We Are Not Starting From Scratch: A Note on Continuity, Constraint, and National Learning By Karl Garcia

The Philippines is often spoken about as if it is perpetually beginning—resetting with every administration, rediscovering problems it has already named, relearning lessons already paid for in time, money, and sometimes lives. That framing is comforting in its simplicity, but it is also misleading.

We are not starting from scratch.

We are, instead, operating within a long accumulation of experience—policy experiments, institutional reforms, partial successes, repeated failures, and adaptive workarounds. The country is not a blank slate. It is a layered system of memory, some of it formal in law and planning documents, much of it informal in practice and lived governance.

To ignore this is to misdiagnose the problem.

The Philippines does not suffer primarily from a lack of knowledge. It suffers from uneven absorption of knowledge into durable systems. Lessons are learned, but not always retained. Policies are written, but not always institutionalized. Innovations emerge, but are often not scaled or protected from political turnover, bureaucratic fragmentation, or resource constraints.

And yet, despite this, the system moves. Sometimes slowly. Sometimes unevenly. But it moves.

This is important to acknowledge because it reframes what reform actually requires. The task is not simply to “introduce new ideas,” but to connect ideas across time—to build continuity where discontinuity has been the norm. It is to strengthen institutional memory, align incentives with execution, and reduce the gap between policy design and operational reality.

We also operate under constraints that are not entirely self-inflicted. Geography shapes logistics. Climate intensifies vulnerability. Global shocks ripple through domestic systems. Strategic competition in surrounding seas adds pressure that no single policy cycle can fully neutralize. These are not excuses; they are conditions.

But conditions are not destinies.

What is self-inflicted—and therefore most within our control—is the tendency to treat governance as episodic rather than cumulative. Each cycle risks discarding the partial gains of the previous one in favor of reinvention. In doing so, we lose compounding effects that are essential for national development.

If there is a quiet argument embedded here, it is this: progress is less about dramatic departures and more about disciplined accumulation. Institutions matter not because they are perfect, but because they allow societies to remember what works long enough to improve upon it.

This is also why writing, documentation, and even imperfect analysis matter. Ideas do not need to be final to be useful. They need to be transmissible. They need to survive contact with future readers—policy makers, students, analysts—who will inevitably operate under different constraints but may still face familiar problems.

If any of this survives revision, critique, or adaptation by those who come after, then it has done its work.

The hope is not that future decision-makers inherit certainty. It is that they inherit continuity.

And from continuity, improvement becomes possible.

Comments
56 Responses to “We Are Not Starting From Scratch: A Note on Continuity, Constraint, and National Learning By Karl Garcia”
  1. JoeAm's avatar JoeAm says:

    As I look at it, there are several factors that contribute to the slow-pace and start/stop jerkiness of progress in the Philippines.

    1. Democracy here runs in six year cycles so there is a major reset every six years, and this reset is extreme when voters do not elect rational platform-based presidents.
    2. The budget is an annual restatement that jerks money around and leaves projects half-built or never started.
    3. Plans are dreams finalized under laws that insert red tape as nightmares. Rights of way issues, land use, LGU ineptitude, NIMBY, all conspire to delay progress.

    Decision-making certainty can be improved by giving a major project prominence over time, politics, and laws. Certain laws should be subordinated to projects of national importance. Get politics, budgets, land use and rights of way, and LGUs out of the way.

    • Karl Garcia's avatar Karl Garcia says:

      Thanks Joe, this sums up and articulated my past long form articles and the one I scheduled next. Which I myself find redundant so I will replace it.

      • JoeAm's avatar JoeAm says:

        I note that younger, tech savvy oligarch family members are moving into key management roles. This is good I think.

        https://bilyonaryo.com/2026/04/21/next-gen-takeover-jaime-alfonso-named-globe-vice-chair-mariana-joins-board/technology/

        • Karl Garcia's avatar Karl Garcia says:

          Yes I think it is good too.
          But the one about a Lopez scoonand Razon is creating a Board room battle

          • kasambahay's avatar kasambahay says:

            battle for leadership, lopez vs lopez much like the marcoses with imee marcos contradicing her brother, but unlike the lopezes, imee can never take over the presidency.

            methink, if the lopezes dont settle their differences and go to court, lawyers will gain the most, financially! maybe, the lopezes will have arm wrestling na lang, cheaper that way: to the winner the spoils.

            whereas polong duterte is up to his old trick again, challenged madriaga, sara’s ex bagman, for a bout of boxing. and surprisingly enough, madriaga accepted the challenge. I am thinking tuloy na maybe, ex gen torre may have to give up his coveted boxing belt to the winner of the polong duterte vs madriaga bout.

            • Karl Garcia's avatar Karl Garcia says:

              TACO trump always chickens out to PACO

              • kasambahay's avatar kasambahay says:

                oh, I loved battles! blond vs brunette, I did not mean vice ganda who is blond these days, haha.

                anyhow, if I have to bring down the abstract, I would give it local context. and we could well be starting from chicken scratch, though we rarely starts from scratch, coz our scratching has long been thought of, just did not have the opportunity to bring it up, conditions were uberly hostile then. now, not so. what was started as sly scratch is finally gaining momentum and maybe imploding big time. but enough riddle!

                me talking about one of the grandest family of all, the embattled dutertes. the family is being consumed from the inside thanks to their own doings: the patriarch cannot escape the hague, the daughter is facing impeachment, and her once trusted bagman is witness against her. and now, she will be leaving the country and approved to be gone for 22 days, before impeachment could start. will she back, is everyone’s guess! but we hope she’ll be back.

                her nemesis, trillanes, has been scratching for so long, now his scratchings are being given time of day! the docus he has been keeping, the bank records of sara duterte, once ridiculed and laughed at loudly, are back in favor, have the potential to pin down sara’s unexplained wealth.

                maybe sebastian duterte will challenged trillanes to a boxing bout too, haha. instead of sebastian 38 to challenge madriaga 58, trillanes is younger and in better physical shape than madriaga. not that I am being boxing promoter.

                • Karl Garcia's avatar Karl Garcia says:

                  Haha one time Zubiri reninded everyine that he is a judo blackbelt when Sen Tri and him crossed. I think as long as The Dutertes won’t send Paquiao if they rub elbows again d na mismatch.
                  Bato is also a big man, he pulled Robin away from Villanueva once, but where is he?

                  • kasambahay's avatar kasambahay says:

                    when the going gets tough, the tough gets going! gone hiding bato is. self imposed. the great absentee has not been to work since november 2025, been stripped of his committee memberships too, his request to stay in the luxurious senate mansion in baguio was denied. but still collecting his regular pay, as well as enjoying perks and benefits like use of govt car. and if he dies of boredom from lack of meaningful work and developed brainrot due to lack of interaction, he’ll probly gets free state funeral too.

                    • Karl Garcia's avatar Karl Garcia says:

                      He is allocated a plot in Libingan ng mga bayani.

                    • kasambahay's avatar kasambahay says:

                      I’m not sure about that, if the great absentee happens to die, himself hidden so well where no one can find him, he would just have to be consumed by worms! given burial by worms: earth to earth, dust to dust, worms will have a grand humongous feast! by the time his mortal remain is found, he can only be identified by dna.

        • kasambahay's avatar kasambahay says:

          much I wanted to say congratulations for being vice chair, I see potential conflict arising. jaime alfonso zobel is sharing vice chairmanship with a singaporean telecom rep. two of them in that chair, I am reminded of the atlassian tech group, there were two directors and very good friends they were too until the two had a fallout, and one was ejected: voted to vamoosh!

          still, it is good to see younger zobels joining the business.

  2. Karl, I took the shameless liberty of adding a title picture to your article as I think it deserved one. Just a tip on how to generate such pictures: I went into Claude, pasted in the entire article text and asked it to make a Bing Image Generator prompt for the topic, then went to Bing and toyed around with different models (it has 3) or went back to Claude and asked for tweaks (more positive please, darker, brigher etc.) until the picture came out that I liked.

    I think in general our articles get more engagement if they have title pictures.

  3. Re national learning: we had a surge in visitors as I actively promoted the OPM article, then Coachella, then the Detroit article. This surge has tipped off again.

    Possibly the the music crowd read some of our stuff and thought “What is that?” and the technocratic crowd read our stuff and thought “Who are THEY?”.

    Ok maybe we don’t realize that the growth of national learning is taking place elsewhere, or is it simply too many spaces that don’t know how to talk to one another?

    There was this X account that correctly analyzed the issues BPO might get soon. There is Behind Asia FB page who are right on many economic matters. There are blogs like d0ctrine about traffic policies that are pretty sensible.

    And there is Heydarian who has some good ideas but is a bit too full of himself to dialog.

    • Joey Nguyen's avatar Joey Nguyen says:

      The written medium makes attracting a new audience quite difficult — less people read nowadays.

      Even I who reads voraciously find myself reading a bit less in recent years…

      What I find very useful is that audio podcasts are often now going video-first then just releasing both on YouTube and podcast platforms. I spend a lot of time listening to podcasts while driving or working on other stuff and switch between video and audio format when convenient. Even when I’m reading longform pieces I often have a podcast on in the background. Maybe I’m one of those weird people but I can multitask well.

      It would be interesting to have a Philippine podcast that actually is about important matters such as what is discussed in articles here, and not the usual Pinoy-cheerleading and what I term “Pinoy-slop” contents (inspired by “AI slop” heh).

      I fully maintain that Filipinos have always been capable, and most are more than open to learning; the problem is almost no one bothers to show them HOW they can use the ABILITY they already have.

      • Giancarlo was experimenting with AI-created videos some years ago based on the content here. Claude has already MASSIVELY improved so that is something we might try again, of course with selected and appropriately tightened articles.

        Karl has articles coming up with more pictorials and diagrams, which makes the text less daunting. Even I who was raised in a bookworm household (my father’s private library in UP had 10K books at some point, and still is huge even if it is now in the La Salle university library) I also am very visual.

        I preferred learning from American popular science books my father brought home from UP Clark when he taught there. They had really good pictorials.

        You probably know the Siemens mobile phones of the late 1990s which were notoriously unintuitive when it came to interface. Very German, just like the SAP interface still sucks, even as the more modern FIORI (HTML5-based) interface is slowly gaining ground.

        Modern Times (I see Charlie Chaplin my mind’s eye) make things both easier and harder, always.

        P.S. downloads for today. Yesterday there were none, after a flurry when I posted the article.

        P.P.S. re 1960s, yes most big firms were American. Even the ABS part of ABS-CBN started American while CBN came later, I still saw “Uncle Bob” the old GMA owner on Channel 7 as a kid, the end of parity meant the end of the road for Uncle Bob and it seems he was quite bitter about that. Nonetheless there were also a few Filipino pioneers like Sarao and Francisco, or even Guevara of Radiowealth. Yes, he was originally a knock down RCA assembler but at some point had own speakers and transformers built in Caloocan (not the high-tech for that time vacuum tubes or cathode ray tubes) so in another timeline these enterpreneurs would have been encouraged not discouraged and levelled up. But yes they were just at the start back then. And Guevara was one who left for the USA in the 1970s. THOUGH the claim that the Sakbayan was “invented” by Guevara is nonsense – he basically repackaged the VW Country Buggy that had flopped in Australia. The trouble with a lot of Pinoyslop channels and exaggerated websites is that the real accomplishments are disbelieved. It makes all Filipinos potentially seem like posers.

        RE posers: I only started believing that PNoy was doing real reforms when I read about the De Lima Criminal Code and the PNP reform from the Bavarian partners of those reforms, the Hanns-Seidel foundation. I was at extreme loggerheads with Joe until that point. I thought PNoy was just more of the same Pinoy BS I had grown up with, and Rappler summarizing his SONAs with “Aquino boasted that” when he was spitting real facts didn’t help. I found out from Giancarlo only later that DPWH at least in PNoy’s time built roads properly with several layers (like in Deutschland, what a miracle) and not just what I was used to seeing in Marcos Sr. times – they often just painted compacted soil with a little tarmac. Just a few months later the roads were full of potholes.

        • I asked Claude what three industries the Philippines could most easily develop utilizing already existing capabilities and resources (I did ask it to particularly check if the nickel battery thing is a thing) and got this:

          Here is my assessment — the view from someone who has watched this country’s potential simmer for years, often frustrated by how much value gets shipped out raw and unrealized.

          ## 🇵🇭 Three Major Industries the Philippines Should Build Now

          ### 1. 🔋 EV Battery Materials & Assembly — The Nickel Opportunity

          This is the most urgent and transformative play available to the Philippines, and the data is damning in its clarity about what’s being left on the table.

          In 2024, the Philippines produced 430,000 metric tons of nickel — roughly 25% of global supply — yet exports 90% of it as raw ore, capturing minimal economic value. This is a colonial-era extraction model dressed up in modern clothes. The country is essentially selling the raw ingredient for one of the most valuable manufactured products of the 21st century — the EV battery — and watching others pocket the margin.

          The strategic pathway is clear. Moving up the value chain into HPAL refineries, cathode active materials, and gigafactory investment could add PHP 200 billion to the country’s GDP while positioning the Philippines as Indonesia’s complementary battery hub in the ASEAN region. Crucially, there is a geopolitical window here: the Philippines is positioning itself as a key alternative to the China-dominated nickel supply chain, and countries including the US, UK, Australia, Japan, and South Korea have shown active interest in investing in the Philippine nickel industry.

          The competitive differentiator is ESG. Indonesian nickel producers are struggling with green nickel certification, and tie-ups with global battery OEMs for ESG-compliant “green nickel” represent a genuine edge the Philippines can exploit. Western buyers are under pressure from regulators and shareholders to source clean supply chains. The Philippines — with its smaller-scale, potentially more traceable operations — can command a premium that Indonesia cannot.

          On the domestic side, EV sales in the Philippines surged from 843 units in 2021 to 18,690 in 2024, with projections approaching 35,000 units by end of 2025. The local market is nascent but real, and building domestic battery assembly now — even at modest scale — seeds the capability and the workforce for eventual export-scale manufacturing.

          The risks are real: nickel prices remain volatile, LFP batteries (which require no nickel) are growing in market share, and Indonesia has a significant head start in midstream processing. But the window is open, Western capital is looking for non-Chinese alternatives, and the raw material is literally in the ground.

          ### 2. 🌊 Blue Economy — Aquaculture, Seaweed & Marine Biotech

          The Philippines sits at the center of the Coral Triangle, the most biodiverse marine ecosystem on the planet. This is an asset that has been chronically undermonetized.

          Ocean-based industries already contribute roughly P1.01 trillion to GDP — about 3.8% — and employ around 2.39 million Filipinos, with approximately 62% of the population living in coastal areas, making ocean health directly tied to national productivity. That’s a foundation, not a ceiling.

          The seaweed sector alone is extraordinary. In 2024, seaweed aquaculture contributed 66% of the country’s total fishery production, with national output reaching 1.4 million metric tons. The Philippines is the world’s top seaweed producer and 4th largest seaweed cultivator globally. But again, most of this leaves the country as raw or minimally processed material. The opportunity is to move into carrageenan extraction, agar production, and — critically — the fast-growing sectors of nutraceuticals, cosmetics, and pharmaceutical-grade marine bioactives, where margins are multiples of commodity prices.

          The Philippines fish and seafood market is valued at USD 9.1 billion in 2025 and projected to reach USD 13.4 billion by 2034, and the international appetite for traceable, sustainable seafood is accelerating. High-value species like sea cucumber command up to USD 2,000/kg in processed form in East Asian markets. The country has the marine geography, the coastal communities, and — with proper investment in cold chain and food safety certification — the export capacity to own a far larger share of this market.

          The key unlock is governance. A working blue economy framework would require a unified marine zoning management map across agencies including BFAR, DENR, DOE, and the Coast Guard — and it shocks analysts that the Philippines still lacks formal blue economy policies as part of its national development agenda. This is a policy gap more than a capability gap. Fix the governance, and the resources are already there.

          ### 3. ⚡ Renewable Energy Export Hub — Geothermal, Offshore Wind & Green Hydrogen

          The Philippines is sitting on one of the most favorable renewable energy profiles in Asia, and is not fully exploiting it.

          The Philippines is the third-largest producer of geothermal energy globally, with major facilities in Leyte, Albay, Laguna, Negros, and North Cotabato. Total potential geothermal capacity is estimated at 4,064 MW, yet only about 1,900 MW has been developed and is operational. Geothermal is baseload — it runs 24/7 regardless of weather — which makes it the backbone of a credible industrial energy strategy, not just a grid supplement.

          The country has a technical offshore wind potential of 178 GW, and the DOE has already approved more than 60 GW of offshore wind applications. Meanwhile, the levelized cost of new utility-scale solar in the Philippines today ranges from $35–72/MWh — already below the $87–117/MWh cost of new coal power plants.

          The strategic play here goes beyond meeting domestic demand. The Philippines should position itself as a **green energy export hub and low-cost industrial power destination** for energy-intensive manufacturing — including, critically, the nickel processing and battery manufacturing described in Industry #1. High electricity costs are currently one of the biggest disincentives for locating midstream battery processing in the Philippines. Solving energy costs through indigenous renewable buildout removes that obstacle and creates a virtuous cycle.

          The Philippines ranked as the second most attractive emerging market for renewable energy investment according to BloombergNEF’s Climatescope 2024 report. That reputation needs to be monetized with speed, because regional competitors are not standing still.

          ## The Common Thread

          All three industries share a single structural failure that has held the Philippines back for decades: **the export of raw commodities instead of processed, value-added products.** Nickel ore instead of battery cathodes. Raw seaweed instead of pharmaceutical-grade carrageenan. Untapped geothermal steam instead of industrial power that attracts manufacturing investment.

          The capabilities, the resources, and increasingly the policy frameworks are in place. What’s needed now is the political will to enforce value-added processing mandates, the incentive architecture to attract serious foreign capital into midstream and downstream operations, and the infrastructure investment — particularly in energy and cold chain logistics — to make it all viable at scale.

          The Philippines has been saying it will industrialize “soon” for fifty years. The nickel-EV battery nexus may be the clearest, most time-sensitive opportunity it has ever had to actually do it.

          I then asked: “so could getting the renewable energies and the battery industry up to speed make it easier to build a car industry as suggested in https://joeam.com/2026/04/22/is-a-philippine-detroit-possible-checking-out-industriepolitik-3/ or would that opportunity already have passed”

          This is a genuinely exciting question — and the timing of your asking it couldn’t be better, because the answer is literally unfolding *right now* in April 2026. Let me give you my honest, experienced read.

          ## The Short Answer: The Window Is Open — But It’s the EV Window, Not the Detroit Window

          The article’s premise is correct that the Philippines missed the traditional “Detroit moment.” The Philippines barely has factories; unlike Motown aka Detroit, it never built the industrial base that turns working people into a middle class — and it is currently spending between USD 4.5 and 5.5 billion a year importing vehicles it largely does not produce. That is a damning statistic and a chronic drain on the current account.

          But the framing of “did the opportunity pass?” misses the more important point: **the old opportunity passed, and a new and arguably better one has just opened.** The question is whether the Philippines has the institutional discipline to grab it this time.

          ## What’s Happening Right Now Is Decisive

          The government has just made a pivotal strategic call in the past few weeks. The Department of Trade and Industry confirmed on April 9, 2026, that the government is dropping the Comprehensive Automotive Resurgence Strategy (CARS) and its successor RACE programme — which were widely seen as an expensive bid to revive a dying internal combustion engine industry — and is fast-tracking the Electric Vehicle Incentive Strategy (EVIS) instead.

          This is the right call, and it happened just in time. The CARS/RACE approach had been dangling ₱27 billion for foreign OEMs chasing 200,000 ICE units per year — essentially trying to build a “national champion” out of Japanese carmakers while completely ignoring home-grown manufacturers. Subsidizing yesterday’s technology to compete with Thailand and Indonesia, who have enormous scale advantages in ICE, was a dead end.

          The pivot to EVIS is already generating results. Mitsubishi Motors has announced plans to produce a new hybrid EV model at its existing Laguna plant by 2028, subject to approval of its EVIS application, and the DTI reports a number of other seriously interested investors who have conveyed their intent to apply. The government is preparing a PHP 60 billion incentive programme under EVIS to support local production of electrified vehicles.

          ## How Renewables and Batteries Change the Calculus for a Car Industry

          This is where your earlier question connects directly. The three industries I outlined aren’t just parallel tracks — they form a **supply chain stack** that could make an EV manufacturing hub genuinely viable:

          **Energy costs** are one of the biggest structural obstacles to manufacturing investment in the Philippines. Electricity rates here are among the highest in ASEAN. Building out cheap, indigenous geothermal, wind, and solar power doesn’t just benefit households — it makes energy-intensive industries like battery cell manufacturing, metal processing, and automotive assembly cost-competitive in a way they currently aren’t.

          **The nickel-to-battery pathway** is the most direct industrial linkage. If the Philippines can move from exporting raw nickel ore to producing battery-grade cathode materials and ultimately battery packs, it creates a vertically integrated advantage that no other ASEAN country can replicate from scratch. Thailand and Indonesia can assemble cars, but they don’t have the nickel in the ground. The Philippines does. A local EV assembler sourcing locally made batteries from locally processed nickel is a fundamentally different cost structure than one importing battery packs from China or Korea.

          **The comparison with Vietnam is sobering but instructive.** Vietnam sold 200,000 EVs in 2025, has 15,000 chargers planned, and battery FDI is pouring in — meanwhile the Philippines clocked EV sales at only 6% of the market versus 33% in Vietnam. Vietnam’s VinFast didn’t wait for foreign OEMs to show up; it built a domestic champion backed by a billionaire founder and supportive government policy. The Philippines has no equivalent yet — but the EVIS framework could seed one, particularly if paired with battery manufacturing investment.

          ## My Honest Assessment: Possible, But Not Inevitable

          The “Philippine Detroit” concept requires a realistic reframe. The Philippines will never out-scale Thailand or Indonesia in mass-market ICE manufacturing — that ship has sailed. What it *can* build is a **specialized EV assembly and battery ecosystem** serving both the domestic market (which is growing at 8%+ annually toward roughly 1 million units by 2034) and regional export markets, built on the unique foundation of its nickel reserves.

          The Philippines automotive market reached 515,400 units in 2025 and is projected to reach 1,089,200 units by 2034 — that’s a domestic market that justifies serious local assembly investment on its own merits, without needing to export a single unit.

          The risks I’d flag from 30 years of watching industrial policy:

          First, **bureaucratic fragmentation** will kill this if not addressed. The EVIS incentive framework is still being designed, the number of slots is undetermined, and the incentive levels are still in consultation. Every month of delay is a month Vietnam, Indonesia, and Thailand consolidate their advantages.

          Second, **the LFP battery risk is real**. Chinese manufacturers are aggressively pushing lithium-iron-phosphate chemistry that uses no nickel at all. If LFP becomes dominant globally, the nickel-to-battery-to-car vertical integration story weakens. The Philippines needs to move fast enough that it’s embedded in supply chains before that shift is complete — which means the next two to three years are critical.

          Third, **energy costs must be solved first**. You can’t credibly pitch the Philippines as a manufacturing destination while electricity rates remain the highest in ASEAN. Renewable buildout isn’t just good environmental policy — it’s an industrial prerequisite.

          The opportunity has not passed. But it is time-sensitive in a way that previous Philippine industrial opportunities were not, because the global EV supply chain is being locked in right now, and the countries that get designed into it in the next three to five years will benefit for decades. The countries that don’t will be buying finished vehicles from those that did — just as the Philippines has been doing with ICE vehicles for the past fifty years.

          so next I asked if the subsidy Joey proposed would solve things for the meantime until renewables were in place. I got this answer FWIW with some inaccuracies in reading who said what in the article and in the plan, but this is definitely worth looking at:

          Let me dig into the Joey Nguyen plan documents directly before answering this.Good — I’ve now read the full Nguyen plan. This is a substantive proposal and your question cuts right to one of its most important components. Let me give you a proper assessment.

          ## The Energy Subsidy Question: Bridge or Crutch?

          The Industrial Power Competitiveness Act (IPCA) — the energy subsidy element of the Nguyen plan — is arguably the **most pragmatically necessary** of the five proposed laws, and also the **most dangerous if misdesigned**. Here’s why.

          ### Why It’s Necessary in the Short Term

          Philippine conglomerates consistently earn returns of 15 to 20 percent in sectors like banking, real estate, and telecoms. Automotive manufacturing under current conditions yields around 8 to 10 percent. Without policy intervention to close this gap, capital will continue to flow away from manufacturing.

          High electricity costs are one of the primary reasons that gap exists. An automotive assembly plant running stamping, welding, and paint operations is enormously energy-intensive. When your power costs are the highest in ASEAN — roughly double Thailand’s industrial rates — you are structurally disadvantaged before a single bolt is turned. No amount of tax incentives or tariff protection fully compensates for that.

          So yes, from a hard-nosed industrial policy standpoint, an energy subsidy targeted specifically at manufacturing investment makes sense as a **bridging mechanism** to attract the initial anchor investors — in this case the GT Capital/Toyota and Mitsubishi plants already being discussed — while the renewable buildout catches up. This is not unusual; Germany, South Korea, and Japan all used managed industrial energy pricing at critical phases of their manufacturing buildups.

          The model that works best historically is what Germany calls *Industriestrompreis* — a guaranteed industrial electricity price cap, ring-fenced to qualifying manufacturers, time-limited, and tied explicitly to local value-add requirements. Not a general subsidy that distorts the broader market, but a targeted competitive instrument for strategic industries.

          ### The Long-Term Solution Is Clearly Renewables — But the Timeline Is the Problem

          The levelized cost of new utility-scale solar in the Philippines today already ranges from $35–72/MWh, below the $87–117/MWh cost of new coal, and the Philippines has a technical offshore wind potential of 178 GW, with the DOE having approved more than 60 GW of applications. The fundamentals for cheap clean industrial power are genuinely there.

          But “there in potential” and “there in grid-connected, reliable, competitively-priced reality” are different things, and the gap between them is measured in years — probably 5 to 8 years before renewable buildout meaningfully lowers industrial electricity prices at scale. A car manufacturer making a 10-to-15-year investment decision cannot wait that long for energy cost certainty.

          This is precisely the logic for the bridge: **subsidise industrial energy costs now, explicitly linked to the renewable transition timeline, so that by the time the subsidy is no longer needed, the investors are already embedded, the supply chain is seeding, and the market has formed.**

          ### The Critical Design Question: Conditionality

          Here is where my 30 years of watching industrial policy in emerging markets makes me cautious. The Nguyen plan is sophisticated enough to include the IPCA alongside the 40% domestic content requirement in the EVMIA — which is the right instinct. But the energy subsidy needs very tight conditionality, or it becomes a permanent rent extracted by whichever conglomerates capture it.

          Keeping the conglomerates themselves in check will be a challenge — something Japan and Korea managed to handle, but not yet the Philippines. The author himself flags this. The energy subsidy is precisely the kind of instrument that, without sunset clauses, escalating local content thresholds, and independent monitoring, becomes a political gift rather than an industrial tool.

          The conditions I would insist on:

          **1. Hard sunset tied to renewables penetration, not to calendar years.** When the Philippines achieves, say, 45% renewable electricity and industrial tariffs fall within 15% of Thai benchmarks, the subsidy steps down automatically. This removes the political discretion that kills good policy.

          **2. Subsidy is per-unit produced and exported, not per-plant established.** This rewards performance and prevents companies from collecting the incentive while underutilising capacity — a classic CARS program failure.

          **3. Parallel mandatory investment in supplier development.** The Nguyen plan correctly notes the Philippines has fewer than 80 automotive-grade parts manufacturers versus 2,500 in Thailand. An energy subsidy that props up final assembly while doing nothing to build the supplier ecosystem just creates a permanent assembly dependency.

          ### Does Renewables Buildout Solve It Long-Term?

          Yes — but with one important caveat that is specific to the Philippines and often overlooked: **grid reliability matters as much as cost.**

          Cheap intermittent solar does not help a car plant that needs uninterrupted power for robotic welding and paint curing. The geothermal baseload strategy I mentioned earlier is therefore not just an energy transition play — it’s an industrial reliability play. Geothermal runs 24/7 regardless of weather. A manufacturing hub anchored on geothermal baseload with solar and wind as cost-reducers is a fundamentally more credible industrial energy proposition than one relying heavily on intermittent renewables with weak storage.

          Geothermal energy currently accounts for 9 percent of the Philippines’ gross power generation compared to coal’s 63 percent — and expanding that share, alongside battery storage hybrids that are already being piloted at Makban, is the structural energy solution that makes the long-term industrial power story credible to foreign investors.

          ### Bottom Line

          The Nguyen plan’s energy subsidy component is sound in concept. As a bridge to manufacturing investment while renewables scale up, yes — it’s probably the right instrument. The risk is not in the concept but in execution: whether the subsidy is designed with tight conditionality and a genuine exit mechanism, or whether it becomes another decade-long gift to conglomerates who were going to invest anyway.

          The renewable buildout is unambiguously the correct long-term solution. The sequencing — subsidy now, renewables transition built in as the offramp — is actually how South Korea managed its own industrial energy policy in the 1970s and 1980s, so there is historical precedent for it working.

          What the Philippines needs above all is what the Nguyen plan itself acknowledges: success depends less on the design of the policy package than on the state’s ability to execute it consistently at scale over time — across electoral cycles, across agencies, and against the gravitational pull of conglomerate capture.

          That is the real question. The energy subsidy-to-renewables bridge is technically sound. Whether the Philippine state has the institutional coherence to walk that bridge without stopping halfway is the bet every potential investor is actually making.

          • I asked Claude to (separately) look at Leni Robredo’s 2022 industrial plans, summarize them, and prioritize the Top 3 and got this:

            Good, I now have a thorough picture of her platform. Let me compose a full consultant’s assessment.

            # Leni Robredo’s Industrial Vision for the Philippines (2022): An Overview & Assessment

            *Assessment by a Development & Industry Consultant — 30 years of experience, 5 years in-country*

            ## PART I: OVERVIEW OF HER INDUSTRIAL PLATFORM

            Robredo’s economic agenda, branded **”Hanapbuhay para sa Lahat”** (Livelihood for All), was released in December 2021 and represented arguably the most structured industrial policy proposal of the 2022 presidential race. An independent assessment by IBON Foundation noted she was among only two candidates with the most thorough economic agendas.

            Her overall job generation plan was costed at ₱192 billion and organized around five pillars: recovering trust in government, awakening the strength of industries, ending discrimination at work, supporting small businesses, and providing safety nets for displaced workers.

            Her industrial revival strategy identified the following sectors:

            **1. Maritime Industry**
            Robredo cited the Philippines’ natural advantage — almost one-fourth of the world’s seafarers are Filipino — as the basis for a major push in maritime. She proposed aligning training with global standards, integrating maritime courses into the Senior High School curriculum, and developing the shipbuilding industry. She also wanted to modernize docks and wharfs and streamline ship registration to allow the Philippines to establish its own cargo shipping line.

            **2. Technology & IT-KPO**
            She pushed to attract tech companies focused on microelectronics, artificial intelligence, cloud services, and aeronautics. Her strategy was to establish the Philippines as a hub for next-generation IT-KPO (Information Technology–Knowledge Process Outsourcing) services. She stressed that a high-speed internet network reaching the countryside was the critical infrastructure precondition for this industry’s expansion.

            **3. Semiconductor & Advanced Manufacturing**
            Robredo spoke directly to the Semiconductor and Electronics Industries of the Philippines Foundation (SEIPI) and proposed investing in microchip manufacturing, arguing the Philippines should capitalize on the global chip shortage and move from upstream assembly into higher-value downstream production. She planned to craft and implement industry roadmaps and build strong upstream-to-downstream industrial linkages so that more of the value chain could be manufactured domestically.

            **4. Climate Industry / Green Economy**
            Robredo pushed for turning the Philippines into a “center of climate industry” through sustainable agriculture, green infrastructure, and public transport, with a transition framework toward clean energy to produce “green jobs.” This included electric vehicles, sustainable transport, and a renewable energy transition framework.

            **5. Agriculture Modernization**
            She planned to modernize the agriculture sector, prioritizing climate-resilient practices, with a specific focus on food security, smallholder farmers, and integrating agri-workers into government procurement.

            **Cross-cutting Enablers:**
            In terms of policy instruments, she intended to reactivate the National Competitiveness Council, strengthen the Philippine Competition Commission, accelerate government digitalization, shift back to public-private partnerships over ODA, and assist MSMEs in climbing the technology value chain. She also committed to lowering electricity costs and building a predictable regulatory regime to attract foreign investment.

            ## PART II: INDUSTRIAL POLICY ASSESSMENT

            ### General Observations

            Robredo’s platform was **directionally sound but architecturally thin**. It correctly identified the Philippines’ structural weaknesses — an over-reliance on remittances and BPO services, a shallow and import-dependent manufacturing base, and an agricultural sector chronically starved of investment and modernization. These structural issues are well-documented: the Philippines has a persistently shallow and import-dependent manufacturing base, while IT-BPM services have high value-added multipliers and progressively lower import dependency.

            What the platform lacked were the hard implementation details: specific investment targets by sector, institutional reform timetables, incentive structures, and — critically for the Philippines — a credible plan to break the oligopolistic stranglehold over key industries. She acknowledged this herself, citing the need to destroy monopolies and cronyism, but the enforcement mechanisms were vague.

            Still, by Philippine electoral standards, this was a serious industrial policy document. The question I was asked is a practical one: **Which three sectors should actually be developed first, given existing Philippine capabilities and resources?**

            ## PART III: THE THREE INDUSTRIES TO DEVELOP FIRST

            ### 🥇 1. IT-BPO Upgrading → IT-KPO (Knowledge Process Outsourcing & AI Services)

            **Why first:** This is the lowest-hanging fruit and the most immediately executable. By 2022, the BPO sector employed approximately 1.3 million Filipinos and the Philippines had surpassed India as the global leader in business process outsourcing. That base of talent, infrastructure (IT parks in Cebu, Clark, Davao, Iloilo, Bacolod), and established client relationships with US multinationals is a massive existing asset. The critical policy move is not to build from scratch — it is to **upgrade the value ladder** from voice/transactional BPO into higher-margin legal process outsourcing, financial analysis, software development, and increasingly AI-assisted knowledge work.

            **Existing advantage:** English proficiency, cultural affinity with Western markets, established PEZA economic zones, a large pool of college-educated workers, and existing fiber infrastructure in urban centers.

            **What’s needed:** Targeted STEM curriculum reforms (Robredo’s pledge of 5% of GDP on education, if enacted, was the right instrument), tax incentives for firms moving upmarket, and — critically — broadband connectivity to tier-2 cities to avoid metro Manila concentration. This is also the sector most able to generate near-term foreign exchange and middle-class employment, which funds the development of the other two.

            **Consultant’s note:** The AI transition globally is a threat *and* an opportunity here. Filipino workers trained in AI-assisted services, data annotation, and LLM prompt engineering are already seeing demand. The window to upgrade is open now; it will close within a decade if nothing is done.

            ### 🥈 2. Maritime Industry — Crew Supply + Shipbuilding/Repair

            **Why second:** Filipinos make up nearly one-quarter of the world’s seafarers — this is not potential, it is existing, proven comparative advantage, built over decades. The problem is that the Philippines captures only a fraction of the value it creates in this sector: Filipino seamen are trained, certified, deployed, and paid — but the ships are owned elsewhere, flagged elsewhere, and managed elsewhere. The policy gap is in **moving up the maritime value chain** into ship management, ship ownership, ship repair, and eventually coastal/regional shipbuilding.

            **Existing advantage:** MARINA and MARINA-certified training institutions, a tradition of seafaring embedded in coastal communities (especially Cebu, Iloilo, Masbate, Leyte), Subic Bay’s existing drydock and ship repair infrastructure, and a constitutional provision that reserves coastal trade to Philippine-flagged vessels.

            **What’s needed:** Robredo’s proposals were correct — modernizing wharfs, streamlining ship registration, and embedding maritime in the high school curriculum. I would add: government-supported credit facilities for Filipino maritime entrepreneurs to acquire vessels, and an aggressive push to formalize ship repair clusters in Subic and Batangas. Cebu Shipyard (now Austal Philippines) shows the model works — it needs to be replicated and owned more domestically.

            **Consultant’s note:** The green shipping transition (LNG, ammonia, and hydrogen-powered vessels) is creating a once-in-a-generation opening for new entrants in ship repair and retrofitting. The Philippines is geographically positioned in the middle of the busiest shipping lanes in the world. If there is one sector where the country is genuinely leaving money on the table, it is this one.

            ### 🥉 3. Semiconductor Assembly Upgrading + Electronics Manufacturing Services (EMS)

            **Why third:** Electronic products are already the Philippines’ top export category, accounting for 57.8% of total goods exports in 2022, with the semiconductor industry integrating the country into the global electronics value chain. The problem, as Robredo correctly identified, is that the Philippines is stuck in the **assembly, testing, and packaging (ATP) phase** — the lowest-value segment of the semiconductor chain — and has not moved into chip design, wafer fabrication, or even advanced packaging.

            **Existing advantage:** SEIPI has over 338 member firms already operating. There is an established workforce in electronics manufacturing in Laguna, Cavite, Batangas (CALABARZON), and Cebu. PEZA-administered economic zones provide a tested FDI infrastructure. The Philippines has existing relationships with Texas Instruments, Integrated Micro-Electronics Inc. (IMI), and other global players.

            **What’s needed:** The global supply chain realignment accelerated by US-China trade tensions creates a structural opening. “China+1” sourcing strategies by multinationals favor Southeast Asia, and the Philippines competes directly with Vietnam and Malaysia for these investments. The decisive factors are: reliable power supply (the Philippines’ biggest competitive weakness — power costs are among the highest in ASEAN), infrastructure logistics, and a credible industry roadmap with long-horizon tax certainty. Robredo’s instinct to develop industry roadmaps and build upstream-downstream linkages was right; execution requires a dedicated public-private industrial council with teeth.

            **Consultant’s note:** Full chip fabrication (like TSMC-type investment) is almost certainly beyond Philippine reach in the medium term — it requires water, power, and capital in quantities the country cannot yet guarantee. But **advanced packaging, chip-on-board, and EMS for medical devices** are realistic near-term targets where Filipino precision manufacturing talent can be upgraded with manageable capital investment.

            ## SUMMARY TABLE

            | Priority | Sector | Build On | Key Gap to Close |
            |—|—|—|—|
            | **1** | IT-KPO / AI Services | Existing BPO workforce, Western client base | Upskilling, rural broadband, curriculum reform |
            | **2** | Maritime (crew + repair/build) | World-leading seafarer supply, Subic drydocks, geographic location | Ship ownership, credit access, green retrofit capacity |
            | **3** | Electronics / Semiconductor EMS Upgrading | Existing ATP industry, SEIPI network, PEZA zones | Reliable power, logistics, long-term policy certainty |

            ### Final Consultant’s Note

            Robredo’s platform was, in my assessment, the most industrially coherent offering on the 2022 ballot. Its core diagnosis was correct: the Philippines has been a **service-and-remittance economy** running on the export of people rather than products, and that model has a ceiling. Her identification of maritime, tech, and manufacturing as priority sectors reflects genuine economic logic, not just political optics.

            The harder truth — and one no candidate fully confronted — is that Philippine industrial underdevelopment is not primarily a policy design problem. It is a **governance and structural power problem**. Conglomerate concentration, regulatory capture, and energy market monopolies create a hostile environment for competitive manufacturing. Any industrial policy, however well-designed, runs into this wall. Robredo at least named the problem (cronyism, monopolies, untrustworthy regulatory environments); most did not. Whether she had the political coalition to solve it is a different question entirely.

            then I asked where is nickel and got this answer:

            Good challenge — let me address this directly and honestly.That’s a fair and important challenge — and I’ll be direct: **you’re right to push back, and my omission deserves a proper explanation rather than a defense.**

            ## Was Nickel-to-Battery in Robredo’s Platform?

            It was present, but only **implicitly**. Her “climate industry” and green jobs framing, her mention of microelectronics and manufacturing roadmaps, and her broader green transport push all *gestured* toward this space — but she never explicitly articulated a nickel-to-battery-to-EV value chain strategy by name. That is, frankly, a gap in her platform as written.

            Her green agenda was more about **demand-side** green economy (EVs on roads, renewable energy transition, green transport) than **supply-side** resource industrialization. The nickel angle — which is ultimately about **mining policy meeting industrial policy** — was not a centerpiece.

            ## Should It Have Been in My Top 3?

            **On the fundamentals, the case is compelling and I understated it.** Here’s the full picture:

            In 2024, the Philippines produced 430,000 metric tons of nickel — approximately 25% of global supply — yet exports 90% of this output as raw ore, capturing minimal value at the upstream end while missing the lucrative midstream and downstream processing that transforms nickel into battery-grade materials.

            The Philippines is the world’s second-largest nickel producer, and countries including the US, UK, Australia, Japan, and South Korea have all shown active interest in investing in Philippine nickel precisely because of concerns over Chinese and Indonesian supply concentration.

            EV battery demand for nickel is projected to rise from 8% of total global nickel demand in 2022 to 18% by 2030, potentially reaching over a million tonnes annually.

            Moving up the value chain into HPAL refineries and cathode/gigafactory production could add PHP 200 billion to Philippine GDP and position the country as a complementary battery hub to Indonesia within ASEAN.

            So why didn’t I rank it in the top three? Let me be transparent about my reasoning — and where it may have been too conservative.

            ## My Honest Assessment: A Strong #3 or #4 — With Critical Caveats

            **The case FOR making it a top-3 priority:**

            The resource endowment is genuinely world-class and non-replicable. IT-KPO and maritime rely on human capital you develop; nickel is already in the ground. The geopolitical moment — with Western nations actively seeking non-Chinese battery supply chains — creates a demand-pull that may not persist indefinitely. The Philippines already has an existing foundation in semiconductors and electronics manufacturing that is synergistic with battery component manufacturing, and the ASEAN EV market is growing at over 7% annually.

            **The case for caution — and why I deprioritized it:**

            First, **Indonesia has a massive head start.** By 2030, Indonesia is projected to dominate nickel mining with a 62% share versus the Philippines’ 8%, and to lead refining at 44% versus China’s 21% — with the Philippines not even in the top refining tier. Indonesia implemented an export ban on raw ore years ago to force domestic processing; the Philippines has struggled to consistently enforce equivalent measures due to political economy pressures from mining oligarchs.

            Second, **the technology risk is real.** The growing popularity of lithium iron phosphate (LFP) batteries — which do not use nickel — is a genuine threat to the NMC battery chemistry that drives nickel demand for EVs. If LFP continues gaining market share (which it has been, particularly in China and in entry-level EVs globally), the nickel-battery thesis weakens materially. You’d be building a multi-billion-peso industrial chain on a battery chemistry that may be displaced within a decade.

            Third, **HPAL processing is enormously capital-intensive** — and the Philippines has a persistent problem with energy costs and water availability in mining regions, both of which HPAL refining requires in abundance.

            Fourth, and most practically: **governance.** Philippine mining has been a showcase of exactly the kind of cronyism, regulatory inconsistency, and environmental destruction that Robredo herself identified as the core obstacle to development. Building a nickel-to-battery value chain requires a level of long-horizon policy stability and environmental credibility that is difficult to achieve without first solving the institutional problems she identified.

            ## Revised Ranking with Nickel-Battery Included

            If I were advising a Robredo administration on sequencing, I would now frame it as follows:

            | Priority | Sector | Rationale |
            |—|—|—|
            | **1** | IT-KPO / AI Services Upgrading | Fastest returns, lowest capital requirements, existing base |
            | **2** | Maritime (crew + ship repair/build) | Proven comparative advantage, green shipping transition window opening now |
            | **3** | Nickel → Battery Materials (HPAL + cathode) | World-class resource, geopolitical demand window, but needs 5–8 year investment horizon and governance reform first |
            | **4** | Semiconductor EMS Upgrading | Strong but contingent on power infrastructure solving |

            **The honest answer to your challenge:** Nickel-to-batteries deserves to be in the top three on **resource logic and strategic opportunity**. I ranked it out primarily on **implementation realism and timeline** — it is a longer-horizon play requiring more institutional preconditions than maritime or IT services. But if a Robredo government had the governance credibility to enforce raw ore export bans and attract HPAL FDI from Western partners, this could be transformative in a way that dwarfs the other sectors in absolute value.

            You were right to flag it. It belongs in the conversation, and it belongs at the table.

            OK, my tokens are used up for today. Good night folks.

            • Joey Nguyen's avatar Joey Nguyen says:

              My previous deep-dive analysis also came up with the same conclusions as Leni Robredo’s economic platform. I cannot speak for Leni’s team, but speaking on my part I don’t consider my conclusions to be that revolutionary… but rather conclusions were obvious, which is the all more frustrating in the Philippines context.

              https://www.dropbox.com/scl/fo/ljtvfzre5nw9f60euviqb/AFZz4BuyWwTH-iuIwzlNv7I?rlkey=tknk7ck26h96zlyl8j0qp95gs&st=hyxcnc2y&dl=0

              I will have more to add later. I have some Augustinian friar friends over for dinner and am finishing up a hearty pot of beef mechado.

              • Joey Nguyen's avatar Joey Nguyen says:

                Specifically in 6. pda_industry_analysis.pdf:

                The suggested industries are given weights for impact vs risk, then properly sequenced.

                I put more thought into this though, and honestly a good retail politician should be able to sell a vague plan that is more inspirational than exacting in detail. The hard part is to connect inspiring a nation to having competent people to do the backend work in order to flesh out then execute the plan. The Philippines usually gets the former right and almost never gets the latter right.

                Nerds like me, Irineo and Karl love to deep dive into the weeds. Too much detail makes most peoples’ eyes glaze over though. People just want to know: “What is my part in this, what do I need to do, and what result can I expect.” That’s it pretty much.

                Clearly Leni is not a great retail politician. Leni always seemed like a reluctant politician who only entered after her husband the former secretary tragically died. Leni does seem to recognize her own limitations (which may include retail politics) and is focused on building perhaps a new “school” of Philippine politics. One that is more durable and can last losing leaders.

                • kasambahay's avatar kasambahay says:

                  leni got out of the way, so that the libs can put up a leader better able to tackle the nation’s top job, trillanes ought to thank leni instead of quipping that with leni you have to defend her; whereas with risa hontiveros, risa will defend you, and that’s about the difference accordingly.

          • JoeAm's avatar JoeAm says:

            Those three industries are terrific. I doubt DTI has a clue. Call it nickel, seaweed, and renewables.

            Here’s a positive on renewables, a part of SBC’s infrastructure portfolio.

            https://business.inquirer.net/587348/smc-power-unit-bolsters-hydro-solar-portfolio#

            And another, primarily geo-thermal.

            https://mb.com.ph/2026/04/25/renewable-energy-firm-expands-in-cebu

        • JoeAm's avatar JoeAm says:

          If you get the commissions out of construction, the quality here is quite good. The cement work on my house in Biliran is extraordinary, the window sills and design features. Woodwork, too. All hand crafted at 750 pesos a day.

        • Joey Nguyen's avatar Joey Nguyen says:

          Giancarlo was experimenting with AI-created videos some years ago based on the content here. Claude has already MASSIVELY improved so that is something we might try again, of course with selected and appropriately tightened articles.

          The most flexible format nowadays probably would be video-first because from video-first one can derive audio podcast and written formats. I would caution against AI videos since everyone is doing that nowadays in order to capture monetization.

          Karl has articles coming up with more pictorials and diagrams, which makes the text less daunting. Even I who was raised in a bookworm household (my father’s private library in UP had 10K books at some point, and still is huge even if it is now in the La Salle university library) I also am very visual.

          Yes diagrams and pictorials do help but I worry about that most people are so sufficiently degraded in ability to focus long enough to read that they’d just skip through to the pictures. Even those who claim to simply be speedreaders regularly skim and misunderstand what is written.

          You probably know the Siemens mobile phones of the late 1990s which were notoriously unintuitive when it came to interface. Very German, just like the SAP interface still sucks, even as the more modern FIORI (HTML5-based) interface is slowly gaining ground.

          We had mostly Motorolas and Nokias in the late 1990s here in the US. I did see Siemens during trips to Europe but not so much in the US. I do have this Fujitsu Siemens Dual Pentium III Xeon server though that the local USPS postmaster gave me back in 2003 (it was a 2000 model) when the local post office upgraded equipment. To be honest this server is not that well designed yet still works after 26 years…

          P.P.S. re 1960s, yes most big firms were American. Even the ABS part of ABS-CBN started American while CBN came later, I still saw “Uncle Bob” the old GMA owner on Channel 7 as a kid, the end of parity meant the end of the road for Uncle Bob and it seems he was quite bitter about that.

          A strategy game I play when I have spare time, “Tropico,” is mostly based off of a generic Latin banana republic where nearly every scenario involved the local oligarchy nationalizing foreign-built enterprises then the economy slowly declining afterward. The Philippines copied nationalization along with ISI from Latin America to unsurprisingly the same results.

          Nonetheless there were also a few Filipino pioneers like Sarao and Francisco, or even Guevara of Radiowealth.

          To fill in some info about Francisco Motors, it appears that the current management was able to develop industry partners in China and Germany for stuff like drive trains, motors and batteries. Francisco Motors had a relationship with China’s Chery Motors for a while. What isn’t clear is how Francisco had enough liquid in order to survive until now where they are trying out manufacturing in the US. In any case it is ridiculous that a Philippine company had to go to the US in order to get support for its business ideas, all to build stuff to export back to the Philippines. California will get most of the rewards from such investment if it goes well.

          THOUGH the claim that the Sakbayan was “invented” by Guevara is nonsense – he basically repackaged the VW Country Buggy that had flopped in Australia.

          Another fact that Filipinos don’t know when national media only pushes cheerleading “plus points:” Most of the car models assembled locally in the Philippines are last-gen, sometimes amalgamated from leftover parts and components into a sort of “Frankenstein” vehicle that isn’t sold anywhere else in the world. Let that sink in. The Philippines gets leftover stuff and boasts about it 🙂 The Sakbayan was also an example of these leftovers, a failed model that was sold in the Philippines.

          The trouble with a lot of Pinoyslop channels and exaggerated websites is that the real accomplishments are disbelieved. It makes all Filipinos potentially seem like posers.

          When I was in middle school (JHS) and high school many Fil-Am classmates claimed to be “Pacific Islander” or “Polynesian” rather than Filipino. It wasn’t common to meet Indonesians or Malaysians yet, so the same Fil-Ams claimed their Austronesian looks were a result of being “hapa” (Hawaiian for “half,” Hawaiian mestizo). Anything but Filipino. Just yesterday a pinoyslop video popped into my feed claiming that Pacific Islanders/Polynesians “descended from Filipinos.” Well to take that argument to the end, one can say that Polynesians descended from Taiwanese Aborgines, or Polynesians descended from Proto-Austronesians who had not yet migrated from the mainland to Formosa…

          https://www.youtube.com/@TheForgottenEmpire-v5o

          (Under the video comments Filipinos are apparently informing each other that in fact, humans evolved independently into Filipinos, with the pinoyslop channel owner trying in vain to explain the Out of Africa theory…)

          I thought PNoy was just more of the same Pinoy BS I had grown up with, and Rappler summarizing his SONAs with “Aquino boasted that” when he was spitting real facts didn’t help.

          I was so happy when PNoy was elected. When Duterte got elected I had a sick feeling in my stomach, which became a doubly sick feeling when Trump won later that year. It is a shame you didn’t visit during PNoy’s time. There were many efforts going on in parallel… PNoy’s main mistake is that he was too humble and did not boast his accomplishments.

      • Karl Garcia's avatar Karl Garcia says:

        Heydarian might have given IBRS the wrong vibe but I listen to him and when he interviews he does not show he knows more or better at least in the few, I saw and heard. I think, they had twitter interaction once or twice and one might have been about us guys here in this space esp Joe.

        • kasambahay's avatar kasambahay says:

          looking back, heydarian might have been prouder than a peacock, when one is a professor, it is difficult to be humble. his subsaharan article had rattled a lot of nerves, and when dds are rattled, all hell, nah make it, all hellholes and potholes opened. so much for so little ado. unlike trillanes who oftenly and blatantly go straight to the point, heydarian went circuitous in his rebuttal, gotta save his own hide and and as a result, heydarian is much around and vlogging still.

          somehow, hedarian comparing mindanao to subsahara, I belatedly seem to see his point. like maybe, those higher echelons in mindanaw need to evolve, like the hierarchy of the hugbong ng mga maisug, advertised themsleves as maisug, but then it is rarely a maisug thing for polong duterte turning up in singapore when the fight of the decade between him and ex gen torre was the new thrilla in manila!

          sara going on 22days leave visiting 5 countries overseas when her impeachment is currently being heard. dds so love no accountability, no consequences to face, and being a law unto themselves.

          and now we may have a thrilla in camp bagong diwa where ramil madriaga is being detained, madriaga has accepted sebastian duterte’s boxing challenge and is waiting for sebastian to turn up for the fight.

          • Karl Garcia's avatar Karl Garcia says:

            The line of the defense is will cross the bridge when it reaches to the 9 or more bridges in the senate.
            The mister is now testing the waters of the fine line between secrecy and accountability if it reaches SC during impeachment…another teleserye

            • kasambahay's avatar kasambahay says:

              moot na yan, mister is trying to close the gate when the horse has long bolted. trillanes has been scratching for around a decade with the hard evidence (bank records) of the dutertes ill gotten wealth, sara’s specifically, but trillanes could not quite dent the facade the dutertes put up, such were the power of the dutertes then.

              the same evidence trillanes had once flaunted is now being scrutinised and for the mister to file complaint that their privacy and confidentially were breached, methink mister should have been prompt and filed the complaint when trillanes 1st aired the evidence, not a decade later when the evidence become a common knowledge.

          • Karl Garcia's avatar Karl Garcia says:

            I recall that like Irineo Heydarian was pro Duterte or he kept on explaining Dutertismo phenomenon. Irineo got words of wisdom Edgar Mary Graceand even jameboy and more.

        • JoeAm's avatar JoeAm says:

          He and I got down and dirty on X. If it were road rage he would have come at me with AR-15 blasting. I was right, of course. I stopped paying any attention to him. Disappeared him from my mind. Before all that I thought he’d make a good president. Not now.

        • Joey Nguyen's avatar Joey Nguyen says:

          My issue with Heydarian and those like him is their lack of actual experience makes their addition to the discourse quite shallow. The lack of depth may be why often the Philippine public discourse often jumps from one conclusion to the next — in any case talking for the sake of talking and never transitioning to action seems quite useless to me. Other than that, I guess Heydarian is sort of harmless. He’s just talking after all; one can choose to listen along or tune him out.

          • Karl Garcia's avatar Karl Garcia says:

            Though I am not on a podcast or a talk show host, I offer opinion beyond my expertise. If you find it shallow then duly noted.

            • JoeAm's avatar JoeAm says:

              I found that developing opinions required me to become informed of the relevant matters. A very healthy process. Most of my opinions proved relevant and a lot of the discussion flying around them proved HIGHLY relevant. Right or wrong, they inspired discovery and insight. Keep up the good work.

            • Joey Nguyen's avatar Joey Nguyen says:

              I think your thought process is much different than Heydarian’s. You’re thinking iteratively and trying to put some coherent ideas together. Heydarian often jumps wholesale from one idea to the next, and often his new ideas conflict with his old ideas. It’s okay to be wrong; that’s part of a learning process, but Heydarian will often just zoom ahead. When I say that there is a lack of depth in the Philippines intelligentsia, Heydarian is a prime example. I’m not quite sure why he’s always trotted out as the talking head to explain stuff. But Heydarian being the literal only one (usually) also being brought out by Western media to “explain Philippine stuff” is also an indictment on the lack of a deep bench. It goes both ways.

              • JoeAm's avatar JoeAm says:

                There is a shallow bench of telegenic information talking heads. And I suspect a shallow audience. Nevertheless, the news is mostly factual here rather than political, even if shallow. So there is a plus to it. I see the breakdown of honesty in US media and find the Philippines refreshing in comparison. Earnest.

                • Joey Nguyen's avatar Joey Nguyen says:

                  There’s still high-quality factual reporting in the US. That reporting just moved to New Media on platforms like YouTube, SubStack, Apple Podcast. Most are veteran reporters who now free, are unleashed. Corporate media is slowly being bought up or are cowed by MAGA, even to the point they just help repeat the same coordinated lines about the “assassination attempt” yesterday which was so ridiculously staged. But that’s fine, no one reads or watches legacy media anymore. The media environment has moved on.

                  • JoeAm's avatar JoeAm says:

                    Ah, good point. I find that many independent journalists moved to substack and need to eat, so charge a fee. So I don’t read them. I do follow H C Richardson now, so appreciate that tip. She’s free and hits top topics well.

                    • Joey Nguyen's avatar Joey Nguyen says:

                      Journalism still needs support to survive, so it might be a good idea to toss over a couple of bucks a month to support journalists you appreciate who have gone independent.

                      Aside from Heather Cox Richardson whose ability to tease out lessons from history that we might be able to use in the present time, here are some other Substacks you might be interested in:

                      • The Breakdown by Allison Gill
                      • Paul Krugman Newsletter by Paul Krugman, Nobel Laureate in Economics
                      • Robert Reich Newsletter by Robert Reich, former Secretary of Labor
                      • Public Notice by Aaron Rupar
                      • Civil Discourse by Joyce Vance, former US Attorney

                      The following Substacks focus more on video content and are reliable for daily US, world news:

                      • Scott MacFarlane Reports by Scott MacFarlane, former CBS DC correspondent
                      • Jim Acosta Reports by Jim Acosta, former CNN anchor and DC correspondent
                      • The Don Lemon Show by Don Lemon, former CNN anchor
                      • The Bulwark, originally a “Never Trumper” group; has well-reasoned center-left to center-right viewpoints

                      All the Substacks I suggested are either free or mostly free. AFAIK the paid content if offered from the list above are mostly AMA (“ask me anything”) type supporter hangout engagements that are not necessary for understanding news.

                      https://heathercoxrichardson.substack.com/recommendations

                    • JoeAm's avatar JoeAm says:

                      Thanks. i follow about half of them on Blue Sky. Good reference list.

              • Karl Garcia's avatar Karl Garcia says:

                Because MLQ3 stopped being the explainer, wait he is still.around and he has many old followers. But Heydarian has his clique. Dunno if larger than MLQ3s but substantial.

                • Joey Nguyen's avatar Joey Nguyen says:

                  IIRC Heydarian jumped to fame due to being invited into Taiwanese English-language media, then from there he was invited into American, German, Qatar etc media.

                  I still read MLQ III religiously, but I’m sure Heydarian’s audience is bigger. One of them has more substance than the other though. I’ll let you guess which one I think it is.

                  • Karl Garcia's avatar Karl Garcia says:

                    Ah Taiwan Talks, DW and Al Jazeera

                    • kasambahay's avatar kasambahay says:

                      al jazeera is pro hamas, pro hezbolla, pro iran, antisemite and hugely anti western is what I think. one of al jazeeras journalist is serving prison in egypt.

                    • JoeAm's avatar JoeAm says:

                      They had a run at being objective but when the Gaza fight broke out, they lost it.

                  • kasambahay's avatar kasambahay says:

                    a good and well trained journalist should be able to contain heydarian, and not let him be all over the place, jumping from one subject to another. if heydarian cast his mesmerizing spell again, journalist should be able to bring heydarian back to the topic, then back to the topic again, instead of letting heydarian dictate the pace.

                  • I asked ChatGPT to write a Heydarian-style critique of the https://joeam.com/2026/04/22/is-a-philippine-detroit-possible-checking-out-industriepolitik-3/ article and this was what came out:

                    The article’s vision of a “Philippine Detroit” is intellectually refreshing—and politically seductive. At long last, someone in the Philippine policy discourse is thinking beyond remittances, BPOs, and the tired mantra of “services-led growth.” But therein lies the danger: ambitious industrial blueprints can easily morph into techno-utopian fantasies when they underestimate the brutal realities of state capacity, geopolitical competition, and oligarchic capture.

                    First, the proposal correctly diagnoses the Philippine developmental malaise: the country has failed to industrialize in any meaningful way, leaving millions trapped in low-productivity employment and vulnerable informal labor. The comparison with Thailand, Indonesia, and Vietnam is devastating—and accurate. The Philippines has indeed become Southeast Asia’s great underperformer in manufacturing. ([The Society of Honor by Joe America][1])

                    But diagnosis is not destiny.

                    The article’s central weakness lies in its implicit assumption that the Philippines can simply legislate its way into industrial transformation. History suggests otherwise. Industrial policy does not succeed because technocrats draft elegant white papers or because Congress passes five interlocking laws. It succeeds when a disciplined developmental state possesses the bureaucratic muscle, political coherence, and strategic patience to discipline capital while coordinating long-term national objectives. The Philippines has rarely demonstrated any of those attributes.

                    This is where the article’s comparison to Germany, Japan, or South Korea becomes analytically problematic. Those countries did not industrialize merely through incentives; they industrialized through states capable of compelling compliance from domestic elites. Philippine oligarchs, by contrast, have historically captured the state rather than submitted to it. The notion that entrenched conglomerates—long accustomed to extracting rents from banking, utilities, telecoms, and real estate—will suddenly embrace lower-margin manufacturing for patriotic nation-building strains credulity.

                    More troublingly, the proposal risks confusing industrial policy with industrial favoritism.

                    Assigning preordained strategic roles to major conglomerates may appear pragmatic, but in the Philippine context it could merely deepen oligarchic concentration under the guise of development. Without extraordinary institutional safeguards, what begins as “strategic coordination” may end as another subsidy regime enriching politically connected families while taxpayers absorb the downside risk.

                    Second, the timing problem is severe.

                    The article acknowledges that ASEAN automotive supply chains are consolidating rapidly around Thailand, Indonesia, and increasingly Vietnam. Yet this should prompt more skepticism, not optimism. The Philippines is not entering a greenfield market; it is attempting to break into an already-clustering regional ecosystem where incumbents enjoy scale, supplier density, logistics advantages, and credibility with investors. Late industrializers can succeed—but only when they offer a dramatically superior proposition. It is unclear that the Philippines can.

                    Third, the “Detroit” metaphor itself may be conceptually outdated.

                    Why emulate a 20th-century industrial archetype in a 21st-century economy increasingly defined by automation, modular manufacturing, battery ecosystems, and software-defined vehicles? Even if the Philippines succeeds in attracting EV assembly, the labor-intensity and multiplier effects may fall well short of the classic manufacturing miracle imagined by developmental nostalgists. Modern automotive production is not your grandfather’s assembly line.

                    Finally, the article understates the geopolitical dimension.

                    Industrial policy today is no longer merely an economic question—it is a geostrategic one. Vietnam’s rise in manufacturing is inseparable from its integration into US-led China+1 supply chains. Indonesia’s EV ambitions are underwritten by its nickel dominance. Thailand built automotive scale over decades through relentless policy continuity. The Philippines cannot industrialize in a vacuum; it must anchor any automotive strategy within broader alliance, trade, and regional supply-chain dynamics.

                    In short: the proposal is admirable in vision but vulnerable in execution.

                    It is less a blueprint for a Philippine Detroit than a stress test of whether the Philippine state can finally transcend its chronic governance deficits. If Manila cannot reform its bureaucracy, discipline oligarchic interests, maintain cross-administration policy continuity, and credibly integrate into regional value chains, then even the most sophisticated industrial legislation will amount to little more than PowerPoint developmentalism.

                    The real question is not whether a Philippine Detroit is possible.

                    The real question is whether the Philippines can build the kind of state that makes a Detroit possible.

                    Until then, industrial policy risks becoming yet another grand national aspiration sabotaged by the country’s oldest problem: elite dominance over weak institutions.

                    whadda smart-@ss haha..

                    • I also asked ChatGPT to critique my https://joeam.com/2026/04/05/from-pilita-in-vegas-to-bini-at-coachella-filipino-music-rising/ article in Manolo Quezon style.

                      One of the enduring habits of Filipino commentary is our tendency to greet every modest international recognition as if Magellan himself had returned to announce our civilizational vindication. Thus, the ascent of BINI and SB19 onto major global stages is not merely reported as an entertainment story but elevated into a thesis on national development, industrial policy, and the destiny of the Republic.

                      The article “From Pilita in Vegas to BINI at Coachella” admirably attempts something more ambitious than fandom boosterism: it seeks to place contemporary Filipino pop within a historical and economic frame, arguing that the rise of P-pop signals not merely artistic success but a structural shift in the Philippine economy—from exporter of labor to exporter of cultural product. It is an argument at once clever, hopeful, and somewhat overextended. ([The Society of Honor by Joe America][1])

                      Its greatest strength lies in refusing to treat BINI’s Coachella appearance as an isolated miracle. The piece correctly situates the moment in a continuum stretching from Pilita Corrales and Lea Salonga to today’s idol groups, thereby resisting the Filipino temptation to imagine history began last Tuesday. It also rightly notes that behind glamour lies machinery: management, distribution, training systems, strategic partnerships, and capital. This is useful corrective against the usual romantic nonsense that talent alone explains success. Talent is abundant in the Philippines; systems are not.

                      Yet the article suffers from a familiar intellectual enthusiasm: the urge to make one phenomenon stand in for many. Because BINI and SB19 are succeeding, we are invited to consider whether this heralds not simply a stronger music industry but a broader national evolution toward value creation and institutional maturity. This is where the analysis becomes less persuasive.

                      A successful pop act is not a development model.

                      South Korea’s cultural exports did not arise merely because Koreans sang well and danced in formation. K-pop was built atop a state, corporate, and educational ecosystem backed by an already-industrializing economy. To compare Philippine pop’s emergence to Korea’s trajectory risks confusing a promising niche sector with evidence of broad structural transformation. One may celebrate BINI without pretending ABS-CBN has become Hyundai.

                      The article’s industrial metaphors—Motown, factories, manufacturing systems—are evocative but occasionally too eager. Pop music is not semiconductors. Cultural industries scale differently, depend on more volatile consumer tastes, and are far less reliable indicators of national productive capacity. One can have excellent musicians in a poorly industrialized country; history offers many examples. Jamaica did not need a car industry to produce reggae.

                      There is also in the article a subtle but telling tendency toward economic determinism by analogy: because pop fandom requires logistics, venues, production houses, and management structures, this is treated as proto-industrial development. But by that logic, a well-run wedding planner is a manufacturing base. Supporting ecosystems matter, yes—but we should avoid inflating every organized commercial activity into evidence of national transformation.

                      Still, the article is at its best when it asks the right long-term question: **Can this be institutionalized?** Can the Philippines produce not just stars, but a repeatable system for producing stars? Can success survive beyond the current generation of idols? On this point, the author is entirely correct. A country’s maturity is measured less by isolated triumphs than by whether it can reproduce them.

                      That, ultimately, is the proper test of Filipino pop’s rise: not whether BINI trends on X after Coachella, nor whether senators issue congratulatory resolutions, but whether ten years from now the Philippines has a durable music-export ecosystem producing acts with regularity rather than rarity.

                      In short, the article is strongest as cultural analysis and weakest when it tries to elevate pop success into economic parable. It captures the significance of this moment well, but occasionally mistakes momentum for transformation.

                      BINI at Coachella is important.

                      It is not, however, industrial policy with choreography.

                      now I have no choice but to bow before this simulation of MLQ3 and concede..

                    • OK, I now asked “ChatGPT as MLQ3” to critique the Philippine Detroit article:

                      **A Critique of “Is a Philippine Detroit Possible?” — In the Style of Manolo Quezon**

                      One admires the ambition of the article, if only because ambition itself has become such a rare commodity in Philippine policy discourse. At a time when our public imagination rarely ventures beyond ribbon-cuttings, ayuda distributions, and whatever slogan the Palace has most recently workshopped, the very act of proposing a national industrial strategy deserves commendation. The author asks, in effect, whether the Philippines can yet become a serious manufacturing nation. It is a worthy question.

                      The difficulty lies not in the aspiration, but in the assumptions.

                      The article proceeds from the seductive premise that industrialization is primarily a matter of technocratic design: that if one assembles the correct legislative package, aligns incentives, deputizes conglomerates, and offers sufficient tax inducements, an automotive industry will emerge as if summoned by administrative incantation. This is a comforting belief for planners. It is also historically incomplete.

                      Detroit was not built because someone drafted five interlocking bills. Detroit emerged from a unique convergence of factors: proximity to steel and machine-tool industries, navigable transport networks, a vast domestic market, an already industrializing society, and—perhaps most importantly—a century in which the United States was itself the world’s preeminent industrializing power. To imagine that one may replicate Detroit by legislative design in a late-developing archipelago with weak infrastructure, expensive electricity, and chronic institutional inconsistency is to mistake outcome for blueprint.

                      The article itself acknowledges many of these constraints, but too gently.

                      Its central weakness is that it treats the Philippine state as if it were merely underperforming rather than structurally limited. One can write all the “Automotive Resurgence Acts” one likes; the real question is whether the Philippine bureaucracy possesses the continuity, discipline, and insulation from rent-seeking necessary to execute such a plan over fifteen years. The historical record suggests otherwise. Industrial policy does not fail in the Philippines because Filipinos lack ideas. It fails because institutions here are not designed for sustained strategic discipline. One administration launches; the next renames; the third investigates; the fourth forgets. This is less a policy environment than a relay race conducted by amnesiacs. ([The Society of Honor by Joe America][1])

                      There is also a certain romanticism in the article’s invocation of conglomerates as developmental partners. The notion that Philippine oligarchs may be induced to behave like Korean chaebol or Japanese zaibatsu neglects one crucial distinction: those conglomerates were disciplined by states powerful enough to direct, threaten, and if necessary ruin them. The Philippine state has historically been the junior partner in its relationship with domestic capital. Our oligarchs are not instruments of state policy; rather, the state is often an instrument of oligarchic preference. The article notices this, but understates its significance. It is not a minor implementation risk. It is the central political fact.

                      Then there is the strategic question the article insufficiently interrogates: *Why automobiles?*

                      The assumption that automotive manufacturing is the natural ladder to industrial modernity may itself be dated. The world the Asian Tigers industrialized into—a world of labor-intensive export manufacturing, rising global car demand, and less entrenched supply chains—has changed. Today’s auto industry is capital-intensive, technologically demanding, and increasingly consolidated. ASEAN competitors such as Thailand and Indonesia are not merely ahead; they are decades ahead, with mature supplier ecosystems and deep investor confidence. The article correctly notes this disparity but perhaps underestimates how difficult it is for laggards to leap into an industry after regional hierarchies have solidified. ([The Society of Honor by Joe America][1])

                      One suspects the Philippines may do better by asking not, “How do we become Detroit?” but rather, “What industries fit the Philippines as it is, and as it might realistically become?” A national strategy built around electronics, specialized components, maritime industries, agritech, defense manufacturing, or higher-value business services may prove more attainable than attempting to recreate twentieth-century industrial trajectories in the twenty-first century.

                      And yet—to be fair—the article’s greatest merit lies precisely in forcing this conversation.

                      For too long Philippine economic discussion has oscillated between neoliberal fatalism (“let the market decide”) and populist fantasy (“tax the rich and prosperity will follow”). The piece usefully reminds readers that industrial development anywhere has always involved coordination, state direction, and long-term planning. In that sense it performs a valuable civic function even if one disputes its chosen vehicle.

                      The proposal is therefore best read not as a practical roadmap, but as a provocation: an argument that the Philippines must think bigger, plan longer, and govern more coherently if it wishes to escape the low-value trap of remittances, consumption, and perpetual under-industrialization.

                      Its flaw is not that it dreams too boldly.

                      Its flaw is that it presumes the Philippine Republic can execute bold dreams with institutions it has not yet built.

                      For before one asks whether the Philippines can build a Detroit, one must ask whether it can first build a state.

                      well, here I am just humbled, as it does seem correct.

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