Problem Solving the Philippines: How the National Budget Is Managed
By Giancarlo Angulo
This is part 3 of 4 in The Budget Series. Part 1 gave the overview and part 2 covered how the NEP is generated. This part covers what happens after the President signs the General Appropriations Act (GAA): how the budget is managed.
The question
Once the budget is signed, who controls when an agency can commit and pay, and what can change during the year?
TLDR
- DBM controls two permissions: to commit (allotments and SAROs) and to pay (Notices of Cash Allocation).
- Agencies file three plans through the Unified Reporting System: a financial plan, a physical plan and a monthly disbursement program.
- The Unified Reporting System (URS) carries both the plans and the reports on actual obligations and disbursements. DBM uses them to schedule releases and to monitor spending.
- Modification, savings and augmentation are three different tools with different limits.
- Agencies report quarterly and monthly, and DBM reviews performance twice a year, before COA audits.
- This post is accurate as of October 24, 2026.
Once the President signs the General Appropriations Act (GAA), the money is not in the agencies’ hands. DBM keeps control of three things: the permission to commit (obligational authority), the permission to pay (disbursement authority), and the plans that tie them to what the agency says it will do. This is from National Budget Circular 599, which covers the FY2026 budget.
1. The plans. Each agency files its annual Budget Execution Documents (BED) through the Unified Reporting System (URS), described below. BED No. 1 is the financial plan, which sets the obligation program. BED No. 2 is the physical plan, updated for changes between the NEP and the GAA. BED No. 3 is the monthly disbursement program, which is the basis for DBM’s release of cash authority.
A short history of the GAA as allotment order. It is not old. Before FY2014, agencies had to wait for DBM to prepare an Agency Budget Matrix after the budget was enacted, and then for Special Allotment Release Orders. On August 7, 2013, then Secretary Abad announced that the 2014 GAA would “also serve as the primary fund release document” and that DBM would begin to phase out the matrices and the SAROs. National Budget Circular 551 (January 2, 2014) put it in force: items not on the “For Later Release” list are “considered released as allotments when the GAA takes into effect”. It was called GAARD (GAA as Release Document) in the 2014 to 2016 circulars. By the FY2017 circular (NBC 567, January 3, 2017) the name was GAA as an Allotment Order (GAAAO), and the policy “shall continue”. The 2026 circular still uses it.
2. Permission to commit. The GAA itself is the allotment order for items with no preconditions (GAAAO). Other items need a Special Allotment Release Order (SARO) first. These are the items with conditions in the GAA, the items Congress added or increased, and the automatic appropriations. For the added or increased items in 2026, the agency has to submit a request, get approval from the Office of the President and revise its performance targets, following the President’s veto message. DBM’s tests for new items are alignment with the development plan, readiness to implement, agency utilization not lower than 85%, and the tight fiscal position.
3. Permission to pay. DBM issues a Notice of Cash Allocation (NCA). An initial NCA covers the first quarter, January to March. Later NCAs follow the monthly disbursement program, “subject to actual agency disbursement performance and national government fiscal position”. The National Tax Allotment and the BARMM block grant get a full-year NCA. Within an agency’s available NCAs, salaries, operating expenses and capital outlays are paid before unpaid obligations from earlier periods. The NCAs are issued to three government servicing banks: Land Bank, DBP and the Philippine Veterans Bank.
4. Changing the plan during the year. Three tools are in the GAA’s general provisions, and they are easy to confuse.
| Tool | What it does | Limit |
|---|---|---|
| Modification of allotments (Sec. 87) | Changes the details of an activity or project, or moves among expense classes or operating units | Cannot raise the total for the activity or project |
| Savings (Sec. 84) | Declares unobligated balances free: the project is done, discontinued, or delivered at lower cost | A discontinued project cannot be proposed again for two fiscal years |
| Augmentation (Sec. 85) | Uses savings to cover a deficiency in an existing item | Only the constitutional officers named in the GAA, within their own offices (Art. VI, Sec. 25(5)); personnel benefits come first (Sec. 86) |
DBM set November 16, 2026 as the cutoff for agency requests that need obligational or disbursement authority.
5. Reports and review. Agencies submit the Budget and Financial Accountability Reports within 30 days of each quarter’s end, a monthly report of disbursements by the 10th of the next month, and the aging of unpaid obligations within 30 days of year end. DBM also runs an Agency Performance Review twice a year: the annual review (February) and a mid-year self-assessment of financial and physical performance (August). Transparency provisions in the GAA require disclosure, with the Freedom of Information executive order as the baseline. After all of that comes the COA audit.
How long the money is valid, and what reverts afterwards, is in part 1 (phase 3). How little of it had been obligated by mid-year 2026 is in part 1, “Appropriated is not spent”.
The system behind the paperwork: URS
Most of the plans and reports above move through one DBM web system, the Unified Reporting System (URS). DBM’s own primer describes it as “a facility for online data entry and submission of the various reports required from National Government Agencies and its Operating Units”. It is where the plans that drive releases and the reports that track spending meet.
What goes in.
| Type | Reports | What it holds |
|---|---|---|
| Budget Execution Documents (BEDs) | BED 1 Financial Plan, BED 2 Physical Plan, BED 3 Monthly Disbursement Program | The agency’s targets and plans for the year |
| Financial Accountability Reports (FARs) | FAR 1 Statement of Appropriations, Allotments, Obligations, Disbursements and Balances (with FAR 1-A by object of expenditure and FAR 1-B list of allotments and sub-allotments); FAR 2 for off-budget funds; FAR 3 Aging of Due and Demandable Obligations; FAR 4 Monthly Report of Disbursements; FAR 5 Quarterly Report of Revenue and Other Receipts | What the agency actually obligated, disbursed and owes |
| Budget Accountability Report | BAR 1 Quarterly Physical Report of Operation | Physical accomplishments |
| Summary Performance Monitoring Report (SPMR) | Derived from the BFARs | The agency’s cumulative obligation and disbursement rates, monthly. DBM discontinued it on March 8, 2023 (CL 2023-5), because the quarterly BFARs now arrive on time and carry more detail |
Agencies work in three roles. A Maker creates the report. A Reviewer or Approver checks it and can send it back with comments. Once it is submitted to DBM, it cannot be sent back. Access depends on the agency’s coverage, and accounts are requested through the agency’s DBM analyst.
How it came to be. The circulars show a step-by-step build-up, in this order:
| Date | Issuance | What it did |
|---|---|---|
| Nov 25, 2013 | CL 2013-13 | Rolled out an “Online Reporting System” (available from Nov 18, 2013) for the BEDs for 2014, right after the GAA became the release document. Agencies key in only the amounts, since “most of the NEP 2014 data and UACS codes are already in the system”. It reused the logins from the OSBP. |
| Jul 2, 2014 | COA-DBM JC 2014-1 | Set the modified BFAR formats (cited by later circulars; I did not read it). |
| Oct 27, 2016 | CL 2016-9 | Reiterated online submission of the BEDs through URS. The consolidated BEDs “guide the Development Budget Coordination Committee in formulating the national government’s quarterly disbursement program”. |
| Dec 6, 2016 | CL 2016-11 | Required the quarterly BFARs to be submitted online through URS, so that “oversight agencies” can review “agency utilization of funds vis-a-vis quarterly plans/targets”. |
| Sep 6, 2018 | CL 2018-9 | Set encoding schedules per agency because network congestion near deadlines was hurting compliance; access is disabled outside the agency’s scheduled dates. |
| Jan 1, 2019 | COA-DBM JC 2019-1 | Modified BFAR formats; agencies submit to COA, DBM and the Bureau of the Treasury “through the URS”. It describes the reports as consistent with the GAA as an Allotment Order and the Unified Accounts Code Structure. |
| Oct 28, 2022 | CL 2022-14 | Current rules for BEDs (below). |
Is URS still in use? As of the latest documents I found, yes, for the plans and the reports above. NBC 599 (January 5, 2026) says releases follow BEDs submitted through URS. DBM circular letters in 2024 (CL 2024-5 and 2024-12) tell agencies to submit the BFARs and the mid-year FAR 1 through URS. CL 2026-10 (September 30, 2026) does the same for the FARs behind personnel-services releases. I found no “URS 2.0” or any issuance that retires URS. (The FY2027 budget call does speak of “OSBP System v2.0”, which is the proposal-intake system, not URS.) Two newer systems sit next to it:
| System | What it is | Source |
|---|---|---|
| Budget and Treasury Management System (BTMS) | Revived in 2025 as a cloud-based system, starting with budget execution and utilization. Its budget execution module captures the purchase request, obligation request, purchase order, disbursement voucher and related documents, and produces FAR 1, FAR 1-A and BAR 1 from the transactions. CL 2025-8 does not mention URS or say when URS stops. The earlier BTMS circular was CL 2019-4. | CL 2025-8 |
| DBM SUBMIT | An online channel for agencies’ budget-execution requests and their supporting documents, with status tracking and a reference number. Rollout in batches from November 3, 2026 to January 11, 2027. It covers requests, not the BED and BFAR reports. Local governments are excluded. | CL 2026-12 |
So URS is the reporting channel today, BTMS is meant to generate the same reports from agencies’ own transactions, and SUBMIT digitizes the request side. Which of them will carry the BEDs and BFARs in the end is not stated in any document I read.
How DBM uses it. From the documents:
- To schedule releases. CL 2022-14 says BED 1 guides “scheduling release of allotment orders”, and BED 3 is the “basis for the initial and subsequent issuance of disbursement authorities”, including the comprehensive NCA at the start of the year, and it helps the Bureau of the Treasury judge how much cash to raise and when. NBC 599 ties 2026 releases to “DBM-evaluated BEDs” submitted through URS.
- Before the budget is signed. Under CL 2022-14, agencies prepare and submit BEDs based on the NEP, “without waiting for the approval of the corresponding” GAA. Agencies that do not have regional units submit by November 15; regionalized agencies by November 30. After they click submit, the system closes for encoding. If Congress changed an agency’s level, it files a revised financial and physical plan within 15 working days of the GAA’s approval. The BEDs also let agencies do early procurement.
- To monitor obligations and disbursements. FAR 1 has the columns of the table in part 1: appropriations, allotments, obligations, disbursements and balances. CL 2016-11 says the BFARs serve as “bases of oversight agencies in the conduct of periodic review, monitoring and evaluation”. Until 2023, DBM also collected the monthly SPMR, which summarized each agency’s cumulative obligation and disbursement rates, and CL 2023-5 dropped it in favor of the BFARs. I did not confirm that the DBCC’s June 30 table in part 1 was drawn from URS.
- To decide on releases. CL 2026-10 (September 30, 2026) lets DBM determine agencies’ personnel-services deficiencies from its plantilla database and from “FAR Nos. 1 and 1A submitted by agencies”, and tells agencies to submit the FARs through URS on time “to facilitate the efficient and timely release of funds”. NBC 551 (2014) introduced a “No-Report, No-Release” policy: DBM monitors compliance with the quarterly reports and posts it on its website.
- To meet legal reporting duties. The 2026 GAA has agencies report quarterly donations and trust receipts through URS, “or other electronic means for reports not covered by the URS until such time that all agencies have fully migrated to the Budget and Treasury Management System (BTMS)”. That is the sign that URS has a planned successor.
For a future post
This post stops at the rules. Three things sit between the rules and what actually happens, and each deserves its own post:
- Procurement. Between permission to commit and an obligation there is a procurement, under the New Government Procurement Act (RA 12009). How it connects to the budget calendar, and why an agency can hold an allotment and still be months from a contract, is the next step in following a peso.
- How DBM releases, holds or withdraws in practice. Circular 599 gives the rules for the SARO, the NCA and the savings declarations. What DBM looks at when it decides, and how long a request takes, are not in the circular.
- The audit. COA is the end of the budget cycle and the start of the next one. What it audits, how findings come back to the budget, and what happens to them are not covered here.
What I’m unsure about
- This post follows National Budget Circular 599, which covers the FY2026 budget. It gives the rules, not the practice.
- I did not research procurement, DBM’s release practice or the COA audit. They are listed above for a future post.
What I’d like readers to do
Correct a number, point me to DBM or COA data I missed, or tell me where the process differs in practice from what is on paper.
Why this series
The problem solving series is about trying to chip at the problems of the Philippines. It is about finding solutions that may work because we will never admit defeat.
Sources
- DBM Circular Letters 2023-5, 2024-5, 2024-12, 2025-8 and 2026-12
- DBM URS primer; Circular Letters 2013-13, 2016-9, 2016-11, 2018-9, 2022-14 and 2026-10; COA-DBM Joint Circular 2019-1
- DBM National Budget Circulars 550, 551, 556, 561 and 567
- Official Gazette: DBM: 2014 General Appropriations Act to serve as release document (August 7, 2013)
- 1987 Constitution, Art. VI Sec. 15, 24 to 27, 29; Art. VII Sec. 22; Art. IX-D Sec. 2
- Republic Act No. 12314 (2026 GAA), Sections 3, 77, 83 to 87
- DBM National Budget Memoranda: No. 156, No. 157, No. 158, and National Budget Circular No. 599
The Budget Series
Problem Solving the Philippines: The Budget Series.
- Part 1: Who does what in the national budget, and where the money goes
- Part 2: How the National Expenditure Program is generated
- Part 3: How the national budget is managed (this post)
- Part 4: How the rules of the budget have been tested (coming soon)
Lovingly made with Claude.
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Rules like banning submission of cancelled projects for two years seem to put process over need. Good that online submissions and management have a 10 year history, so agencies should be adept at handling the processes. I can’t add much to the discussion because this is way over my head, technically. I’d like to see AI deployed to run live formulaic audits of processes to spot anomalies for review.
Everything can be audited by AI now. And it is the natural next step. To not do that would be a form of malfeasance moving forward.
On a surface level the Philippines national budgeting process is exceptionally transparent, especially after pork barrel was banned. I did a comparative analysis (in Claude using available public data) of the US, the Philippines, Indonesia, and Malaysia, which pointed to the US having an extremely complex national budgeting process, followed far behind by Indonesia. Malaysia’s national budgeting process is the most transparent and least complex, while the Philippines is only slightly less transparent and less complex than Malaysia. In effectiveness of public accountability mechanisms and institutions, the ranking was US, then followed far behind by Indonesia, Philippines, Malaysia.
So it seems that a transparent budgeting process, important as that is, does not reduce public corruption. In the Philippines the bulk of public corruption actually occurs during execution and disbursement (i.e. procurement, contracting, and allocation transfers), especially in the use of unprogrammed and reprogrammed funds. While cases exposed by the COA and Ombudsman face a judiciary overwhelmed with caseloads and prosecution that is slow-walked where political allies are implicated.
“ In the Philippines the bulk of public corruption actually occurs during execution and disbursement (i.e. procurement, contracting, and allocation transfers), especially in the use of unprogrammed and reprogrammed funds.” – Joey N.
My cyber acquaintance, Mar Tecson, who has an extensive background in auditing and accounting and is the author of Inequality: Economic Tyranny, has advocated (in the Philippines) restoring the pre-audit function of the Commission on Audit (COA).
As I understand it, pre-audit was already part of the system during the Marcos dictatorship, but was lifted in 1982. Following the fall of Marcos Sr., it was reinstated in 1986, partly in response to the corruption exposed during his regime. Eventually, it was lifted again.
The idea is to have questionable transactions examined before public funds are disbursed, rather than discovering irregularities only after the money is gone. It seems particularly relevant to the problem Joey describes.
I am not familiar with this person. His book seems to be a self-published manifesto in book form, only available at Central Books (re Central Books: those who know the retailer, know the target demographic). I am not in the Philippines as of now so I cannot skim through the book itself. Mr. Tecson himself advocates for a number of positions (anti-corruption, anti-oligarch, anti-privatization) that I can agree with though I find his prescriptions to be somewhat defective and mainly moralistic, which likely won’t have large effect on the problems at hand.
I have read the original American administration document which introduced the pre-audit mechanism into the Philippines (1907 Accounting Act). As introduced, the pre-audit was under the auspices of the Insular Auditor and was highly effective. During Filipinization the Filipino elite who gradually took over bureaucracy, then government co-opted and adapted the form but not the substance of the pre-audit, subsuming it into Philippine government ritual — an instance of isomorphic mimicry. So the pre-audit in fact had never been that effective in cutting wastage and public corruption once the process fell out of the control of direct American oversight. It just became another type of clearance which adhered to the literal requirements while creating cover for potential public corruption. A type of bureaucratic theater.
AFAIK Marcos Sr. initially used the pre-audit process to show his administration was not corrupt (compared to the alleged corruption of the earlier Third Republic). It seems that the bureaucrats were so enthusiastic in their theater that the whole pre-audit process became massive red tape that prevented what the Marcos Sr.-aligned elite wanted, which was the cover of legitimized process obfuscating crony looting. So the pre-audit was ended.
Nowadays the pre-audit is largely forgotten, but likely it was not for those who came of age during the Third Republic. Cory Aquino re-instated the pre-audit as a response to Marcos cronyism. But once again political elites adapted, keeping the form of satisfying pre-audit requirements while the corruption happened further downstream, as I pointed out previously. What is the use of a pre-audit in “stopping the money before it goes out” if the pre-audit is approved, then the monies are disbursed in a corrupt manner afterwards? While at the same time, apparently the pre-audit red tape during the immediate post-EDSA period was even greater than that of the Marcos Sr. pre-audit red tape. I have also written often about my disdain for the Philippine culture of extraneous clearances and requirements, which create mini-fiefdoms of gatekeepers whose power to stop everything leads to gatekeepers (like auditors) themselves becoming part of the corruption ecosystem by charging bribes and demanding kickbacks in return for a stamp. Agency heads also started claiming that “this passed the pre-audit, therefore I am not liable for downstream corruption.” For these reasons the pre-audit was discontinued again.
I alluded to in my opening comment that the budgeting process in the Philippines is actually extremely transparent and made clear line-by-line. One must realize that the Philippines has a culture of “paper perfection,” where administrative rules, legal requirements, where needed clearances and certificates are strictly adhered to — yes, even by corrupt actors. Not only does the clearance-granting or auditing agent control an administrative “gate” from which they can be tempted to “charge a toll,” but the embossed and stamped piece of paper itself becomes a shield of impunity: “Every voucher was checked by accounting, cleared by the legal department, certified by the engineers, and audited by COA.”
I would just point out that the whole point of collecting all those signatures is in case an investigation arises, the lower-level signatories take the fall, which we have seen repeated over and over again. I wonder then, will another added procedure help in any way? The Philippine elite adapted to co-opt an administrative system which prioritizes strict procedural adherence over physical outcomes. While the Philippine bureaucratic administrative state measures governance by how well and precisely paperwork is filled out rather than whether the road actually exists and lasts. As-is, compliance frameworks are the primary instrument of public corruption, not the constraint.
Now here are some broad ideas:
1. Instead of predictable process, introduce unpredictability by way of unannounced site inspections and paperwork audits. Make it random enough that the threat of an unannounced audit dissuades corruption. Corruption and rent-seeking exist where the environment is stable for it to exist.
2. Unmask shell companies by making it a legal requirement to list the actual owners, so that “competing” bidders are not in fact controlled by the same entities.
3. Data and digital tracking that is automatic and easily available to public scrutiny without the need for constant FOI requests which can be slow-walked or redacted.
4. In addition to internal government auditors, invite civil auditors such as professional engineering associations and professional CPA associations to perform independent, civil audits.
it is: https://economictyranny.com/
Click to access About_the_author_2021-09.pdf
how his background is described is very interesting, so I will not comment it further:
MLQ3 has often mentioned that the corrupt are the masters of making everything look perfectly clean in the Philippines.
basically check the reality not just the paperwork: especially No. 1 would be a deterrent to total ghost projects like those uncovered recently. I would add AI-based fraud pattern detection to Item 3 as Item 3a.
I am willing to bet that all of the flood control projects had impeccable documentations. When the end to end chain is corrupt pre audit and post audit is useless. People have to understand that all of the audit stuff just slows down the people wanting change while the corrupt has something akin to a factory for all of these audit stuff. Cultural issue.
“I am willing to bet that all of the flood control projects had impeccable documentations.” – Giancarlo
Not according to this Phil Star news report:
MANILA, Philippines — The Commission on Audit has filed fraud audit reports covering more than P360 million worth of flood control projects in Bulacan, citing mismatched sites and missing records under the Department of Public Works and Highways (DPWH) Bulacan 1st District Engineering Office.
COA said on Friday, September that the four reports it transmitted to the Independent Commission for Infrastructure (ICI) detailed how district engineers and contractors allegedly altered project sites without justification, counted pre-existing structures as new work, and failed to submit critical documents despite repeated demands.
https://www.philstar.com/headlines/2025/09/26/2475638/coa-files-p360-m-fraudulent-bulacan-flood-control-projects-ici
but what would happen is that they would just resubmit better documents.
just Google all the issues with big 3 accounting firms and you will see that audit without honest people is a compliance theater. adding a new pre audit with the same people would be useless.
now it is easier to get 1 good person then equip that person with AI and lots of grunts and that would end up costing much much less than what we have right now.
“now it is easier to get 1 good person then equip that person with AI and lots of grunts and that would end up costing much much less than what we have right now.” – Giancarlo
I can see the appeal of an honest, capable person leading a team supported by AI. What I’m not clear on is how that arrangement would overcome the “cultural issue” you mentioned.
culture of utang na loob etc is easy to subvert for a Neuro divergent person
Irineo’s suggestion 3a would be a good addition.
On impeccable documentation (and arguably even the audit process), the Philippine political elite have always had a pattern of isomorphic mimetic adaptation of Western forms as formal legal protection of their rents, including property rights, oligarchic/oligopic economic control. If one thinks about it the patronage system to guarantee blocs of supporter votes through things like ayuda, politically disbursed calamity assistance, and the like guarantees the former. Importantly, this has existed even before the Revolution and has been continually updated and adapts to new social circumstances.
If the dynasties can adapt and change, why can those who claim to want good governance not adapt and change? The certain tendency of wanting to create a perfectly moralistic, hermetically sealed, perfectly unchanging world is exceedingly weird. Even weirder when such individuals constantly quote Rizal or other Revolutionary figures to justify their mental perfection.
My problem with it all is despite political elite bastardization and co-optation, institutions and structures that were/are set up get “most” things right. It is incumbent for a reformer to put a magnifying glass up to what doesn’t work, then tweak stuff to make the rest that is sort of working, work better . Throwing everything out and starting over again seems to be a Filipino pastime.
Earlier this year, Mar and I spoke a bit about his crusade for restoration of the COA Pre-Audit step. Here is a paste of an email he sent me. I’m sure he would not mind my sharing it as it was part of a group exchange. There were many folks on the email list.
>>CV,
Let us not lose heart. Let us draw lessons from Jose Rizal.
Pilosopo Tasio was writing a book not for the present but for future generations, so that it cannot be said that all were asleep during the time of their forefathers. Rizal also meant that in the future, when the conditions are right, when no one can successfully fight reform ideas whose time has come, then the wisdom preserved in the book will be of use in governance.
I echoed Rizal’s thought when I wrote the following in the Dedications of my book:
“To the youth and hope of the Motherland, so that from the legacy of wisdom and insights preserved in books as their inheritance, they may learn early enough during the prime of their lives what their elder generations learned the hard way, some at a high cost, during the best years of their lives.”
Right now, we have known doable solutions to corruption. I have written about them. What we need is a Filipino Lee Kuan Yew. In the Philippines, he is equivalent to the COA Chairman and the President. As I wrote before, they are the two persons in the country who can neutralize corruption. Without their participation, no amount of efforts by the remaining more than 100 million Filipinos can curb corruption.
Leni Robredo is the personification of the President we need. She is an economist, a product of UP at that, and a lawyer. She has shown the kind of character our public officials need. I believe that, sooner or later, we will have a President who has more good qualities than bad ones. A good President will appoint good COA Chairperson and Commissioners.
If COA pre-audit is restored, it will have far-reaching implications. COA auditors, on their own, will do it right; otherwise, if they sign anomalous disbursement vouchers during pre-audit, they will be prosecuted and convicted of corruption.
With proper pre-audit of big-time procurement and infrastructure construction contracts, vote-buying politicians who intend to recover their huge election spending through rigged public bidding cannot do it anymore. Hence, they will be discouraged from vote-buying. Contractors who contribute huge campaign funds to corrupt politicians will be discouraged also. Their source of election fund recovery, rigged public bidding, will be hard to undertake. Therefore, there will be a good chance of having better candidates elected, with consequent positive impact on governance.
COA management audit is important. However, provided there is proper COA pre-audit, progress can be achieved against corruption.
How to have COA pre-audit restored is the biggest problem. It is included in what I am doing, but I work on it on an on-and-off basis only because I have other things to do.
Mar<<
This is naive and doesn’t look at what happens in the real world.
This is like hammer time. I see a problem and the solution is my hammer.
Complex systems does not have easy solutions.
It’s about vigilance and constant motion to improve and get ahead the problems.
If you look at any great endeavor it is a small group of people trying to problem solve until you get to success.
Have to revise this. I agree with pre audit but it needs to be AI based anything else is just gonna put sand in the wheels of the system
The pre-audit was introduced by the Insular Government in 1907. Aside from 3 short instances of discontinuance, the pre-audit existed in the Philippine system for nearly 90 years.
But the pre-audit was only effective for 9 years, from 1907-1916 — 9 whole years. The process of Filipinization started in 1916 with the Jones Act after continual prodding by Quezon and Osmeña.
I’m guessing here that Mr. Tecson is in his late 60s or early 70s, judging from his self-published biography, which has him being a child of the Third Republic. So tbh I’m not sure what Mr. Tecson is referring to regarding the pre-audit as an effective means of deterring public corruption, since even before the Commonwealth the pre-audit had already been co-opted by the landed political elite. The usefulness of the pre-audit just got worse under the Third Republic, though not as bad as it got apparently under the Marcos Sr. regime.
Knowing what we know about how the Philippine elite operate, via Alfred W. McCoy (Anarchy of Families), Paul D. Hutchcroft Booty Capitalism, Julio C. Teehankee (Predatory Parties and Dynastic Coalitions), it might be better to adopt accountability and enforcement mechanisms that cannot be co-opted, adapted, or used as legal cover by corrupt actors.
Just my opinion, but additional paperwork is always an opportunity for obfuscation not transparency unless the clearances and vouchers can be easily verified and irregularity exposed. Nothing is an easy fix, especially when the detritus has built up so much. But a start might be to have some sort of public register that is easily searchable, with civic watchdogs that actually care about pragmatic fixes more than they care about moralizing using such public registers to maintain vigilance. In addition, the Philippine elite are really good at adaptation and co-optation, while keeping the cultural substrate that the bulk of Filipinos understand. So not using the same cultural substrate, which I call the “cultural operating system,” reversing it against bad behavior such as through hiya, seems highly self-defeating to me.
Here is another post that Mar Tecson wrote to our group:
>>>CV,
I asked my questions to know if there are uses of X-Road that I am not aware of. AI’s response seems discouraging because, ultimately, it comes down to the same question: who will investigate and do what it takes to curb corruption based on X-Road information?
However, as I said before, do not lose heart. Behind every cloud is a silver lining.
Actually, I am pleasantly surprised to know about Estonia’s X-Road from the email exchanges in our group. In substance, it is a form of a subtle or disguised unrestricted implementation of the Freedom of Information Act, one of my espoused anti-corruption measures, shown on page 400 of my book, Inequality: Economic Tyranny, August 2022 edition. And it is about one of the most crucial pieces of information—the government’s corruption-prone disbursements of its more than SIX-TRILLION-PESO annual budget or appropriation.
The X-Road information will be used by at least two groups, as follows:
1. Concerned citizens and civil society groups, who will use X-Raod information for the right reasons—to curb corruption by punishing the corrupt, no matter who gets hurt. For example, they will gather evidence, they will observe actual infrastructure construction, to see if project specifications shown in X_Road are actually followed, in order to have good governance for the betterment of the people.
2. Defeated politicians and opposition political parties—who will do the right thing—gather evidence against incumbent public officials and have them prosecuted—for the wrong reason: so that they who are out of power may be elected in the next elections.
3. AI is right. Even if records are lost or destroyed by agency officials and COA auditors, there are independent records, in the form of X-Road data and information, that can serve as an audit trail in pinning down the corrupt. Having X-Road information accessible to the public will also serve as a moral deterrent to corrupt politicians. They will know that, sooner or later, they may be caught because of the audit trail in X-Road.
Here is an excerpt from my book of what I cited:
D. THE ROLE OF THE PEOPLE
The people shall serve as an independent check and watchdog against potential collusion among government agency officials and COA auditors. Along this line, the Office of the President should initiate the following anti-corruption measures through the issuance of the following Presidential orders:
1. People empowerment, through the promulgation of less restrictive implementing rules of the Freedom of Information Act. The people’s asking for data and information should be deemed a matter of right. They should not be asked to justify their requests for government documents. If government officials and their staff, who are public servants of the people, can see government documents, why cannot the people in whom sovereignty resides and from whom all powers emanate under the Constitution? There is no valid reason to deny them their request for documents that do not involve military secrets. Without unrestricted freedom of information except for highly confidential matters, disclosure of which will endanger national interest and security, the people cannot effectively perform their crucial role as watchdogs against corruption and inefficiencies in government.
Mar<<
Mr. Tecson is correct in principle, but principles remain principles unless applied through power. In order to have power, one must win in politics. That is where most of the reformist elite and reformist middle class get it wrong, because they are unwilling to obtain that power through winning in politics, which requires compromising with what exists now rather than what one wishes to exist.
Their fundamental misunderstanding is that public corruption is an engineering problem that can be fixed with more compliance, more paperwork, more legalism — rather than the political economy problem that incentivizes the Philippine form of public corruption to begin with. And so the moralizing reformist continually insists on wholesale importation of outside legal and technological frameworks, whether that be the old obsession with “Singaporean efficiency” or this simplistic understanding of Estonia’s X-Road eGovernment, not recognizing that these frameworks unadapted are wholly foreign to actual Philippine realities. That reality includes how power, rent-seeking, and the networks of patron-client relationships work in the Philippines.
First of all, Estonia is a high-trust, low-patronage society, while the Philippines is a low-trust, high-patronage society — complete opposites. The nature of Russified corruption the Baltics were left with after independence was also different from what is seen as “corruption” by the Filipino reformist. Soviet-legacy corruption was due to institutional friction within a communist command economy and operated at a horizontal, peer-to-peer level moderated by middlemen. Austronesian (Philippines, Indonesia, to an extent Malaysia) corruption is highly verticalized with patrons who provide resources to a cascading client ladder with each ladder’s rung being a gatekeeper for the lower rungs, based on relational networks of kinship and allyship.
As such more efficient governance in the post-Soviet Baltics, such as the Estonian X-Road, sought to cut out the middlemen, which is where the corruption originates. Okay, suppose the Philippines adopts something like X-Road, e.g. “PH-Road,” then what? The corruption in the Philippines as I explained is vertical. The corruption emanates from rent-seeking political and oligarchic dynasty heads; heads that also control every other part of the Philippines’ political economy, including any government which would administer a “PH-Road.” In an by itself, all a “PH-Road” would do is to accurately store and swiftly transmit records inputted into it, which I and Giancarlo have already pointed out, exists as “perfect paperwork” that is exactly complied with. The public corruption does not exist at this layer — as I noted the corruption is downstream. Garbage In, Garbage Out, as the technical community calls it, and by the way, the probably corrupt administrators of the probably corrupt politicians are the ones controlling the system to begin with and are the ones feeding the inputs.
Further suppose that there exists a strong civic society and a network of civic watchdogs that goes beyond simple moralizing. First of all, that doesn’t presently exist: civic society is inert until instances of mass mobilizations and civic watchdogs are more interested in proving their own moral superiority to each other than actually doing anything useful. Okay. Around the same time X-Road was conceived in Estonia (early 2000s), the Philippines already had well-intentioned reformist bureaucrats who pushed for the Philippine Government Electronic Procurement System (PhilGEPS), the Integrated Financial Management Information System (IFMIS), two legs of the monitoring capability (budgeting, bidding, procurement, disbursement) exposed via X-Road. In 2025 the E-Governance Act was enacted, which seeks to provide much of the capability a “PH-Road” would theoretically have.
Why did that not work to curb public corruption? Political networks reorganized and adapted quickly to the new requirements, producing perfect compliance paperwork, rigging contract awards, externalizing kickbacks off the books, further obfuscating vote-buying as “gifts” and “relief,” while at the same time resisting and slow-walking the reform of lump-sum appropriations, unprogrammed funds, confidential funds, and the ability to re-program funds.
In the absence of strong and impartial judicial enforcement, a system like “PH-Road” would be completely useless. And besides, the masa don’t care about abstract legalese when they can’t even afford to live a dignified life. To the masa, “anti-corruption” is just another privileged luxury position they cannot afford to invest time and attention on. One must remember that while public corruption affects all Filipinos, it mainly and disproportionately affects the middle class and elites who do not have political power.
Sometimes I am convinced that the out-of-touch nature of reformist agitators due to their privileged position leads them to show disrespect to the culture of the country they claim to want to reform (and even lead). Any reform needs to be re-framed into the cultural operating system the masa understand in order to take root over time within the cultural substrate. Wholesale and unadapted importation of foreign frameworks is not only disrespectful to the cultural understanding of literally 93%+ of Filipinos, but is self-defeating. So here are some ideas to re-frame “anti-corruption:”
1. A re-framing towards direct material welfare: eGovernance as a system to guarantee earned benefits (e.g. PhilHealth, pensions) and social assistance is paid directly to eWallets (e.g. GCash, PayMaya) that cannot be withheld or taken as a bribe by the local politician. The system can still have accounting and budgeting functions for various levels of government.
2. A re-framing towards Filipino dignity and friction reduction:
How much time do Filipinos waste waiting in queues waiting for basic government services like clearances? It’s a lot. Time wasted waiting in a queue where when one’s turn comes up the official might even go home for the day reduces a Filipino’s dignity as well as reduces chances to earn for their family’s economic survival. The government cannot eliminate private queues (e.g. banks), but the government can eliminate queues for government services.
This also cuts out gatekeepers and in cutting out gatekeepers the chance of petty corruption is eliminated.
3. Force the patron-client relationship to become performance-based again:
Publicize and make visible government data in a way easily digestible by the Filipino so they can track and compare their elected politician’s performance relative to nearby politicians. This is called yardstick competition and forces positive adaptation rather than destroys the relational network. The relational network is the fundamental structure of Austronesian society and if Malaysia couldn’t eliminate it, it is doubtful the Philippines could.
Connect how reducing and eliminating corruption directly effects the material welfare of the Filipino in actual, concrete terms. “Clean governance means you have… better and affordable medicine… access to reliable food supply… to encounter less flooding… to deal with less traffic on commutes… etc.” Clean governance should be re-framed to superior patronage that delivers needed services and proven through actual, observable, and felt performance.
A Filipino might not be able to leave their local patron and “walk” to a new patron today, but given the information and understanding on how performances effects their economic outcomes, they can start demanding their local politicians to deliver actual government services rather than flashy ribbon cuttings that become empty promises.
4. Re-frame and re-direct indigenous socio-cultural concepts towards the positive:
In pre-colonial society, there was a recognition that everything had a good and bad, and degrees of in-between. So re-frame Filipino concepts such as hiya, which still exists as a social behavioral constraint, rather than doubling down on abstract legalism. Publicize billboards with the project’s purpose, exact budget, contractor’s actual beneficial owners, targeted completion date. Provide a digital “hotline” where citizens can upload, share, and disseminate photo and video evidence of unfinished or substandard work — Filipinos already share this on Facebook, but it needs to be centralized where any citizen, anywhere in the country, can view and critique how public monies are spent.
A re-directed hiya would connect project failure or malfeasance to specific politicians and administrators responsible. Maintaining family prestige and public standing is far more effective than legal filings no average Filipino would never read or follow.
5. Civic Procurement Oversight:
As I explained previously, there is a need for independent, civil audits. Internal oversight bodies can be co-opted due to pakikisama and relational ties, either by conversion or installation of administrators. Include civil society and civil watchdogs as equal partners in the oversight process as accredited monitors who accompany internal auditors on inspections, bidding proceedings, government-contractor meetings. This re-framing of inclusion in community decisions shows respect to how Philippine Austronesian-based governance worked in pre-colonial times.
Good read of the day. I like the reality-based solutions.
Good list. Implement then adjust.
I’ll try to reply by number.
Direct material welfare is good. But this will only work if it is a intergenerational deal.
There has been much fanfare on 4Ps. I will try to see what can be internet research on this.
The deal was 4Ps to end the intergenerational poverty. Did it work? When does it work? How does it work? When will it not work?
From my anecdotal observation spending time with mainly Class D/E, and my recent trip (last year) in the poorer parts of Mindanao setting up solar irrigation for Class E farmers, I can say with regard to 4Ps:
1. 4Ps helps most families who are eligible and enrolled by being directly targeted to impoverished children.
2. 4Ps does often lift the eligible and enrolled families out of poverty with health, nutrition, and education support.
3. Enrolled families are usually very careful to adhere to 4Ps requirements (keeping kids in school, taking kids to clinic checkups, receiving child development counseling). They want the 4Ps benefits.
4. What 4Ps does not do is to encourage the parents to have actual and gainful employment. I encounter many Class E’s out in the bukid rural areas where the parents are completely fine with not working, subsisting mainly on ayuda and utang, not even bothering to grow basic root crops like the grandparent and great-grandparent generation (who are often still alive but too old to tend to gardens) despite living on family land that has plenty of space to grow basic foodstuffs. Unsure how many Filipino families live this way but out in the bukid far from urban centers, there’s a lot, though it’s worth noting that Class E’s are a tiny slice of the population.
5. Kids enrolled in 4Ps are supported with enough benefits that get them through the individual program limit (7 years per child). After 7 years, the family is expected to have had enough time to “graduate” out of poverty, yet if the parents still don’t have work or income, the entire family would be disenrolled regardless. For example, if at enrollment a family has children aged 3, 7, 10, the family will be disenrolled by the time the youngest is 10 years old and the eldest is 17.
6. However, around this summer (can’t recall exact month), Marcos Jr. issued an EO which automatically maintains enrollment exception past 7 years IF there are any enrolled children still under 18 years old AND are attending school.
7. In 4Ps there are if I recall 3 levels, L1 Survival, L2 Subsistence, L3 Self-Sufficient. L3 means the family will graduate out of the 4Ps program once the 7 year limit is reached. Problem is, many Class E’s don’t find work as I noted, or work sometimes (e.g. seasonal labor during harvest) to buy what they want not what they need, and therefore are stuck at L1 or L2 pretty much permanently.
8. While 4Ps does absolutely help impoverished families while they are enrolled, just from my unscientific observation it doesn’t seem to help the kids become successful in school to lift the family out of intergenerational poverty. Usually the way a family gets out of poverty is because a family member goes abroad as an OFW or a gifted child manages to graduate college by some generous relative’s help. Then the earner helps their family. But I know many cases were it is literally 1 person (usually female) supporting like 10 family members.
9. In places with concentrations of impoverished families, the local politicians are completely useless. Case in point, the recent illegal POGO bust in Zamboanga. The local dynasties seem to be skimming off of the NTA and engage in questionable activities, as they basically are uninterested in developing their LGU beyond building themselves a nice mansion or building “businesses” that they control. Specifically in Siay, the resort the Chinese criminals operated out of is literally owned by the mayor/mayor’s family, but after the bust the mayor’s rep said something along the lines of “I had no idea!” I was invited to this exact resort just last year. See:
https://globalnation.inquirer.net/340486/244-foreigners-nabbed-in-largest-pogo-bust-in-zamboanga-sibugay-bi
10. I still see people making rational choices, even if a family choosing to stay dirt poor and live off of ayuda or guilt tripping OFW relatives to send money seems irrational to us. These families have somehow calculated that it is a rational choice to do so. Need to somehow find and give them better choices, and provide more support for those who want to change. It is a touchy subject and hard to talk about sometimes with educated Filipinos who are far-removed from walking among the poor due to the pride-centric reaction. It is not anti-Pinoy or an attack on Filipinos to talk about realities as realities exist.
Thanks for the stories they lend color to the situation. Great program aims and even I even welcome the EO. Now PIDS/DSWD and the concerned agencies have an obligation to see this through.
Make the program work. Studying anything is just time, data, and tokens. Will try to write about the data/research on 4Ps
“In 2025 the E-Governance Act was enacted, which seeks to provide much of the capability a “PH-Road” would theoretically have.
Why did that not work to curb public corruption?” – Joey N.
Of course the “PH-Road” as we have dubbed it, is far from complete. At every stage of completion, it is still but a tool to be used by Filipinos with resolve to fight graft and corruption in the government. That the Gatekeepers will fight its implementation is a given They have the resolve to do that. Hence the need for resolve to fight the Gatekeepers of the corrupt system we have today. The “PH-Road” will not reduce or eliminate corruption on its own. We all know that.
Meanwhile, I’m sharing more from our kababayan Mar Tecson who is crusading against corruption in the Philippines. He wrote this via email earlier this year 2026 (note the “snipped” you see in his exhibits are Tecson’s, not mine):
>>Friends,
You are right, having COA properly perform its anti-corruption role is not enough. Other government agencies and offices must also undergo reforms to address corruption, as well as waste and inefficiencies in government operations.
Please note, though, that COA’s role encompasses not only corruption detection and prevention but also the streamlining of government operations, including promoting efficiency and avoiding waste and losses. This latter role is handled through the required conduct not only of COA financial audit but also of management (or operational or performance) audit of government agencies and corporations nationwide. Under this setup, the COA Chairman’s audit function is a full-time job. Thus, he has a more major and dominant role against corruption and an equally important role in streamlining of government operations compared with the President. If COA will conduct no-nonsense, timely, and sustained management audit of government agencies, COA can serve as a catalyst for change or reform in the government. This is evident from its role as an auditor that will ensure government agency adherence to the COMPLIANCE matters or performance standards shown in EXHIBIT 1.
The President’s anti-corruption role is to appoint an Anti-Corruption Czar and support him in his work, regardless of who gets hurt in the process. This is just a part of his grave responsibilities as Head of State.
Following are some excerpts from my aleady existing writings on corruption and governance matters:
· The Main Anti-Corruption Role of the COA Chairman
.
Restore selective COA pre-audit of high-amount government transactions most susceptible to corruption, as well as have COA undertake comprehensive, timely, and sustained management audit of government operations. The management, operational, or performance audit shall use as government performance standards my recommended list of Compliance Matters that can serve as a form of Management information and Control System and Best Management Practices (EXHIBIT 1).
· The Main Anti-Corruption Role of the President
Appoint an internal-control-expert Anti-Corruption Czar who, as the President’s anti-corruption arm and Internal Auditor in the Executive Branch, will handle the preventive aspect of fighting corruption before it is committed in national and local government units (EXHIBIT 2, as excerpted from my book Inequality: Economic Tyranny). If progressive private corporations need and have their Internal Auditors, the government’s operating and spending arm—the Executive Branch—also needs and must have its Internal Auditor.
The President should authorize appropriate actions on COA’s adverse findings in the conduct of its pre-audit, post-audit, and management (or operational or performance) audit.
EXHIBIT 1
COMPLIANCE MATTERS
AS (1) PERFORMANCE STANDARDS
IN COA MANAGEMENT AUDIT, As WELL AS
(2) MANAGEMENT INFORMATION AND
CONTROL SYSTEM AND (3) BEST
MANAGEMENT PRACTICES IN
PLANNING AND MANAGEMENT
OF GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS
(Pages 382-384 and 426-427 of the
book Inequality: Economic Tyranny)
OBJECTIVES OF
COA MANAGEMENT AUDIT:
TO ENSURE COMPLIANCE BY
GOVERNMENT UNITS AND ENTITIES
TO BEST MANAGEMENT PRACTICES
AS PERFORMANCE STANDARDS OF
GOOD GOVERNANCE
Through its management audit, COA should ascertain the compliance or non-compliance with the following best management practices and performance standards for audited government units and corporate entities, then recommend any needed remedial measures:
1. In general, compliance by each national and local government unit and attached government corporation—hereafter individually or collectively referred to as government agency or agencies—with its mission or legal mandate, like proper enforcement of laws and regulations it is mandated to administer.
At the outset, each government agency must thoroughly prepare a 100% list of its detailed missions or functions, for review by the Presidential Management Staff (PMS) in the Office of the President for correctness and completeness.
As contingency planning, the government agency must also prepare a 100% list of potential risks of natural, force majeure, or man-made calamities and disasters that it must guard against and prepare for in its turf or jurisdiction.
In other words, what are the worst things that can happen within the government officials’ jurisdiction?
The potential calamities and disasters include tsunamis in low lying villages along seashores; typhoons like Ondoy in Marikina and Yolanda in Leyte with death, destruction, and floods in low lying areas; floods from delayed releases of water from overflowing dams during the rainy season; sinking of ships during bad weather; oil spill from oil tankers; landslides in areas with denuded mountains or steep terrain; fires, earthquakes, and volcanic eruptions; breach in reservoir dams; famines from drought; epidemic or plague; acts of terrorism such as bombing of oil refineries, oil storage depots, and power plants; civil commotion; disruption in rice and oil importations due to international political upheaval; and so on.
[On oil spills from oil tankers that cause so much damage to ecology and the livelihood of fishermen, to minimize this risk in case of shipwreck or accidents, the Maritime Industry Authority (MARINA) must require that oil tankers, especially for bunker fuel oil, must have double hull, as well as extra thick steel materials for oil compartments.]
Based on its 100% list of functions and potential risks, the government unit or entity must prepare its preset logical, coherent, and comprehensive standards of performance, akin to key performance indicators (KPI) in management by objectives (MBO). The performance standards should be reviewed and approved by the head of the government agency or entity. Thereafter, there should be monitoring of performance vs. standards internally within the government office, which should be preparatory to the review by the Presidential Management Staff (PMS) in Malacanang (p. 423 of the cited book).
2. Compliance with total or 100% handling of the comprehensive and detailed list of functions based on applicable missions and legal mandates—which handling of functions should include prioritization of budgeting, funding, and implementation of projects based on a proper hierarchy of needs.
3. Compliance with targeted quantity or volume of work, like number of bridges and length in kilometers of roads programmed to be constructed during the budget year.
4. Compliance with quality of work, as shown in contract specifications and standards of professional practice, aimed at preventing cheating and inefficiencies, typified by the use of inferior or incomplete materials and poor workmanship, as in the NAIA 3 airport terminal part of which collapsed even before actual use, or in newly constructed concrete roads that promptly developed cracks within one year or a few years of use. For multi-lane highways and expressways, design and construct for heavy loads (with more and bigger steel bars) one lane in each direction, to be assigned for use by heavy cargo trucks. This will minimize road cracks without spending heavily on all lanes.
5. Compliance with deadlines or timeliness of work, such as completion of projects on or before targeted dates during the budget year.
6. Compliance with total and per unit standard costs, or project accomplishment according to originally allotted total budget and per-unit cost standards, such as constructing a given length of road project at the budgeted absolute-amount limit and pre-determined cost per kilometer.
————SNIPPED———–
EXHIBIT 2
ANTI-CORRUPTION CZAR,
THE INDISPENSABLE EXECUTIVE
BRANCH’S INTERNAL AUDITOR IN THE
GOVERNMENT’S ANTI-CORRUPTION WAR
The Crucial Role of the Anti-Corruption Czar:
Doing Preventive Anti-Corruption Functions that
Must be Done But are Currently Not Being Done—Because Competent Internal Control Professionals Who Know What Must be Done are Heretofore Not Tapped by the Office of the President
As COA is an independent constitutional body, the President must designate a separate Anti-Corruption Czar for corruption PREVENTION who will coordinate with COA officials, legislators, and various government agency officials on the restoration of partial COA pre-audit, creation of a special fraud prevention unit in COA, sponsorship of legislation that may be needed, and other aspects of the government’s anti-corruption campaign.
To begin his job, the Anti-Corruption Czar must know and size up the problem—by taking a comprehensive inventory of all past, present, and potential corruption cases nationwide. Thereafter, in coordination with COA, his group should determine or formulate the corresponding preventive or remedial measures for each mode of corruption employed.
Some Priority Anti-Corruption
Measures that the Anti-Corruption Czar
Must Initiate or Coordinate with Other
Government Offices, Including COA
and Office of the Ombudsman
· Preparation of primers on important government accounting, auditing, and disbursement rules, addressed to elected and appointed government officials. This way, they will not commit unintentional violations. If they break government rules later on, for evidentiary and prosecution purposes, there will be no doubt about the intentional nature of their violation as they were aware of the rules.
· Use of cost standards and other key indicators of fraud to detect anomalies. For example, overpricing in road construction bids can be seen from excessive price differential over cost standards, while cheating in compacting work and cement quantity can be shown by cracks that immediately develop on newly built concrete roads. Designation of supervising government project engineer from start to completion of the project to fix responsibility for any resulting project defects, coupled with the conduct of independent engineering tests (like core sampling) under the auspices of COA or the Anti-Corruption Czar. Confiscation of guaranty bonds and prosecution of contractors together with the supervising government project engineers for any cheating on work done and materials used.
————SNIPPED———–<<
CV, a personal request from me: I read, digested, and spent considerable time replying to your comments to address the points you raised. Sharing stuff like Mr. Tecson’s observations, is nice, but it would also be nice if we discussed what’s at hand before dropping a whole bunch of other things.
Specifically to the new stuff from Mr. Tecson you shared:
It seems Mr. Tecson is very process- and compliance-oriented. This is not strange for someone with a CPA professional background like himself. There is also a reason why CPAs are not the rule makers nor decision makers in anything — their role is to deal with budgets and compliance paperwork. As a decision maker, even on multi-million dollar projects, I have never once solicited a CPA’s opinion for anything. A CPA is just another input for risk.
Most of the stuff Mr. Tecson is proposing in this new snippet you shared has to do with more audits, more paperwork, more compliance. The Philippine relational political system, which is deeply rooted in cultural behavior, adapts and evolves much faster than any imposed paperwork and compliance can. So the solution is not to create more paperwork or more compliance. The solution is to have real, substantive, and most importantly, visible enforcement. Public corruption in the Philippines exists precisely because of weak or absent enforcement of existing law and regulation, not because paperwork and compliance were not adhered to. Once again, audits are meaningless if not paired with enforcement.
Many of the enforcement levers in the Philippines are controlled by various levels of government despite ostensibly falling under unified national auspices (e.g. PNP, NBI, department auditors). Under the LGC and later SC rulings, local executives (who are the local political dynasty), have great influence over the enforcers assigned to them under the principle of shared command. Often the locally assigned enforcers are co-opted into the local political machinery due to proximate relationship, indirect pressure (e.g. LGU withholding housing, food, or offering “stipends” on top of government salary).
There is also a difference between willful public corruption and wastage due to simple incompetence. The two are not the same, though the former may use the latter as an excuse to escape greater accountability by accepting partial lesser accountability.
I have outlined a rough set of ideas which reflect the reality on the ground as I see it in my other posts.
“Once again, audits are meaningless if not paired with enforcement.” – Joey N.
“The President should authorize appropriate actions on COA’s adverse findings in the conduct of its pre-audit, post-audit, and management (or operational or performance) audit.” – Mar Tecson
Looks like you and Mar Tecson are on the same page.
In principle, yes. Where Mr. Tecson and I differ is I account for realities on the ground and prefer pragmatic solutions which address the root causes rather than operating on theory.
As I explained, the formal enforcement mechanism is often slow-walked or even co-opted by actors who exert power over those mechanisms. The actors are not necessary the Executive Department or even Philippine President himself/herself. In fact, actors often blame the Chief Executive to cover up their own malfeasance since it is easy to do so within the cultural operating system.
Therefore, the greatest enforcement mechanism is using the cultural operating system itself. Strategic deployment of hiya to expose who is truly culpable.
“Therefore, the greatest enforcement mechanism is using the cultural operating system itself. Strategic deployment of hiya to expose who is truly culpable.” – Joey N.
I see that Philippine newspaper journalist Randy David disagrees with you as he writes in his column “Why Corruption Persists (Aug. 2025):”
>>“Anti-corruption drives typically end with the arrest of a few low-ranking employees, the public shaming of a handful of principals, and a fresh round of calls to moral renewal. Then, as memory fades, everything is forgiven. The business of politics goes on as usual….
“The officials implicated rarely show remorse. Deep down, they tell themselves that everyone is guilty because it is the whole system that is corrupt….
“Worse, even when cases prosper, the corrupt often succeed in finding redemption at the polls. Victory wipes the slate clean. The ballot box becomes a laundering machine for soiled reputations.”
Crooks in our government are “walang hiya.”
In Randy David’s wrote in his column “The Sociology of Corruption (October 2024)”:
>>The feudal value of noblesse oblige—the notion that those in high positions had a moral duty to act nobly—manifested in our culture as delicadeza (Sp.) or delikadesa (Fil.), meaning a sense of refinement or, in Filipino, kapinuhan. This cultural norm once served as a strong check on the abuse of power, reinforced by a pervasive sense of hiya (shame). One did not hear people justifying unethical or immoral actions by simply claiming, as they often do today, “It’s not illegal, so it’s permitted.”
we cannot just accept things as they are we have to slowly walk towards the change. this means walang hiya must become kahiya hiya.
this is because of the perfection mindset. I am not perfect therefore everyone is corrupt
I do not see how the two Inquirer opinion pieces by Prof. Randy David “disagree” with my position. There is no incongruence between what I said and what Prof. Randy David said, in the parts where his and my view on this subject coincide. I do differ somewhat in the degree and the method of the solution. Also, you are starting to search out random stuff to try to “win” the argument rather than discussing and defending your points, which wastes my time replying and others time reading. That assumes that I have not read the articles (I had on original publication) and that I am too lazy to memory recall the article contents thus accept positions uncritically. I do not appreciate that.
Anyway.
In the October 2024 opinion piece, Prof. David explains how hiya can serve as a check on socially undesirable behavior. But what he did not explain, perhaps due to the medium’s constraint, is why a Filipino can say “It’s not illegal, so it’s permitted.” This is not about Western or Judeo-Christian morality. This is about a cultural operating system which perceives morality differently from the Western and Judeo-Christian moral worldview. The masa, who comprise 93%+ of the population, may have exterior Christian moral features but it is filtered through the cultural lens.
In the August 2025 opinion piece Prof. David diagnosed the problem and explained the result, but in the same article he did not explain the mechanism by which the problem proceeds to the corrupted result. Nor does he explain how redemption and reputation works in the Filipino cultural worldview. The scenarios he highlighted are operating exactly as the culture expects. Because again, indigenous Austronesian morality which still have strong echoes in the masa works completely differently from Western expectations of Judeo-Christian morality.
In the cultural operating system one cannot use Western morality to accuse another of “walang hiya,” because that’s just not how it works. In the cultural operating system, hiya is failure to honor relational obligations, which is flexible and negotiable. Further, “triumphing” over accusation of one’s honor is justification precisely because in the same cultural understanding, a triumph is equated with being correct. In order to have substantial change, one needs to actually understand the culture and work with the culture to redefine the relational obligations of each Filipino, including the leaders. Truly, even after 30 years of closeness to the Philippines and Filipinos, I’m shocked I understand this but many educated Filipinos do not.
The easiest way to see there is some sort of cultural operating system underneath the superficial aspects of the culture is to do a comparative analysis of how exactly public corruption works in the Philippines, Indonesia, and Malaysia.
The Philippines is an officially secular country with Western overlays (Spanish and American), with the majority of Filipinos (92%) being Christian (78.8% Catholic, 13.2% Evangelical and Other Christian).
Indonesia is also an officially secular country with a strong Arabicized overlay over an earlier Hindu overlay, with the majority of Indonesians (87%) being Muslim and Islam is given an unofficial national position.
Malaysia is an officially Muslim country with Anglicized governance, with the majority of Malaysians (Malays — 64%) being Muslim.
Yet the type of public corruption, how public corruption works, and how society views public corruption is remarkably similar between all 3 countries. Likewise the reaction and out-of-touch proposals of the Westernized middle class and out-of-political-power elite to public corruption is very similar in Indonesia and Malaysia as in the Philippines.
“hiya” is something that works within a community – or maybe it even worked within the “imagined community” of the Third Republic, meaning its thought and opinion leaders, because if one reads the old stuff like Teodoro Locsin Sr. or Nick Joaquin, one gets the idea of a certain nation-building community. Maybe what that community called hiya was closer to delicadeza in spirit.
In any case, that community did NOT manage to make the masses part of the larger “imagined community”, and even if there might have been a bit of that remaining during EDSA Uno, MLQ3 is most probably right that the rift between the masses and middle class plus elite became very clear during EDSA Dos and EDSA Tres. “Hiya” only works among “kapwa” and the “National Village” of social media is without the true community bonds of a real Filipino village of the olden days, so many people shrug or laugh if called “walang hiya” nowadays.
my personal hypothesis is that both West and East (I mean both Northern Asia and South Asia) developed fixed moral norms to handle human nature that real community too far beyond the “Dunbar number” is hardly possible, with ideas of public shame (beyond relational boundaries) in Confucian cultures and internalized guilt in the West. What a somewhat exasperated opposition commenter on social media said during the Duterte era that the Philippines has neither Western guilt nor Eastern shame might be true – with the addition that hiya doesn’t reach beyond the in-group.
>>“Hiya” only works among “kapwa” and the “National Village” of social media is without the true community bonds of a real Filipino village of the olden days, so many people shrug or laugh if called “walang hiya” nowadays.<< -Irineo
I agree w/ your thoughts on “hiya” and “delicadeza” in your post, Irineo.
Marco Garrido of the University of Chicago School of Sociology wrote a case study about the dynamics between EDSA II and EDSA III in the American Journal of Sociology (November 2017) titled Why the Poor Support Populism: The Politics of Sincerity in Metro Manila. It’s available here as uploaded by the author (the official University of Chicago site is paywalled):
https://www.researchgate.net/publication/321639025_Why_the_Poor_Support_Populism_The_Politics_of_Sincerity_in_Metro_Manila
Garrido’s basic argument was that the main actors of EDSA I were already of the emergent new middle class that were not bound by the old land-based patronage system due to having their wealth derived from the foreign multinationals that were then making inroads into the Philippine economy, either working directly for foreign companies or being within the service ecosystem supported by foreign capital inflow.
In essence, Garrido finds that the EDSA II revolution and the EDSA III counter-revolution was a dynamic that played out as a class war between a new middle class which was starting to establish itself as new enclaves (as opposed to the old enclaves of the Third Republic middle class) feeling “besieged” by the informal settlers who were concentrated in Metro Manila’s urban slums. Garrido argued that the Class D/E’s living in urban slums perceived Erap Estrada as being more sincere, caring about them beyond simple electoral considerations of requiring their bloc vote, because Erap’s performative style engaged with masa expectations in a coherent manner while the politics of the new middle class seemed disassociated and alien to masa cultural values. For the new middle class, it seemed they were replaying events that happened many times in the Philippines past, i.e. the multiple anti-masa panics that led to the post-war build-up of the original subdivisions of the old middle class in the first place.
The repeated behavior of the middle class and non-political dynasty elite seems to keep repeating itself from the old compradores days leading up to the Revolution: they need the labor and support of the masa in order to build wealth, but also choose to enclave themselves off. Take in point the kakampink “Starbucks wokesters” who often considered themselves separate and morally above others — the middle class is just too small to win electorally.
In contrast political dynasties are always deeply rooted in their local communities, even if they might skim off the NTA or other funds to enrich themselves and build power. If one thinks about it, the reason established political dynasties fall from power is because the family separated itself from the community over time then overreached by taking but not redistributing. We as the enlightened and supporters of good governance might say that ayuda and vote-buying are bad things, as those are, but to many communities it is just part of the social compact that ran long before the Spanish arrival on the shores of Cebu. So in cultural terms, as long as the local dynast is fulfilling their relational obligations to the community, it is impossible to pin them down with “walang hiya,” since hiya is measured by relational reciprocity, not by Judeo-Christian morals as it is understood by the middle class.
Well, even Malaysia was not able to completely eradicate basic cultural behavior and cultural expectations even though arguably Malaysia is the “best governed” Austronesian Maritime SEA country. Nor did Indonesia make large efforts to do the same there.
I think it’s probably a self-defeating exercise to impose fully Western expectations onto a culture that already have strong, established behaviors. If one looks to how pre-colonial Philippines, Indonesia, and Malaysia integrated external culture, governance, and economic systems, imported cultural, political, and economic technology served to mainly plug holes in where the base Austronesian culture did not have that technology (I am using the term technology here in the sense of tools that allow the application of conceptual knowledge). One major example of this “hole plugging” is how the Pasyon was re-interpreted by the masa to plug holes in their indigenous cosmological knowledge (Pasyon and Revolution by Reynaldo Ileto).
The only way forward, I guess, is to re-connect with the sense of kapwa and re-frame what relational obligations mean. I think Leni Robredo’s Angat Buhay laying a lot of groundwork for the middle class to do just that.
that is interesting, because MLQ3 sees the old middle class as leading the charge back then, and Jim Paredes of Apo Hiking Society was definitely old middle class as one of the people at the forefront. Though TSOH author Will Villanueva looks to me like that new middle class (distinct from the BPO and OFW money new middle class that MLQ3 has also described as relevant TODAY) as he has never mentioned ancestral homes like Karl has for his folks, or responded “oh we also have the in our family” like Sonny did when I posted scans of some Spanish-era land documents here.
My guess about Will is because his ways remind me of the crowd that would take the Fairview to Makati “Love Bus” (the air-conditioned Metro Manila Transit Bus heavily propagated by Imelda) who were in the new subdivisions built between Philcoa and Fairview in the 1970s and went to work in Makati.
looking at this systemically there is a similarity to the fear of the Bikolanos who were “bajo las campanas” towards the ones the Spanish called “monteses” and “cimaronnes” (source: Prosperity without Progress book) while they called them “Gentil” (Gentiles, i.e. “non-Christians”) as evidenced by this documented story from Tiwi by the descendants of the abaca boom mayor Higino Templado:
https://tiwialbay.blogspot.com/2012/07/the-legacy-of-sr-don-higino-templado.html
how Templado dealt with them (and what I am reading now in Prosperity without Progress) shows that the reduccion still was in progress in parts of Bikol until then:
I guess parts of the middle class that was still new in the 1980s thought of the slum dwellers in ways similar to how bajo las campanas Bikolanos thought of “Gentil”. Maybe a manifestation of that were some yellows whose first reaction to Duterte was “para siyang huramentado”.
the “bajo las campanas” Filipinos did have a sense of kapwa as re-framed by Catholic missionaries. Will’s article below is the concept of “damayan” in practice, similar to how Vicente Rafael observed a sense of “damayan” among those standing on the street at EDSA Dos, as opposed to the way people otherwise act on the street in Metro Manila.
There are studies of how the Catholic priests utilized native concepts they learned when they lived among the people and studied their languages to make Christianity understandable to them.
in fact the “bajo las campanas” Filipinos are freaked out by the “Pasyon” types, I recall Will writing that one should avoid being like Valentin delos Santos in civic matters.
What Leni Robredo is doing with Angat Buhay seems similar to how the Catholic Church in Naga reached out to the remontados in the hills nearby and IIRC integrating them into the devotion to “Ina”, Our Lady of Penafrancia, with the exuberant wildness of the voyadores (the men who carry Her to the boat on the Bikol river) as a ritualized memory of those days.
Of course the reduccion which created the division between those “bajo las campanas” and the “Gentil” is still the major rift – and my father’s birth town (he grew up more in Daraga when my grandfather moved there as the new judge and their barangay Sagpon is basically the poblacion area near the Daraga cathedral) and my grandfather’s hometown Tiwi was practically the border zone between those “under the bells” and those “in the boondocks”. What the future synthesis will be in the Philippines is anyone’s guess and in the hands of those who live there.
Yes, more recent historical research confirmed that in actuality the new middle class were the main actors in EDSA I and only grew by EDSA II. TBH I prefer non-Filipino research where it pertains to history and sociology since I find Philippine academia to be heavily polluted with nationalist sentiment combined with over-theorizing and not enough empirical groundwork. Aside from the usual American researchers, the Japanese (through MITI, now METI) have also put in a lot of effort towards empirical research.
Here’s a paper (click through for pdf) written by Masataka Kimura, a researcher for the Japanese think tank Institute of Developing Economies (which is under the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry, aka METI, the successor ministry to MITI) in that think tank’s quarterly journal The Developing Economies:
Kimura, Masataka (2003). The Emergence of the Middle Classes and Political Change in the Philippines. The Developing Economies, June 2003.
From page 280; bolded emphasis is mine.
Certainly under the reducción those who lived within bajo la campanas may have been wary about who who moved into or through their sitio or barrio. I’m not sure if this meant the settlement dwellers have a different sense of kapwa at that point though, or even now in our modern time, because doesn’t kapwa imply that in order to be considered a member of the community, one would need to have relational obligations to each other and to the community? In Sikolohiyang Pilipino Prof. Virgilio Enriquez wrote about the insider-outsider nature of kapwa (hindi ibang-tao/ibang-tao). Austronesian cultures are known for their hospitality to outsiders, which is often generously extended as damayan, but at some point it may be that the welcome and generosity is exhausted if it is perceived the outsider is not repaying their incurred relational obligations.
We know that the Spanish never bothered to fully colonize the Philippines, even in the spiritual sense which was the primary purpose of Spanish colonialism I shared in the other comment a few articles ago. The Philippines was basically a convenient waystation for the Chinese goods headed to Nueva España (Mexico) until the 19th century economic reforms. So probably that incomplete colonization was the true societal cleavage of the reducción — that between who became “sedentary” and who still “migrated.”
I thought about something while reading your comment: the first two attempts by the Spanish to colonize the Philippines were military in nature through Magellan (who was goaded into use of military force) and Villalobos (whose invasion succumbed to tropical disease). Legazpi was given explicit instructions of Política de Pacificación from Philip II to build alliances wherever possible. His engagement with the sanduguan blood compact ritual kinship perhaps made him kapwa in the eyes of Datu Sikatuna of Bohol and later native allies. In that view Legazpi became another “foreign datu” among a long history of foreign datus who were accepted then later rose to become a sort of paramount datu, because he understood the system of relational obligations. So perhaps something like this is needed.
or in-group biases.. the more nationalistic takes will usually come from UP, while the more liberal takes will come from the likes of MLQ3, Randy David, Leloy Claudio and the late Vicente Rafael.
often a bit like some flawed NBI investigations where the ones in charge tried to look for what confirmed their prejudice.
A lot of Filipino journalism is like that too. The political commentariat and PPop fandoms even if they fact-check are like that to the extreme, mostly.
the modern research from Americans etc is in a different league from the self-confirming colonialist stuff of the early days which a lot of Filipino nationalist history pridefully reacted to.
the perspective of the Templado account is from a Tiwi political family partly from the Claveria era (the Clutarios) and partly new (Templados) who displaced a lot of the remontados and possibly saw them as trouble when they became bandits – the latter is documented and known in Albay folklore. I am not yet at that chapter of the Prosperity without Progess book though.
that is what it is in theory, though there are also damaged parts of Filipino culture like the AFAM hunter types and their often complicit families who will from the beginning decide to milk the white guy “because all they want is to use us anyway, so ‘unahan na natin'” or the DDS types who see any help coming from Leni Robredo and Angat Buhay as “elite manipulation” or “panlilinlang na Pinklawan” because they believe that a certain group of people are out to exploit them as the constant victims..
Chapter 1 of Prosperity Without Progress mentions that making most Bikolanos settled in the Western sense continued into the 19th century – of course my examples from Tiwi are quite marked and to this day barangay Mayong there is mostly Agtas – and even into the early 20th century. The Albay/CamSur border area staying NPA heartland for long is I guess a continuation of all that.
that book also mentions how people who moved between places still considered themselves part of their old communities even in the 19th century, even across provincial borders.
it makes it quite clear that Cory appointing OIC mayors (including Binay) and vice-mayors (including Duterte) and then the IRA system paying the “local rulers” off worked as little as the “royal” control that was possible from the time of Quezon to that of Marcos, when the President had the power to remove governors, mayors and even school principals, “super-“powers inherited from what were prerogatives of Spanish Captain-Generals and their American successors. Duterte tried to be “supreme rajah” but also sent the likes of PNP Jovie Espenido to kill local leaders who were not in line like Mayor Parojinog or intimidate the likes of Iloilo Mayor Mabilog into fleeing, thus practicing a “postcolonial” model with a nativist coating. I wonder how the Indonesian social contract works which is a de facto reincarnation of Majapahit, ruled by the Javanese with stronger local autonomy since 1998. That Malaysia has its sultans rotating at being the “Agung” (King) is their model. I joked a decade ago the FVR should have become the constitutional monarch of the Philippines with his resemblance to Bhumibol, but it is too late for that now..
A lot of current political dynasties, including the Dutertes, seem to be established from Cory Aquino’s OIC appointments. In hindsight, the whole OIC system looks like it was a bad idea as it let a new crop of dynasties establish themselves bases of power, but I’m not sure what Cory could’ve done differently — 1986 seemed like on the verge of a new era of warlordism.
Speaking of utang na loob, I once queried a DDS who was of the educated middle class the following: “By making the Aquinos his enemy, Digong broke his utang na loob obligations from Cory Aquino appointing him OIC vice-mayor of Davao.” The DDS looked at me like I was crazy, and claimed the Aquinos broke utang na loob FIRST, therefore whatever loyalty Digong owed the Aquinos was voided.
On rajahs, the Philippines does sort of operate like a looser version of an elected rajahnate or penultimate datudom, except the supreme datu is in effect elected by a coalition of lower datus (the local political dynasties). There are even coalition-cementing marriages. Just like the old days before the Spanish. But unlike that time when barangays raided neighboring barangays or tried to get prestige goods from overseas (e.g. Chinese tribute system), they just raid Malacañang instead.
>>Speaking of utang na loob, I once queried a DDS who was of the educated middle class the following: “By making the Aquinos his enemy, Digong broke his utang na loob obligations from Cory Aquino appointing him OIC vice-mayor of Davao.” The DDS looked at me like I was crazy, and claimed the Aquinos broke utang na loob FIRST, therefore whatever loyalty Digong owed the Aquinos was voided.<< – Joey N.
Utang is transactional. Utang na loob is not transactional.
this is problematic as currently there is a flex culture. it’s like a whole generation has woken up lead the nouveau rich flex lifestyle.
The flex culture is related to the older lamangan culture of the past. The only difference is nowadays more people have the ability and resources (sometimes on utang) to one-up their peers. This is also integral to Filipino (and Austronesian broadly) culture, so it’s not really something the can be eliminated. But perhaps it can be redirected towards positive behaviors.
Funny aside: iPhones are the preferred mobile phone of North America, are available on affordable no-interest installment, so everyone has one. Many people also have Apple Watches, which are ubiquitous now. I have a cellular model Apple Watch since sometimes I go out without my phone, but I didn’t know the cellular model has an anodized red dot on the digital crown to differentiate it from a standard Wi-Fi model. The red dot is very small. I was perplexed when multiple Class D/E’s kept asking if I had a cellular model Watch and found out that they knew every single detail and generation variations between iPhones and Apple Watches despite not even being remotely able to afford a secondhand iPhone or Apple Watch. Then later, I found that Shopee and Lazada stores sold fake stick-on iPhone Pro Max triple camera array lens and red dot stickers for Wi-Fi model Apple Watches, which apparently are popular items.
https://budget.bettergov.ph/hgab/2027/we-are-not-ignorant
Great work from the better Gov ph people.
Thanks for sharing GC. This is great. I am working on a substantial governance analysis that has been ongoing for months now. I just finished ingesting and analyzing patterns in CMCI from 1992-present. This insertion list would be good data to input then compare with my list of all LGUs to see if there are any patterns validating that once a local dynasty grows powerful enough, whether via “thin dynasty” or “fat dynasty,” they start sending family members and allies to Congress in order to capture budget allocation beyond NTA.
That is a nice research to read
Downloaded a couple of Annual Audit Reports from the COA website today to read on my iPad. Cebu 2023 AAR. 46 downloads. I’m the 47th. Presumably some of the downloads are from media and journalists, while a handful might be from concerned citizens. Just astounding that all across the Philippine government, accountability bodies assemble exhaustively detailed reports that apparently nobody reads. Except this “foreigner,” I guess. It’s so easy to understand how brazen corruption can exist when one realizes no one really reads audits. In the US and Europe, there are tons of civic watchdogs who rabidly go through audit reports with fine-toothed combs.
I also read such reports. hate that website hahaha
I kept getting Cloudflare 522 Errors (proxy ok, host timed out), so it actually took me 3 days of trying to download the AAR. The COA website seems to be down for maintenance for hours everyday. Then don’t get me going on the fact that COA’s website is using WordPress as a jury-rigged CMS and that it uses very unresponsive php elements for the dropdowns. *Click on a dropdown, wait 2 minutes for the dropdown to expand* What is the ITO even doing here lol.
wonder if they already patched the recent php2shell cve.
they should really just put all the reports in the cloudflare cdn and be done with it.
Back during PNoy’s time there was an AO that mandated all government ICT needs to be hosted and maintained by DOST using the Government Web Hosting Service (GWHS), or the relevant agency with the advice of DOST (now DICT).
https://elibrary.judiciary.gov.ph/thebookshelf/showdocs/6/58789
Both of us being IT guys, we know stuff made at whatever time is usually stuck in that time lol.
The e-Governance Act attempts to centralize all the stuff not hosted directly by DICT (basically almost every agency fiefdom) into DICT.
On the CVE, even major multinationals are having a hard time with this. At a startup now so everything is new, but before across multiple companies it wasn’t uncommon to find some random server set up like 10-15 years ago that everyone forgot about and the maintainer since retired running a super critical service. Including 10-15 year old versions of php. Attitude in IT is just move forward. Don’t fix it unless it breaks. Because fixing = downtime = lost revenue. It drives security guys like me insane with all the vulnerabilities.