlightenment than some universal, inherent ideal. In East Asia the morality framework is different and derives from East Asian philosophy (“Hundred Schools of Thought”).
I have been thinking for years whether or not the disconnect between the Western and the Filipino could be a major roadblock to Philippines advancement. Perhaps not enough time has elapsed to allow passive permeation of ideas. Then again, it seems to me that even after the influences of Hinduism, Buddhism, and Islam that arrived before the Spanish brought the first building blocks of Western thought, the base culture of Filipinos still didn’t change that much unless one was of a higher class that clung more closely to association with the foreign power. I mean, in many far away provinces today one can find Filipinos living more or less the way Filipinos have always lived, with the addition of modern accoutrements like a mobile phone, motor, TV, or similar. People plant their crops the same way, and harvest the ripened produce the same way. I first learned how to climb a coconut tree to gather buko the “Filipino way” by a kuya I met long ago. I had already learned how to climb coconut trees barehanded, or using a rope thrown around the trunk. He took out his “sanggot” and cut footholds into the coconut trunk, and effectively was able to scamper up the tree much faster more like a monkey than like a bear.
I think a lot of what higher classes imitated from foreign powers was more of clout chasing to show they were close to powerful patrons. Sure, some of the foreign influence seeped in, but one can see how quickly the “Islamic” leaders of Maynila turned Catholic once the Spanish had proven themselves more “malakas”. Especially after they won against Brunei in 1588. It was a bit different for Philippine elites when the USA came, as in those already established clung to Spanish as distinction, while the new and rising elites for instance in Bikol were “Americanistas” as the new rulers gave them a chance to rise. Maybe the Filipino “wumao” groups of today are similar in that they see a chance to rise above older elites that are more Western-oriented.
As for lifestyle, yes, even UP Balara in the early 1970s was basically the barangay of old transplanted to the edge of the city. With our gardener from the Visayas as one of the first to have a color TV. And the sound of squealing pigs slaughtered.
Most Filipinos still live in bahay kubos in the 1910s. Transistor radios grew in coverage until they reached 100% in the early 1970s, which coincided with the USAID funded program to electrify the provinces. The mindset of most Filipinos isn’t too far from the old mindset of what I call 1521+. Think of Lapu-Lapu put into a time machine and landing in 2021, freaking out more than Buck Rodgers. That is what the dillema of the Filipino today essentially is.
I had read somewhere once that in Polynesian culture collecting objects of power is a type of mana accumulation. On the other side of the Austronesia-Melanesia-Oceania the indigenous Taiwanese also practice a similar cultural ritual. It might be possible that overall Filipinos outside of the elite are still essentially “stuck” in what you called 1521+ mentality; well even some elites might be stuck too. The various accoutrements are what I joke as a form of cargo cultism. Which by the way the cargo cults of the Melanesians have some seeming similarities to the collection of gahum — while genetic studies have shown that Melanesians only have small percentages of Austronesian admixture, the Melanesians were heavily influenced from proto-Austronesian languages during the Austronesian expansion and it could be logical to conclude there was a religious influence as well. Well, that’s my conjecture from a lay perspective.
Speaking of bahay kubo/payag, people in the provinces that still live in such houses are slightly better off farmers to show their relative wealth. There actually seems to be a regression in knowledge in even building a kubo/payag with locally available materials. I see many more houses in the provinces that are built with salvaged materials. The poor people who have some extra remittance from an OFW may let’s say build sections of walls or a CR made out of concrete or hollow block lacking rebar reinforcement not to build a better house, but as a way to say “I’m richer than you” (to the neighbor). These concrete and hollow block sections are built haphazardly without even basic knowledge in how to pour concrete or masonry work for hollow blocks, pool rain water on the floor from leaking roofs, and so on. I get it that general construction, masonry, roofing, electrical work are skilled labor that require being taught to do well, but the general principles are not that complicated and I have taken part in building many houses before. It makes me wonder if people who choose to spend money this way are in fact doing it for “hambog” on face, in another form of collecting gahum.
In order to change all these old habits that are no longer compatible for the modern world, especially now that the Philippines is no longer isolated across a sea from a looming aggressor, it would take an effort from the elites to educate and reinforce change of habit. But I guess, that would require the elites to change their own expressions of the habits first…
The Philippine concept of gahum is a rich, culturally rooted term that originates from Visayan languages, especially Cebuano and Hiligaynon, where gahum literally means power, authority, or influence. It is akin to the Filipino (Tagalog) term kapangyarihan. However, gahum carries with it deeper layers of social, cultural, and political significance, particularly in how power is exercised, perceived, and contested in Philippine society. 🔍 Basic Definition of Gahum
But gahum is not just the ability to act or control others — it embodies how power is embedded in relationships, social structures, and historical contexts. 📚 Elucidating Gahum: Beyond Literal Power 1. Gahum as Political Power
In Philippine politics, gahum often refers to who holds authority — from barangay captains to presidents — but more importantly, it reflects how such power is:
This resonates with the concept of patron-clientelism, where gahum is exchanged for loyalty or votes, not just legally held. 2. Gahum as Cultural and Social Power
Gahum is not always formal or legal. It also exists in:
Like Foucault’s view of power, gahum operates through norms, ideas, institutions, and even silence or exclusion. 3. Gahum as Historical Power
Philippine colonial history reveals how foreign powers wielded gahum:
Resistance movements — from Katipunan to Lumad uprisings — were struggles to reclaim or redistribute gahum. 🔄 Demystifying Gahum: Power as Relational and Contestable 1. Gahum is not absolute
Even those in power depend on others (supporters, soldiers, media). Gahum is negotiated, not merely imposed. 2. Gahum can be symbolic
Power doesn’t just lie in wealth or guns, but also in symbols, rituals, or narratives — such as titles (Don, Kapitan, Mayor), political slogans, or ancestral land claims. 3. Gahum can be challenged
People challenge gahum through:
Thus, gahum is a site of struggle — it can be abused, legitimized, redistributed, or even deconstructed. 🧠 Modern Applications: Gahum in Philippine Society Today
📖 Comparative Insight: Gahum vs. Western Notions of Power Concept Gahum Western Notion of Power (e.g., Foucault, Weber) Source Cultural, political, spiritual Institutional, discursive, coercive Nature Relational, embedded in hierarchy and reciprocity Dispersed, dynamic, often invisible Legitimacy Often tied to tradition, patronage, or charisma Tied to law, norms, or authority types Resistance Happens through revolt, satire, storytelling, electoral shifts Happens through counter-discourses, civil disobedience, etc. 🔚 Conclusion: Gahum as Living Power
To understand gahum is to see power not just as domination, but as a living force shaped by culture, history, and everyday life in the Philippines. It reminds us that:
If you’re writing or exploring this deeper, I can help contrast it further with Indigenous governance, postcolonial theory, or the idea of pakikisama, utang na loob, and hiya as soft forms of social gahum.
Power dynamics and asymmetry in the Philippines have deep historical roots that continue to shape its political, economic, and social realities today. These dynamics reflect persistent inequalities in access to wealth, land, education, and decision-making power, often influenced by colonial legacies, elite dominance, foreign intervention, and institutional weaknesses.
Below is an overview of major historical phases and the shifting forms of power asymmetry in the Philippines:
1. Precolonial Period (Before 1521)
Power Structure: Barangays and Datus
Power Asymmetry: Based on kinship networks, wealth from trade, and proximity to external powers (e.g., China, Brunei, Islamic sultanates).
2. Spanish Colonial Rule (1521–1898)
Power Structure: Centralized colonial bureaucracy and Church authority
Power Asymmetry:
3. American Period (1898–1946)
Power Structure: Colonial democracy with elite co-optation
Power Asymmetry:
4. Post-Independence Era (1946–1972)
Power Structure: Elite democracy
Power Asymmetry:
5. Martial Law and Marcos Dictatorship (1972–1986)
Power Structure: Centralized authoritarian regime
Power Asymmetry:
6. Post-EDSA Period (1986–Present)
Power Structure: Restored democracy with persistent elite capture
Power Asymmetry:
Contemporary Forms of Power Asymmetry Domain Dominant Actors Marginalized Groups Politics Political dynasties, party-list manipulation Youth, indigenous groups, grassroots movements Economy Oligarchic families, large conglomerates Farmers, informal workers, small fisherfolk Land Corporate landowners, real estate developers Agrarian reform beneficiaries, ancestral domain claimants Justice Wealthy and well-connected Urban poor, activists, dissenters Media/Information Big media, influencers tied to political interests Independent journalists, fact-checkers Key Takeaways
Would you like a visual timeline or case studies (e.g., Hacienda Luisita, Mindanao conflict, EDSA People Power) to further illustrate these asymmetries?
Chatgpt brainstorming and exploration
Your question — “Pinoy brown brother or an American doormat on trade, defense, security, and aid?” — is a powerful and provocative framing. It echoes the tension many Filipinos feel regarding the Philippines’ geopolitical identity and foreign policy posture, especially in relation to the United States and, by extension, other powers like China.
Let’s unpack both sides of this identity crisis and power dynamic:
🔶 1. “Pinoy Brown Brother” — Historical Ally or Junior Partner?
🔷 2. “American Doormat” — Strategic Ally or Geopolitical Pawn?
⚖️ 3. What Should the Philippines Be Instead?
🛡️ A Sovereign Middle Power:
📈 A Smart Economic Negotiator:
🧱 A Nation Building Its Own Strength:
🧠 Final Thought:
The Philippines doesn’t have to choose between being a Brown Brother or an American Doormat. It can — and must — assert its strategic agency. The path forward lies not in clinging to historical subservience or reactive nationalism, but in crafting a proactive, principled, and pragmatic foreign and economic policy based on sovereign interests.
If you’d like, I can help you draft a position paper, policy brief, or opinion piece based on this framing.
ChatGPT provides a nicely ordered parsing of the historical US/Philippine partnership. I don’t think “dependency” is a risk, as AFP is likely to be inspired to develop skills and materials itself rather than rely on the US. Filipinos are prideful, after all. And I think Secretary Teodoro and President Marcos wholly understand that they run Philippine defense, and the US does not. Developing the capacity to build weapons is a cherry on top of the mundane military marching about, as is a ship refueling capacity. And the jobs are welcome. Giving China something to think anout is a huge positive. Without the US, the Philippines would be a pushover. They’d already have taken the Sierra Madre and started building a base at Scarborough. My guess.
ahem, kung ako lang, I will take chatgpt’s mussing with a grain of salt. I bet china must have a hand in its mussing, leading us to a path of lest resistance where lies travel faster than truth, outrage outruns understanding, and personal failure become global spectacles, etc.
sa opinyon ko lang po, chatgpt is much jibberjabber, not really telling us anything new, and nothing that many filipinos dont already know.
AI systems run about fast scraping ideas from this paper or that and reordering millions of words into neat paragraphs that represent a statistical calculation of who said the most about it. By definition there can be nothing new. But it is packaged nicely and doesn’t leave anything but new ideas out. lol
I have found Google Deep Research to be a power tool, doing the work that it would take a research assistant two to three months. Of course, AI does not replace OWN understanding of the topic. I find Gemini the most neutral and careful in judging while Grok is totally wild as it feeds on the stuff that is on X. ChatGPT I am still experimenting with recently. Every tool has the inherent danger of making us lazy, for instance I used to be great in computing stuff manually but rely more on calculators nowadays. I sometimes forget names or details as searching for them has become too easy. But then again, there are laments from the dawn of time about writing damaging the human capacity to remember, I think it was in Egypt or Sumer, Joey might know.
I wish ancient people have written the musical notations that accompanied salome’s dance of the seven veils when she asked for the head of john the baptist! we could have replicate it everytime during lent in our play about the passion of the cross.
same with egyptian temple music, now we will never know what was king tut’s fave music. or the bridal music when queen nefertiti walked down the aisle and married pharaoh akhenaten.
I think, it is nice to have written record of everything; kept and archived, to be retrieve at a later date, at our convenience. we dont always remember details and forget events. now we take pictures to mark events, and kept them for posterity.
It is up to someone’s imagination and reimagination to reconstruct the music and the dances to be submitted to broadway or the Westend.
So far there is Joey the Dreamer, a musical of Joseph
Jesus Christ Super star
Maybe more
Ancient Egyptians used hieroglyphs to represent their music, though the exact sounds remain unknown due to a lack of surviving musical notation. While researchers have identified that Egyptians expressed music through hieroglyphs, no sources of notated music have been found. The number of distinct Egyptian hieroglyphs evolved over time. However, there is no information regarding scrolls specifically in the context of ancient Egyptian music. The specific details of their musical practices are largely speculative.
You’re asking for a deep research overview on ancient Egyptian music, particularly their use of hieroglyphs (or other forms) to capture or convey musical content. Here’s a thorough breakdown based on current scholarly understanding: 🎵 Evidence of Notation in Ancient Egypt 1. Cheironomy (hand‑sign “notation”)
2. Demotic papyrus markings
3. Greek musical notation in Graeco‑Roman Egypt
🎶 Reconstruction & Instrumental Evidence
🔍 Hieroglyphs & Semiotics
🧠 Key Scholarly Opinions
📊 Summary Table Topic What We Know What Remains Unknown Cheironomy Tomb scenes suggest hand signals guiding musicians Whether these represent codified intervals, and how precise they were Demotic papyri markings Red dots/crosses appear over text potentially indicating rhythmic cues Whether these are musical or literary recitation aids Greek musical notation in Egypt Present in Graeco-Roman papyri, reflecting Greek tradition No evidence of indigenous pre‑Hellenistic notation Depictions of instruments Extensive visual records; instrument replicas help infer playing techniques No surviving melodic structures or notation documents Music transmission Oral, traditional transmission assumed Exact scales, melodies, and rhythm forms remain speculative 🧭 Conclusion
If you’re interested, I can provide references to major Egyptological publications, deep dives into cheironomy, or examples of modern experimental reconstructions. Let me know which direction you’d like next!
thanks, karlG.
My pleasure.
The lament about writing damaging human memory came from the Egyptian myth about the invention (or transmittal from the gods) of writing. In the myth the god of wisdom and magic, Thoth, proposed giving humanity the gift of wisdom and (preserved) memory through writing. As writing was an expression of the wisdom of the gods, Ra objected that writing would have an opposite effect with humans becoming too reliant on things written down rather than memory. Thoth decided to give the gift of writing to the scribes, who in Ancient Egyptian religion also had a religious function.
Later Plato in his work Phaedrus recorded Socrates recounting the Egyptian myth, lamenting that writing weakened the necessity and power of memory, and that written things were only the repeating of the pretense of understanding without true understanding (implied to be the Socratic method of dialogic debate in order to ascertain the truth).
https://www.historyofinformation.com/detail.php?id=3439
Thanks guys for your replies.
Fascinating interview with journalist Karen House from a center-right viewpoint about how Saudi Arabia’s possible path to modernization without moving towards full freedom.
Over the years I have noticed analogous cultural traits between the Arabs and Filipinos. The Arabs have their own form of “datu-ism” in a patron-beneficiary relationship throughout Arab society. If the Arab export is oil, then the Filipino export is labor. In my experience working in the region years ago the Jordanians are the most Westernized, followed by the Kuwaitis, Dubai is somewhere in between, with the Saudis being the most non-Westernized.
Here at this timestamp Karen House discusses the crucial role Saudi women play in MBS’ modernization efforts. Thinking back to the Philippines, in the BPO industry wherever the Filipino side interfaces with the outside client, the leadership role is likely filled by a Filipina from what I’ve observed watching the BPO industry in Cebu and elsewhere. Many of the new small businesses and side hustles emerging in the Philippines in the last half-decade have largely been women led as well. Even back then 20 years ago I rarely saw school age boys engaging in sidelines to earn a bit of extra money for themselves or their family, but there were plenty of girls selling things or having odd jobs for sideline money.
Men also have their cartesian (descartes) contribution, though the oldest profession may have been both done by men and women.
ahem, know what they said about men and boys in ancient greece? I cannot repeat it. apparently it is common practice over there in the very olden days. we laughed about it when the nuns at the convent mentioned it in our biology class, something about population control. some boys are effeminate and dont get preggy.
haha